Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: BC624838, Date: 2022-09-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC624838    Hearing Date: September 6, 2022    Dept: 72

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES-GENERAL, SET TWO

Date:                           9/6/22 (8:30 AM)                   

Case:                           Dr. Lauren Pinter-Brown v. Univ. of Cal. at Los Angeles et al. (BC624838)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff Dr. Lauren Pinter-Brown’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories-General, Set Two is DENIED.

Plaintiff Dr. Lauren Pinter-Brown moves to compel further responses to Form Interrogatories-General, Set Two, No. 17.1 with respect to Request for Admission, Set One, Nos. 70-78.

On November 6, 2020, after the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in this action, trial was set for October 4, 2021. (11/6/20 Minute Order.) The appellate reversal of the judgment in this action restarted the time limitations on discovery. (Beverly Hospital v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1291.) Accordingly, pursuant to CCP § 2024.020(a), motions concerning discovery must have been heard on or before the fifteenth day before the day initially set for retrial, or September 20, 2021. (CCP §12a [deadlines falling on Saturday moved to next court day].)

On September 10, 2021, pursuant to defendant’s ex parte application and stipulation in support thereof, the Court continued trial to May 13, 2022. (9/10/21 Minute Order.) Notably, the Court signed the proposed Order stating that “[a]ll litigation dates and deadlines related to the existing date are to be governed by the terms of [the parties’] Stipulation.”  (9/10/21 Order.)  With respect to discovery, the parties’ accompanying stipulation provided: (1) that the discovery cut-off was extended to accommodate certain Court-ordered depositions and the deposition of plaintiff; and (2) that the motion to compel deadline would be continued to correspond with the new trial date in regard to written discovery responses received by plaintiff on or about August 26, 2021.

On April 22, 2022, pursuant to the parties’ joint application to continue trial, the Court continued trial to June 5, 2023. (4/22/22 Minute Order at 2.) Notably, the April 22, 2022 minute order does not state that the discovery or discovery motion cut-off dates were extended based on the new trial date.  Further, as reflected in the docket, the Court declined to sign either of the two proposed Orders, electronically received April 20, 2022 and April 21, 2022, which each provided all litigation dates and deadlines would be governed by the parties’ stipulation.

“Except as provided in Section 2024.050, a continuance or postponement of the trial date does not operate to reopen discovery proceedings.” (CCP § 2024.020(b).) Accordingly, the time to have the instant motion heard has expired.  As discussed above, the Court extended the deadline to hear such a motion when it continued the trial from October 2, 2021 to May 23, 2022, but the Court declined to do so again when continuing the trial date from May 23 2022 to June 5, 2023.

Nor did the parties validly stipulate to have the instant motion heard in accordance with CCP § 2024.060, which provides that an agreement to reopen discovery or extend the time for the hearing of motions concerning discovery “shall be confirmed in a writing that specifies the extended date.”  In their stipulation to continue the May 23, 2022 trial, the parties “agree that both parties are preluded from filing and serving any motions to compel discovery, except with respect to . . . any outstanding already served discovery” and further “stipulate and agree . . . [a]ll litigation dates and deadlines related to the existing date are to be governed by the terms of this Stipulation.”  (Shao Decl. Ex. H at 3:11-13, 3:25-4:1.)  This is plainly insufficient.  Further, plaintiff asserts that “Defendant granted Pinter-Brown an extension to bring forth this motion to compel.”  (Mtn. at 4 [citing Reed Decl. ¶ 15 & Ex. 10].)  But the correspondence between the parties evidences only an agreement to allow plaintiff to file a motion to compel further past the 45-day deadline for such motions, as is permitted by CCP § 2030.300.  (Cf. Reed Decl. Ex. 10 [“I’m just writing to confirm the 30-day extension on Plaintiff’s motion to compel deadline that was granted today”].)

Finally, the Court sees no good cause to hear this discovery motion past the deadline or to reopen discovery.  The instant motion contains a motion to reopen discovery, but such request is only to “reopen limited discovery to test or further explore any information provided.” (Mtn. at 11:4-5.) Plaintiff does not address why she should be able to have the motion heard in the first place. The Court does not find that plaintiff sufficiently sets forth the “diligence or lack of diligence of the party seeking the discovery or the hearing of a discovery motion, and the reasons that the discovery was not completed or that the discovery motion was not heard earlier,” which is pertinent to any motion to reopen discovery. (CCP § 2024.050(b)(2).)

Indeed, the parties’ stipulations and Court’s orders thereon have only re-opened discovery for limited purposes, namely, to secure specifically identified discovery.  This makes sense in a case in which plaintiff’s remaining claim (gender discrimination) was previously tried before a jury, presumably with both parties’ having believed they had sufficient discovery to proceed to trial the first time.  Simply put, discovery is closed, and the time to hear motions concerning discovery has passed.

Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.  Further, both parties’ requests for sanctions are DENIED because the basis for denial of this motion was not raised by any of the parties.