Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: BC550144, Date: 2023-04-07 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC550144 Hearing Date: April 7, 2023 Dept: E
Hearing Date: 04/07/2023 – 2:00pm
Case No: BC550144
Trial Date: 05/01/2023
Case Name: ARMAN YEGIYANTS v. HAGOP BARDAKJIAN ET AL
DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Moving Party: Defendant, Hratchia Bardakjian
Responding Party: Plaintiffs,
Arman Yegiyants and 10415 Commerce LLC (Plaintiffs)
Proof of service timely filed (CRC 3.1300(c)): Ok
Correct Address (CCP §§ 1013, 1013(a)): Ok
Opposition and reply Submitted.
Moving Papers: Motion; Declaration of Hratchia Bardakjian; Separate
Statement; Declaration of Clay Wilkinson;
Opposition Papers: Opposition; Declaration of Arman
Yegiyants; Declaration of Bart Baggett; Declaration of Sylvie Merzian; Separate
Statement; Declaration of Henry S. David; Request for Judicial Notice
Reply Papers: Reply; Objections to Merzian Declaration; Hratchia
Request for Judicial Notice; Objections to Yegiyants Declaration; Hratchia’s
Response to Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Additional Facts; Reply Declaration
of Clay Wilkinson; Objections to Declaration of Bart Baggett
RELIEF REQUESTED
Defendant, Hratchia Bardakjian moves for summary judgment
on Plaintiffs’ – Arman Yegiyants and 10415 Commerce LLC – Fourth Amended
Complaint (FoAC) pursuant to CCP §437c(a)-(c).)
75/80 Days
Under 437c(2), notice of the motion and supporting
papers shall be served on all other parties to the action at least 75 days
before the time appointed for hearing. If the notice is served by mail, the
required 75-day period of notice shall be increased by 5 days if the place of
address is within the State of California. If the notice is served by facsimile
transmission, express mail, or another method of delivery providing for
overnight delivery, the required 75-day period of notice shall be increased by
two court days. (CCP §437c(a)(2).)
The parties have stipulated to the timeliness of the
filing and service of this Motion.
30 Days
The motion shall be heard no later than 30
days before the date of trial, unless the court for good cause orders
otherwise. The filing of the motion shall not extend the time within which a
party must otherwise file a responsive pleading. (CCP §437c(a)(3).)
The aforesaid stipulation
filed with the Court on 3/6/2023 cures any such defect here.
BACKGROUND
According to Defendant’s Introduction, Plaintiffs’ (Arman Yegiyants and
10415 Commerce LLC) only two remaining claims against Defendant are for quiet
title to 703 and 707 E. Angeleno Ave., Burbank, CA 91501. Defendant does not
state which two causes of action these are labeled/numbered as in the FoAC.
Further, in the Opposition, Plaintiffs don’t state which two causes of action
this MSJ pertains to. Therefore, the Court will presume this applies to the
first and third causes of action in the FoAC because those are the only two causes
of action in the FoAC that explicitly mention quiet title.
LEGAL STANDARD
The function of a
motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to
whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or
claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary
judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits
or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact
within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”
(Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993)
12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI
Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)
Code of Civil Procedure section
437c, subdivision (a) provides that “a party may move for summary judgment in
an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that
there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” The motion shall be
granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).) In determining if the papers show
that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the court shall
consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to
which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all inferences
reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be
granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence
if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as
to any material fact. (Id.)
As to each claim as
framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy
the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element,
or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts
“liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary
judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that
party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
“A defendant
or cross-defendant has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action
has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of
action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is
a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant or
cross-defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff or
cross-complainant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts
exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. The plaintiff or
cross-complainant shall not rely upon the allegations or denials of its
pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead,
shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material
fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (CCP §437c(p)(2).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party
opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
A motion for summary adjudication may be
made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall
proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. (CCP
§437c(f)(2).)
ANALYSIS
Quiet Title
CCP §761.020 states as follows:
The
complaint shall be verified and shall include all of the following:
(a) A description of the
property that is the subject of the action. In the case of tangible personal
property, the description shall include its usual location. In the case of real
property, the description shall include both its legal description and its
street address or common designation, if any.
(c) The adverse claims to the
title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought.
(d) The date as of which the
determination is sought. If the determination is sought as of a date other than
the date the complaint is filed, the complaint shall include a statement of the
reasons why a determination as of that date is sought.
(e) A prayer for the
determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims.
(CCP §761.020(a)-(e).)
Moving Defendant points the
Court’s attention to CCP §761.020(c). Defendant argues that a quiet title
action requires adverse claims to title, that Defendant claims no interest, and
that there is no evidence supporting Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendant has
any interest in the properties or claims an interest in the properties.
Further, Defendant cited West
which states, “An element of a cause of action for quiet title is ‘[t]he
adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is
sought.’ (Code Civ. Proc., §761.020, subd. (c).) West did not satisfy this
element because none of the defendants to the third amended complaint has
adverse claims to title.” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 780, 802.)
To support its argument that
Defendant claims no interest or has any interest in the properties, Defendant
submitted the declaration of Hratchia Bardakjian. In relevant part of the Bardakjian
Declaration, Bardakjian states:
5. For the reasons set forth herein,
I neither have an interest in either of the real properties located at 703 and
707 E. Angeleno Ave., Burbank, CA 91501 (“Angeleno Properties”), nor do I claim
an interest in either of the Angeleno Properties.
6. In or about 2011 and 2012, I
executed two deeds of trust to my brother Hagop Bardakjian, and recorded each
against 703 and 707 E. Angeleno, respectively (“May 2011 Deed of Trust” and
“May 2012 Deed of Trust”).
7. True and accurate copies of the
May 2011 and May 2012 Deeds of Trust, respectively, are attached as Exhibits 1
and 2 to the 4AC.
8. On or about August 3, 2017,
judgment was entered in related litigation captioned 10415 Commerce, LLC v.
Hratchia Bardakjian, et al. and bearing case number BC46919 (“Judgment”).
9. Pursuant to the terms of the
Judgment, my respective interest in 703 E. Angeleno and 707 E. Angeleno was to
be reconveyed to 10415 Commerce, LLC.
10. I am informed and believe that
the May 2011 and May 2012 Deeds of Trust were assigned to 703 E Angeleno LLC
and 707 E Angeleno, LLC, respectively, in or about 2018.
11. I am informed and believe that
the trust deeds were subsequently foreclosed upon in or about August 2019,
resulting in the Trustee’s Deeds upon sale attached to the 4AC as Exhibits 9
and 10, respectively.
12. As a result of the above, I have
no direct interest in either 703 or 707 E. Angeleno.
13. I also do not claim a direct
interest in 703 or 707 East Angeleno, respectively.
14. I say direct interest, because I
do maintain an economic interest in 10415 Commerce, LLC, the entity, which is
not at issue in this case and is undisputed.
15. I did not transfer my prior
interest in the Angeleno Properties prior to the Judgment, nor do I contend
that I transferred my interest.
(Decl. Bardakjian ¶5-15.)
In Opposition, Plaintiffs agree that Defendant has no
interest in the Properties, but Plaintiffs argue that there is an abundance of
evidence that Defendant claimed and recently continued to claim an
interest in the Properties. Plaintiffs state that they filed their quiet title
actions against Defendant to obtain a declaratory judgment so stating.
Therefore, Plaintiffs argue the MSJ should be denied because although Hratchia
purports to disclaim any interest in the Properties in his MSJ, his words and
actions say otherwise.
Plaintiffs argue:
“The plaintiff shall name as
defendants in the action the persons having adverse claims to the title
of the plaintiff against which determination is sought.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
762.010 [emphases added].) Further, quiet title claims are not limited to
legal/ownership claims; instead, “the plaintiff may name as defendants ‘all
persons unknown, claiming any legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or
interest in the property described in the complaint adverse to plaintiff’s
title, or any cloud upon plaintiff's title thereto.’” (Code Civ. Proc., §
762.060(a).) And, “[i]n an action under this section, the plaintiff shall
name as defendants the persons having adverse claims that are of record or
known to the plaintiff or reasonably apparent from an inspection of the
property.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 762.060(b) [emphases added].) Finally,
“[t]he failure to join known adverse claimants will result in a judgment that
does not bind them.” (53 Cal.Jur.3d (2023) Quieting Title § 43, citing Law.Rev.
comm. to Code Civ. Proc., § 762.010.)
Plaintiffs’ inspection of the
Properties made it clear that Hratchia asserted both an ownership and
possessory interest in the Properties, and prevented Plaintiffs from accessing
those Properties. (Opp. SS ## 139-180.) The law therefore required Plaintiffs
to name Hratchia as a defendant to their quiet title claims.
Further, Hratchia has an interest in
703 , LLC and 707, LLC, the entities that claim interests in the Properties.
(Opp. SS # 72.)
(Oppo, p. 8-9)
As far as Defendant’s arguments in Reply, the Court will
address those arguments in its “Discussion” section.
DISCUSSION
Defendant submits the Declaration of Hratchia Bardakjian
to support its argument that Defendant has no adverse claim to tile of the
instant Properties in this lawsuit. In relevant part, Hratchia explicitly states
in Paragraph 5 that he has no interest in either of the properties nor does he
claim an interest in the properties.
Further, Hratchia claims in his declaration, “As a result
of the above, I have no direct interest in either 703 or 707 E. Angeleno. I
also do not claim a direct interest in 703 or 707 East Angeleno, respectively. I
say direct interest, because I do maintain an economic interest in 10415
Commerce, LLC, the entity, which is not at issue in this case and is undisputed.”
(Decl. Bardakjian ¶12-14.)
While it is clear that Hratchia is stating he does not
have any interest in either of the Properties, nor that he claims an interest
in the Properties, the Court is not certain why Hratchia stated, “I say direct interest,
because I do maintain an economic interest in 10415 Commerce, LLC, the entity,
which is not at issue in this case and is undisputed.” (Decl. Bardakjian ¶14.) The
Court is confused why Defendant is stating this if Defendant is admitting this
is not at issue, and the Court is confused as to why this is relevant.
Nonetheless, it appears Defendant successfully met its
burden to show there is no triable issue of material fact and that Defendant
shifted its burden to Plaintiff to show there is a triable issue of material
fact.
However, in Opposition, Plaintiffs successfully met their
burden by submitting evidence to establish that there is a triable issue of
material fact: whether Movant claims title to the properties, adversely to
Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs argued that while Hratchia explicitly disclaims
any interest in the Properties, Hratchia’s actions demonstrate that he in fact
does claim an interest adverse to Plaintiffs’ title.
In both moving and Reply papers, Defendant cites West
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 802 to support its
argument that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the required element of an adverse
title claim because Defendant does not have or claim an adverse interest to
title. Defendant cited the following portion of West, “West did not
satisfy this element because none of the defendants to the third amended
complaint has adverse claims to title.” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 780, 802.)
The Court notes that Defendant’s argument is not
convincing because West depends on a completely different context than
that relied upon by Plaintiffs here in Opposition. Plaintiffs are arguing that
despite Defendant’s declaration, Defendant’s actions demonstrate he in fact is
claiming an interest adverse to Plaintiffs’ title of the properties.
CCP 762.060
In Opposition, Plaintiffs stated the following:
Further, quiet title claims are not
limited to legal/ownership claims; instead, “the plaintiff may name as
defendants ‘all persons unknown, claiming any legal or equitable right, title,
estate, lien, or interest in the property described in the complaint adverse to
plaintiff’s title, or any cloud upon plaintiff's title thereto.’” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 762.060(a).)
(Oppo. p.8.)
The Court notes that the full citation from CCP §762.060(a)
states, “In addition to the persons required to be named as defendants in the
action, the plaintiff may name as defendants “all persons unknown, claiming any
legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the property
described in the complaint adverse to plaintiff’s title, or any cloud upon
plaintiff’s title thereto,” naming them in that manner.” (CCP §762.060(a).) The
Court points this out because based on the full citation, the Court is
uncertain as to why Plaintiffs cite this to support their argument. This
citation appears to refer to naming unknown defendants, and here, Plaintiffs
appear to know the name of the Defendant – Plaintiffs specifically named
Defendant Hratchia Bardakjian.
Plaintiffs further state:
And, “[i]n an action under this
section, the plaintiff shall name as defendants the persons having
adverse claims that are of record or known to the plaintiff or reasonably
apparent from an inspection of the property.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
762.060(b) [emphases added].)
(Oppo. p. 8.)
The Court notes that Plaintiffs’
citation was complete and accurate. However, the reason that Court points this
out to the parties is because while the Court is not entirely certain on the
applicability of the citation to the instant context, it at least appears to be
somewhat on point to the extent that it appears Plaintiffs seem to be citing it
to argue that despite Defendant’s declaration, Defendant’s actions indicate he
is adversely claiming title. Most importantly, the Reply does not address
either of these citations to indicate they are not on point.
Ownership/Title
In Reply, Defendant argues as follows:
Plaintiffs attempt to conflate
Hratchia’s ownership interest in 703 E. Angeleno, LLC and 707 E. Angeleno, LLC
(“Angeleno LLCs”) with a title interest in the Angeleno Properties. Plaintiffs’
attempt is misguided for two reasons. See Opp., 5:7-16.
First, it is tautological that an
LLC has a separate legal existence from its members. See PacLink
Communications Intern., Inc. v. Superior Court (Yeung) (2001) 90 Cal. App.
4th 958, 963. 2 Owning an interest in an LLC that itself owns an
interest in real property is not the equivalent of having a personal interest
in the real property.
Second, even assuming the Angeleno
LLCs do have title interests in the Angeleno Properties, Plaintiffs would need
to quiet title as to the LLCs and not the individual members. Plaintiffs have
ostensibly named the LLCs as defendants for that purpose.
2 “A limited liability
company is a hybrid business entity formed under the Corporations Code and
consisting of at least two ‘members’ who own membership interests. The company
has a legal existence separate from its members. Its form provides members with
limited liability to the same extent enjoyed by corporate shareholders, but
permits the members to actively participate in the management and control of
the company.”
(Reply p. 3.)
Possessory Interest
Defendant argues in Reply that the Court should grant
Hratchia’s motion because Plaintiffs’ allegations of Hratchia’s “Possessory
Interest” Are Immaterial. To support this argument, Defendant states:
Plaintiffs’ Opposition cites
evidence that Hratchia has had a structural engineer and contractors at the
Angeleno Properties and that it is fenced in a further desperate effort to
create a issue of material fact. Opp., 6:6 – 7:13. These facts are immaterial
to the Court’s determination of Hratchia’s motion. Plaintiffs are also well
aware that these facts are immaterial, as evidenced by their conspicuous
failure to provide the Court with the context for Hratchia’s actions.
Hratchia’s actions have nothing to do with any claim to title of these
Properties, and instead Plaintiffs’ attempt to manufacture a waste claim in
order to collect on Hratchia’s appellate bond.
This is not the first, second, third
or even fourth lawsuit pursued by Arman Yegiyants over the last decade and a
half against Hratchia and others. Four years before this lawsuit was filed,
Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Hratchia captioned 10415 Commerce, LLC v.
Hratchia Bardakjian, et al., Case No. BC469194 (the “’194 Lawsuit”). RJN,
Ex. D. The ‘194 Lawsuit resulted in a Judgment on August 3, 2017. Hratchia
timely filed a notice of appeal and thereafter applied to the Court to set an
appellate bond in order to stay the judgment while the appeal was pending. This
kicked off Plaintiffs’ efforts to concoct a waste claim involving the Angeleno
Properties.
Plaintiffs filed an opposition to
the bond motion on September 20, 2017, contending that the Properties, on which
a concrete, sublevel parking deck and foundation had been built, would suffer
millions in “waste” during the pendency of the appeal, for the purpose of
justifying a multi-million dollar bond. RJN, Ex. E.
By order dated September 29, 2017,
the Court in the ‘194 Lawsuit set an appellate bond of $400,000.00. RJN, Ex. F.
Hratchia posted the $400,000.00 bond on October 6, 2017. RJN, Ex. G. The appeal
ran its course and a remittitur issued in July 2019.
Over 3 years later in September
2022, Plaintiffs herein filed a Motion to Determine Amount of Waste in the ‘194
Lawsuit seeking $688,919.00 based on the claim that the entirety of the
concrete slab over the sublevel parking area had to be demolished and replaced.
RJN, Ex. H. Hratchia filed a comprehensive opposition supported by opinions of
a structural engineer and a contractor. RJN, Ex. I.
The Court in the ‘194 Lawsuit
entered an order on the motion on October 7, 2022 setting an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether any waste had occurred. RJN, Ex. J. Plaintiffs
thereafter withdrew the motion on December 15, 2022. RJN, Ex. K.
On February 21, 2023 utilizing
the same counsel for Plaintiffs in this case, Hayim M. Gamzo,
Plaintiffs filed a new lawsuit seeking to abscond with the appellate bond based
on alleged waste captioned 10415 Commerce, LLC v. American Contractors
Indemnity Company, et al. and bearing case number 23BBCV00407 (the “Waste
Lawsuit”). RJN, Ex. L.
As the judicially noticeable
pleadings make abundantly clear and as Plaintiffs’ and their counsel well know,
Hratchia’s work at the Properties, his retention of a structural engineer to
survey the properties, his retention of a contractor to maintain the
Properties, and his fencing of the Properties, has absolutely nothing to do
with a claim to title. Hratchia is attempting to prevent Plaintiffs from
absconding with his $400,000.00 appellate bond based on a frivolous claim of
waste. The facts relating to Hratchia’s efforts in this regard, like all of
Plaintiffs’ other purported “additional material facts,” are immaterial
to the very straightforward issue raised by this Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Reply. p. 4-5.)
Here, while the Defendant argues that the evidence that
Plaintiffs cite are immaterial to this action, Defendant provides no legal
argument supported by case law or statutes to support its argument that Plaintiffs’
evidence is immaterial. Defendant says this in a conclusory fashion with no
support.
Additionally, here, the Court is entirely uncertain as to
what argument Defendant is trying to make with respect to the alleged waste
claims and bond. Most importantly, the Court fails to see how this argument
defeats Plaintiffs’ successfully showing there is a triable issue of material
fact of whether Hratchia has an adverse claim to Plaintiffs’ Properties.
Ejectment
Defendant argues in Reply that the Court should grant
Hratchia’s motion because this is a title action and not an ejectment action.
Defendant argues:
It goes without saying that title
and possession are not one and the same. Unless there is an adverse claim to
title, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy that element of a quiet title action. See
West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal. App. 4th 780, 802 (“[plaintiff]
did not satisfy this element because none of the defendants to the third
amended complaint has adverse claims to title”).
It appears from Plaintiffs’
opposition that they are challenging Hratchia’s exercise of possession. If that
is the case, Plaintiffs’ claim would be for ejectment. See Nathan v.
Dierssen (1913) 164 Cal. 607, 610 (elements are: (1) ownership in
plaintiff; (2) wrongful entry and dispossession by Plaintiff; and (3)
continuing exclusion of plaintiff from possession). But Plaintiffs cannot have
it both ways. They cannot on the one hand argue that Hratchia must prevent
waste while at the same time arguing that Hratchia should be denied access to
the properties to prevent waste.
(Reply p.5-6.)
Here, the Court does not find Defendant’s argument
availing. Defendant simply cited what the elements are for an ejection cause of
action. Defendant cited no legal argument that Plaintiffs cannot bring a quiet
title cause of action.
Waiving an Interest
In Reply, Defendant argues that Hratchia unequivocally
waived any interest in the Angeleno Properties. Defendant states:
Not to be forgotten is that Hratchia
unequivocally waived any claim to title in the Angeleno Properties via his
declaration in support of this motion – the functional equivalent of a sworn
statement in open court. If parties can waive important constitutional rights
by oral consent in open court, the rule should be the same for private property
interests. See Civ. Code § 3511 (“Where the reason is the same, the rule
should be the same”). See also Lompoc Produce & Real Estate Co. v.
Browne (1919) 41 Cal. App. 607, 613 (waiver may be decided as a matter of
law when “but one inference can be drawn from the facts”).
(Reply. p. 6.)
Here, the Court does not find Defendant’s argument
convincing. Defendant’s argument is unclear. Further, Plaintiffs’ Opposition
showed that despite what Hratchia claims, his actions show otherwise, so there
is no unequivocal waiver.
What Would a Trial Look Like
In Reply, Defendant makes the following argument:
But perhaps the real question to aid
the Court in deciding Hratchia’s motion is: what would a quiet title trial look
like if the Court denies Hratchia’s motion? Hratchia respectfully submits that
the trial would look precisely like this motion: Plaintiffs admitting Hratchia
has no title interest in the Angeleno Properties and Hratchia disclaiming any
title interest in the Angeleno Properties. For these and the following reasons,
the Court should grant Hratchia’s motion.
(Reply p. 2.)
Here, the Court notes that what Defendant fails to point
out is that if there were a trial, Plaintiffs could obtain a judgment quieting
title. If the Court granted this motion, Plaintiffs would not have a judgment
in their favor quieting title.
Neither party
cited Water for Citizens of Weed California v. Churchwell White LLP (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 270, but its holdings are instructive and, ultimately,
persuasive. The court in Water
stated:
The purpose of a
quiet title action is to establish title against any adverse claims to property
or any interest therein. (§ 760.020, subd. (a).) Unlike an action for
cancelling an instrument, which is aimed at a particular instrument that is a
cloud on the property owner's title, an action to quiet title “is for the
purpose of stopping the mouth of a person who has asserted or is asserting a
claim to the plaintiff's property. It is not aimed at a particular piece of
evidence, but at the pretensions of an individual.” (Castro v. Barry (1889) 79 Cal. 443, 446, 21 P. 946 (Castro).) The ultimate fact to be found is the
ownership of the property. (Rahlves
& Rahlves, Inc. v. Ambort (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 465, 476, 258 P.2d
18.)
For purposes of
quiet title actions, a claim “includes a legal or equitable right, title,
estate, lien, or interest in property or cloud upon title.” (§ 760.010, subd.
(a).) The term “claim” “is intended in the broadest possible sense.” (Cal. Law
Revision Com. com., West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc., foll. § 760.010.) The adverse claim is not required to “be
of any particular character.” (Castro, supra, 79 Cal. at p. 446, 21 P. 946.) A quiet title action is “ ‘not
confine[d] ... to the case of an adverse claimant setting up a legal title or
even an equitable one; but the [statute] intended to embrace every description
of claim whereby the plaintiff might be deprived of the property, or its title
clouded, or its value depreciated, or whereby the plaintiff might be incommoded
or damnified by the assertion of an outstanding title already held or to grow
out of the adverse pretension.’ ” (Id. at p. 447, 21 P. 946, quoting Head v. Fordyce (1860) 17 Cal. 149, 151.)
The rule may be
stated more broadly: A property owner may bring a quiet title action “to
determine any adverse claim whatever. For if the defendant by *282 his
answer disclaims all interest whatever, judgment may, nevertheless, be entered
against him, though in such case it must be **621 without
costs.” (Castro, supra, 79 Cal. at p. 447, 21 P. 946.)
Hence, “it matters
not whether a claim is based upon a valid title or interest in real estate or
upon a mere pretension or asserted right therein or thereto, or issues out of,
or concerns, or is annexed to or exercisable in connection with such property;
it may still be the subject of an action to quiet title ....” (Hamilton v. Elvidge (1933) 132 Cal.App. 21, 27, 22 P.2d
239.) The action may be brought whether the
adverse claim “be founded on evidence or utterly baseless.” (Kroeker
v. Hurlbert (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 261, 266, 101 P.2d 101.) The action
even lies against any adverse interest that might by regarded by third persons
as a cloud on title. (Bulwer Consolidated Mining Co. v. Standard
Consolidated Mining Co. (1890)
83 Cal. 589, 609, 23 P. 1102 (Bulwer).)
Water for Citizens of Weed California v.
Churchwell White LLP (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 270, 281-282
TENTATIVE RULING
Plaintiffs presented the following evidence, cited in
their Separate Statement, in
order to raise triable issues of material fact: Declaration
of Yegiyants in support of Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
[“Yegiyants Decl.”], ¶¶ 30, 34-44, Exs. 2-3; Declaration of Bart Baggett in
support of Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment [“Baggett Decl.”], ¶ 9;
Declaration of Sylvie Merzian in support of Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment [“Merzian Decl.”], ¶¶ 2-9; Declaration of Henry S. David in support of
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment [“David Decl.”], ¶¶ 3-6, Exs. 5-7.
The Court finds that this evidence submitted by Plaintiff
raises as triable issues of material fact as to whether there exists an adverse
claim by movant to Plaintiffs’ title.
The Court overrules the evidentiary objections material to
this Motion; numbered 31 through 41 made by Defendant in Reply. Objections to evidence that are not ruled on for purposes of the motion
shall be preserved for appellate review.” (CCP §437c(q.)
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Both sides’ requests are granted. CA Evid. code, sec. 362.
MOTION
FOR SANCTIONS
Moving Party: Defendant, Hratchia Bardakjian
Responding Party: Plaintiffs, Arman Yegiyants and 10415
Commerce LLC (Plaintiffs)
Moving Papers: Motion; Wilkinson Declaration; Fernald
Declaration; Bardakjian Declaration
Opposition Papers: Opposition
Reply Papers: No Reply submitted.
RELIEF REQUESTED
Defendant
Hratchia Bardakjian (“Hratchia”) will and hereby does move for an order
imposing no less than $25,000.00 in monetary sanctions against Plaintiffs Armen
Yegiyants and 10415 Commerce, LLC (“Plaintiffs”), jointly and severally,
because the allegations contained against Hratchia in what remains of
Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint do not have evidentiary support and are
therefore being presented for the improper purposes of harassing Hratchia and
needlessly increasing his cost of litigation. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ Fourth
Amended Complaint alleges only two remaining causes of action against Hratchia,
both of them for quiet title.
Paragraph 50 of
the Fourth Amended Complaint alleges: “Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and
on that basis, allege that Defendants, and each of them, claim an interest in
707 E. Angeleno […].”
Paragraph 63 of
the Fourth Amended Complaint alleges: “Plaintiffs are informed and believe and
on that basis allege that Defendants claim an interest adverse to Plaintiffs’
right, title and interest in the Angeleno Properties.”
However, Hratchia
disclaims any and all interest in the Angeleno Properties and there is no
evidence to suggest that he retains any interest in the properties. Rather,
there is only evidence suggesting that he does not have any interest, adverse
or otherwise, in the Angeleno Properties and therefore Hratchia should have
been from this action.
Because
Plaintiffs have allegedly violated Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7,
Hratchia seeks monetary sanctions against Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, in
an amount no less than $25,000.00 which represents the cost of filing this
Motion, the cost of propounding discovery related to Plaintiffs’ baseless
allegations, and the Motion for Summary Judgment Hratchia will filing in this
matter.
Hratchia moves
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7(c), and 128.7(b)(1), (3).
Before the filing
of this Motion, Hratchia provided twenty-one (21) days after service of this
Motion for Plaintiffs to withdraw their Fourth Amended Complaint against
Hratchia and dismiss him from the action.1 This Motion was
originally served by e-mail on January 16, 2023.
1 This particular
iteration of the motion differs from the one served on January 16, 2023, in
only two respects: (1) the court-ordered April 7, 2023 hearing date; and (2)
the addition of Plaintiffs’ subsequent admission that Hratchia has no interest
in the Angeleno Properties.
ANALYSIS
Service
“A motion for sanctions under this section shall be
made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). Notice of motion shall be served as
provided in Section 1010, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court
unless, within 21 days after service of the motion, or any other period as the
court may prescribe, the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention,
allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If
warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the
reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in presenting or opposing the
motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly
responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees.”
(CCP §128.7(c)(1).)
Here, Plaintiffs note in Opposition how Hratchia filed
a revised Motion for Sanctions that is not the same motion he served on
Plaintiffs to commence the safe harbor period. Opposition cites Hart v.
Avetoom (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 410, 414 to argue that because Hratchia has
not strictly complied with the safe harbor provision and because the two
motions are different, the Court cannot grant this motion for sanctions.
Here, the Court notes that Plaintiffs are correct to
note that the motion that Defendant relies on for satisfying the safe harbor
provision is different than the one served that is currently before the Court
for the instant hearing. Defendant’s counsel explicitly states in Defendant’s own
Footnote 1, the motion itself, and the Wilkinson declaration.
“My office served this motion on January 16, 2023 via
e-mail. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the proof of
service of this motion.” (Wilkinson Decl. ¶3.) “The current iteration of
Hratchia’s motion differs from the one served on January 16, 2023 in only two
respects. First, the Court ordered that the motion be heard on April 7, 2023
pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. Second, the current iteration of the
motion includes Plaintiffs’ admissions which Plaintiffs served in the interim.”
(Decl. Wilkinson ¶5.)
The Hart case, cited by Plaintiffs in
opposition, does seem to be on point. The only difference is that Hart dealt
with the instant statute when the safe harbor provision required 30 days, not
21.
Hart, in relevant
part, states:
This, in our view,
is where this train went off the tracks. The record confirms the motion filed
in November 1998 was not the same motion served in December 1997. The
November 1998 version contained additional declarations and supplemental points
and authorities not present in the original version. In fact, a copy of
December 1997 motion was attached as an “exhibit” to the revised version. This,
in and of itself, should have been enough to put all concerned on notice that
something was wrong. True, the two motions were similar, but the problem
is they were not the same. “Close” is good enough in horseshoes and hand
grenades, but not in the context of the sanctions statute.
Avetoom's “new
and improved” sanctions motion was both served and filed on
November 20, 1998. The December 17 hearing date left no “safe harbor” during
which Hart was free to modify or withdraw his complaint. To make matters
worse, Hart had, by that time, already voluntarily dismissed his
lawsuit, and there was no further action he could take to avoid an award of
sanctions.
…
In
sum, Avetoom's failure to file her sanctions motion
before Hart dismissed the case is dispositive of this appeal. So is
the fact the sanctions motion filed was different from the one served.2 In
this particular context, at least, the court was without authority to act, and
the order imposing sanctions was an abuse of discretion.
(Hart v. Avetoom
(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 410, 414-415.)
It appears that movant failed to properly file this
motion so as to allow the required safe harbor time frame. Nevertheless, the Court now turns to the
merits of this Motion.
128.7(c), and 128.7(b)(1), (3)
“If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to
respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court
may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction
upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or
are responsible for the violation. In determining what sanctions, if any,
should be ordered, the court shall consider whether a party seeking sanctions
has exercised due diligence.” (CCP §128.7(c).)
Further, under CCP §128.7(b)(1) a party, by presenting
to the court, whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating, a
pleading, petition, written notice of motion, or other similar paper, an
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under
the circumstances, all of the following conditions are met:
(1)
It
is not being presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation…
(3) The
allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.
(Ibid.)
ANALYSIS
Defendant refers to Paragraphs 50 and 63
of Plaintiffs’ FoAC.
Those allegations state as such:
Plaintiffs are
informed and believe, and on that basis, allege that Defendants, and each of
them, claim an interest in 707 E. Angeleno under, as reflected in, or by virtue
of the May 2012 Deed of Trust on 707, the 707 Trustee’s Deed, and/or the
Commercial Funding 707 Deed of Trust (collectively, the “707 E. Angeleno
Documents”), that is superior and/or adverse to Plaintiffs’ respective record
interests in 707 E. Angeleno.
(FoAC ¶50.)
Plaintiffs are
informed and believe and on that basis allege that Defendants claim an interest
adverse to Plaintiffs’ right, title and interest in the Angeleno Properties.
(FoAC ¶63.)
Defendant then argues:
It is black letter
law that quiet title actions require an adverse title claim. See Code
Civ. Proc. § 761.020(c) (quiet title complaint must include “[t]he adverse
claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determination is sought”).
See also S. Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal. App. 2d 725, 740
(“In an ordinary action to quiet title it is sufficient to allege in simple
language that the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the land and that
the defendant claims an interest therein adverse to him”).
Here, Hratchia has
no claim of title to the Angeleno Properties. See Decl. Hratchia Bardakjian, ¶¶
4-13. There is no evidence that Hratchia has any claim to the Angeleno
Properties, let alone an adverse claim. Accordingly, there is no way that
Plaintiffs can actually believe Hratchia is asserting an adverse interest.
Actual belief is the legal standard. See Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. Co.
(1999) 21 Cal. 4th 71, 82 (“[t]his actual-belief standard requires more than a
hunch, a speculative belief, or wishful thinking: it requires a well-founded
belief. We measure the truth finding inquiry’s reasonableness under an
objective standard, and apply this standard both to attorneys and to their
clients […]”).
The only
reasonable conclusion to be drawn on these facts is that Plaintiffs are keeping
Hratchia in this case to harass him and punish him financially – both “improper
purposes” under Section 128.7(b)(1).
(Def. Mot. p. 5-6.)
To support this argument, Defendant
submitted the Declaration of Bardakjian that stated in relevant part, “For the
reasons set forth herein, I neither have an interest in either of the real
properties located at 703 and 707 East Angeleno Avenue in Burbank California
(the “Angeleno Properties), nor do I claim an interest in either of the
Angelino Properties.” (Decl. Bardakjian ¶4.)
In Opposition, Plaintiffs argue that they
have an abundance of evidence to support their allegation that Hratchia claimed
an interest in the Properties. Plaintiffs note how even though Defendant
points out Plaintiffs’ discovery responses in which Plaintiffs admitted
Hratchia has no interest in the Properties, Hratchia misses the point that
Plaintiffs are arguing that Plaintiffs have evidentiary support for their
allegation that Hratchia claimed ownership and possessory
interests in the properties.
To support their Opposition, Plaintiffs state:
In the interests
of efficiency and economy, Plaintiffs will not rehash and resubmit that
evidence here, but instead refer the Court to their Opposition to Hratchia’s
MSJ and incorporate their supporting evidence as though set forth in full here.
(Declaration of Arman Yegiyants in support of Opposition to MSJ, ¶¶ 2-44, Exs.
1-3; Declaration of Sylvie Merzian in support of Opposition to MSJ, ¶¶ 2-9;
Declaration of Bart Baggett in support of Opposition to MSJ, ¶ 9; Declaration
of Henry S. David in support of Opposition to MSJ, ¶¶ 2-6, Exs. 4-6; Request
for Judicial Notice, Exs. 8-24.) As that evidence establishes, Hratchia has
continually asserted ownership and possessory interests in the Properties, and
indeed, interfered with Plaintiffs’ interests by falsely
stating to
third-parties (a fence company, a real estate agent, workers, and even the
police) that he owned the Properties and/or was allowed to be in possession of
the Properties.
(Oppo. p. 4-5.)
TENTATIVE RULING: In denying the “companion” Motion for Summary
Judgment brought by the same movant here, the Court found, based upon the
evidence presented by Plaintiffs in opposition to that Motion, that there
remain triable issues of material fact extant in the quiet title action brought
by Plaintiffs against Movant here. Based
upon the same evidence, this Motion has no basis, and is therefore Denied.