Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 19STCV24659, Date: 2023-03-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV24659    Hearing Date: March 8, 2023    Dept: 28

Defendants Mario Garcia Ceja and Bernardo Arreguin Ceja’s Motion to Strike

Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. 

 

BACKGROUND

On July 16, 2019, Plaintiffs Maria Mora Rico (“Maria”) and Juan Rico (“Rico”) filed this action against Defendants Mario Garcia Ceja (“Mario”) and Bernardo Arreguin Ceja (“Bernardo”) for motor vehicle negligence, general negligence and loss of consortium. Plaintiff later amended the complaint to include Defendant Guaranty Chevrolet Motors, Inc. (“GMC”).

On November 1, 2019, Mario filed an answer. On November 27, 2019, Bernardo filed an answer. On August 15, 2022, GMC filed an answer.

On December 22, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the FAC.

On January 20, 2023, Mario and Bernardo (“Moving Defendants”) filed a Motion to Strike to be heard on March 6, 2023.

Trial is currently scheduled for June 14, 2023.

 

PARTY’S REQUESTS

Moving Defendants request the Court strike all references to punitive damages.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall not apply to motions specified in subdivision (e).”  (CCP § 435(b)(1), italics added.)  “A notice of motion to strike must be given within the time allowed to plead, and if a demurrer is interposed, concurrently therewith, and must be noticed for hearing and heard at the same time as the demurrer.”  (CRC 3.1322(b), italic added.)  “The defendant shall answer the amendments, or the complaint as amended, within 30 days after service thereof, or such other time as the court may direct, and judgment by default may be entered upon failure to answer, as in other cases.”  (CCP § 471.5(a).)

“The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.”  (CCP § 437(a).)  The court looks to whether “the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense.”  (Ivanoff, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th p. 725.)  The court “assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has been taken.”  (Id.)  “The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.  [Citation.]”  (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)

Code of Civil Procedure § 436 states that “[t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time at its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or any order of the court.”

In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code Section 3294. (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294 (a).) “Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." (Coll. Hosp., Inc., supra, 8 Cal. 4th at 725 [examining Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1)].)

 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s FAC alleges that Moving Defendants negligently operated a vehicle, striking Plaintiff’s vehicle and causing an accident. There are no allegations that would give rise to malice, fraud or oppression, one of which is necessary to make a claim for punitive damages. There are no allegations of intent to cause harm or reckless disregard for human life. For example, there are no allegations that Moving Defendants were under the influence of drugs and alcohol, fled the scene after the incident, were driving with a suspended license—all of which, on their own, would be insufficient to even establish punitive. However, with absolutely no allegations beyond general negligence, there is no basis for punitive damages. The Court grants the motion.

 

CONCLUSION

Defendants Mario Garcia Ceja and Bernardo Arreguin Ceja’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED, with 30 days leave to amend.

            Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.