Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: BC712068, Date: 2024-04-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC712068    Hearing Date: April 23, 2024    Dept: 86

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE

Date:               4/23/24 (1:30 PM)

Case:                           County of Los Angeles v. Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs et al. (BC712068)

TENTATIVE RULING:

The Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Proposed Intervenors Oscar Barragan, Brendan Corbett, Bruce Chase, Anthony Geisbauer, Thomas Giandomenico, John MacDonald, Rick Rector, Steven Ruiz, and Edmundo Torres is DENIED.

I.                   BACKGROUND

Los Angeles County Code section 6.120.020(B)(5) states, in pertinent part: “Persons employed on the items of Deputy Sheriff (Item No. 2708), Sergeant (Item No. 2717), or Lieutenant (Item No. 2719), shall be entitled to compensation at a rate four schedules higher than established for their positions in Section 6.28.140 of this code when they have successfully completed special training and are assigned on a full-time, permanent basis to explosives detail duty.”

On July 14, 2020, the Court (Hon. Mary H. Strobel) entered judgment against County of Los Angeles (“County”) and issued a writ of mandate. The writ commanded County and Esmeralda Ramirez (Assistant Director, Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department, Personnel Administration Bureau) as follows:

To pay explosive detail pay under Los Angeles County Code section 6.120.020(B)(5) to all employees who are or were assigned to explosive breaching duties ("Affected Employees"), including but not limited to Seth Belville, Kenneth Brown, Joshua Corrales, Richard Diliberti, Darrell Edwards, Ervin Francois, Gonzalo Galvez, Patrick Golden, Kevin Hilgendorf, Dan Leon, Stephen Longan, Carlos Lopez, Don McNamara, Jesse Melgoza, John Montenegro, Ricardo Munoz, Michael Pokorny, Steve Pratt, Juan Rodriguez, Grant Roth, Edson Salazar, Shan Seacord, Ian Stade, Andrew Toone, Garrick Twedt and James Wheeler, both retroactive from the date each Affected Employee was eligible for that compensation together with interest at the legal rate thereon, and prospectively. The County shall calculate the appropriate amount of back pay for each of the Affected Employees.

Oscar Barragan, Brendan Corbett, Bruce Chase, Anthony Geisbauer, Thomas Giandomenico, John MacDonald, Rick Rector, Steven Ruiz, and Edmundo Torres (collectively, “Proposed Intervenors”) seek leave to intervene in the instant action to enforce the writ, which they contend would entitle them to back pay.

II.                EVIDENTIARY MATTERS

Proposed Intervenors’ requests to take judicial notice of Exhibits A through D are GRANTED, pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(d).

Petitioner and cross-respondent County of Los Angeles, by and through its Sheriff’s Department’s requests to take judicial notice of Exhibits 1 and 2 are GRANTED, pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(d).

County’s request to take judicial notice of Exhibits 3 through 5 are GRANTED, but only the existence of the documents, not the truth of the matters asserted therein. (See Evid. Code § 452(d); Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564-69.)

III.             MANDATORY INTERVENTION

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 387(b), a nonparty may intervene as a matter of right if the nonparty demonstrates: (1) it has an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (2) it is so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and (3) its interests are not adequately represented by existing parties. (Siena Court Homeowners Ass'n v. Green Valley Corp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1423-1424.)

Proposed Intervenors seek leave to intervene and enforce the Court’s judgment and writ of mandate. (Notice of Motion at 1:1-7.) The Court finds that Proposed Intervenors do not have an interest relating to the back pay ordered by the Court in the writ. On May 10, 2022, in connection with a motion to enforce the judgment and writ of mandate, Judge Strobel considered “whether the writ requires County to pay explosives pay to individuals that otherwise qualify as ‘explosive breachers,’ but who were sergeants or lieutenants when the cross-petition was filed in August 2018.” (Intervenor RJN Ex. A to Ex. C at 2 [5/10/22 Minute Order].) Having explained that “judgment and writ must be interpreted in the context of the allegations made in the cross-petition,” Judge Strobel defined the key question as “whether the cross-petition gave County sufficient notice that [cross-petitioner] ALADS [Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs] sought relief on behalf of deputies that were no longer non-management employees.” (Id. at 4.)

Judge Strobel found that the cross-petition gave “notice that ALADS was representing only deputies for whom ALADS is ‘the recognized employee organization.’” (Id. at 6.) “The cross-petition referred to ALADS as an organization ‘representing sworn non-management peace officers’ and it referred to all of the named Affected Employees as ‘Deputies.’” (Id. at 4.)

Judge Strobel found that County had notice that ALADS sought relief on behalf of two officers specifically named in the cross-petition who recently promoted to sergeant but for whom ALADS filed grievances when they were deputies. (Id. 5-6.) However, for other individuals, Judge Strobel found that County did not have reasonable notice that they were represented by ALADS. (Ibid.)

Proposed Intervenors are captains, commanders, and assistant sheriffs. (Barragan Decl. ¶ 2; Corbett Decl. ¶ 2; Chase Decl. ¶ 2; Geisbauer Decl. ¶ 2; Giandomenico Decl. ¶ 2; MacDonald Decl. ¶ 2; Rector Decl. ¶ 2; Ruiz Decl. ¶ 2; Torres Decl. ¶ 2.) As management-level employees, Proposed Intervenors belong to the Professional Peace Officers Association (“PPOA”), not ALADS. (Barragan Decl. ¶ 14 & Ex. F; Corbett Decl. ¶ 11 & Ex. C; Chase Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10 & Ex. C; Geisbauer Decl. ¶¶ 9, 11 & Exs. D, E; Giandomenico Decl. ¶¶ 8, 9; MacDonald Decl. ¶¶ 9, 13 & Exs. C, D; Rector Decl. ¶ 10 & Ex. B; Ruiz Decl. ¶ 10 & Ex. C; Torres Decl. ¶ 10 & Ex. B.)

Even though Judge Strobel did not expressly mention captains, commanders, and assistant sheriffs in her minute order, Proposed Intervenors are still management-level employees who were not represented by ALADS at the time the cross-petition was filed in August 2018. Proposed Intervenors were also not named in the cross-petition. (Cross-Pet. ¶ 3.) As Judge Strobel found: “The wording of paragraph 3 of the cross-petition reasonably suggested that ALADS brought the petition on behalf of ‘non-management peace officers,’ and not sergeants or lieutenants for whom PPOA would be ‘the’ recognized employee organization.” (Intervenor RJN Ex. A to Ex. C at 5.) Proposed Intervenors provide no reason why Judge Strobel’s reasoning does not also apply to them, as they are similarly not “non-management peace officers” for whom the PPOA would be the appropriate representative, not ALADS.

Accordingly, based on the reasoning in Judge Strobel’s May 10, 2022 minute order, County did not have sufficient notice that ALADS sought relief on behalf of Proposed Intervenors. Proposed Intervenors are therefore not covered by the judgment and writ of mandate.  They thus have no interest in this litigation for purposes of intervention.

Even if County identified some of Proposed Intervenors in its return to the writ of mandate (Reply at 9:15-28; Barragan Decl. Exs. C, D) and even if County issued backpay to others who may not have been entitled to backpay under the writ of mandate (Reply at 10:1-21), it still remains true that the judgment and writ of mandate are interpreted in the context of the cross-petition. This Court cannot expand the judgment and writ of mandate to benefit individuals who were not included in the cross-petition.

For the foregoing reasons, Proposed Intervenors do not have an interest in enforcing the judgment and writ of mandate. The Court finds that Proposed Intervenors do not have a mandatory right to intervene in the instant proceeding. 

IV.             PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION

A trial court has broad discretion to permit or deny intervention. (Lippman v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1630, 1633, fn. 2.)  The Court considers whether the applicant’s interests are already adequately represented in the action, or whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the rights of the original parties.  (Hausmann v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 611, 616.)  When “[p]resented with a motion for intervention, the court must determine whether the intervenor has established (1) it has a direct interest in the lawsuit; (2) intervention would not enlarge the issues raised by the original parties; and (3) the intervenor would not ‘tread on the rights of the original parties to conduct their own lawsuit.’” (Bame v. City of Del Mar (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1364.)  “The ‘interest,’ it has been said, must be of such direct or immediate character that the intervener will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.” (Hausmann, 213 Cal.App.2d at 614.)

For the reasons stated above, Proposed Intervenors do not have a direct interest in the lawsuit. ALADS did not file the cross-petition on behalf of individuals similarly situated to Proposed Intervenors. Consequently, the Court exercises its discretion to deny intervention.

V.                CONCLUSION

The motion is DENIED.