Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 19STCV24659, Date: 2023-03-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV24659 Hearing Date: March 8, 2023 Dept: 28
Defendants Mario Garcia Ceja and
Bernardo Arreguin Ceja’s Motion to Strike
Having
considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On
July 16, 2019, Plaintiffs Maria Mora Rico (“Maria”) and Juan Rico (“Rico”)
filed this action against Defendants Mario Garcia Ceja (“Mario”) and Bernardo
Arreguin Ceja (“Bernardo”) for motor vehicle negligence, general negligence and
loss of consortium. Plaintiff later amended the complaint to include Defendant Guaranty
Chevrolet Motors, Inc. (“GMC”).
On
November 1, 2019, Mario filed an answer. On November 27, 2019, Bernardo filed
an answer. On August 15, 2022, GMC filed an answer.
On
December 22, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the FAC.
On
January 20, 2023, Mario and Bernardo (“Moving Defendants”) filed a Motion to
Strike to be heard on March 6, 2023.
Trial
is currently scheduled for June 14, 2023.
PARTY’S
REQUESTS
Moving
Defendants request the Court strike all references to punitive damages.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Any party, within the time allowed to
respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole
or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall not apply to motions
specified in subdivision (e).” (CCP §
435(b)(1), italics added.) “A notice of
motion to strike must be given within the time allowed to plead, and if a
demurrer is interposed, concurrently therewith, and must be noticed for hearing
and heard at the same time as the demurrer.”
(CRC 3.1322(b), italic added.)
“The defendant shall answer the amendments, or the complaint as amended,
within 30 days after service thereof, or such other time as the court may
direct, and judgment by default may be entered upon failure to answer, as in
other cases.” (CCP § 471.5(a).)
“The grounds for a motion to strike shall
appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the
court is required to take judicial notice.”
(CCP § 437(a).) The court looks
to whether “the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action
or discloses a complete defense.”
(Ivanoff, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th p. 725.)
The court “assume[s] the truth of the properly pleaded factual
allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded
and matters of which judicial notice has been taken.” (Id.)
“The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions,
deductions or conclusions of law.
[Citation.]” (Durell v. Sharp
Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)
Code of Civil Procedure § 436 states that
“[t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time at
its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant,
false or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any
part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this
state, a court rule, or any order of the court.”
In
order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set
forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code
Section 3294. (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal. 4th
704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has
been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294 (a).) “Malice is
defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to
the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a
willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." (Coll.
Hosp., Inc., supra, 8 Cal. 4th at 725 [examining Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1)].)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s
FAC alleges that Moving Defendants negligently operated a vehicle, striking
Plaintiff’s vehicle and causing an accident. There are no allegations that
would give rise to malice, fraud or oppression, one of which is necessary to
make a claim for punitive damages. There are no allegations of intent to cause
harm or reckless disregard for human life. For example, there are no
allegations that Moving Defendants were under the influence of drugs and
alcohol, fled the scene after the incident, were driving with a suspended
license—all of which, on their own, would be insufficient to even establish punitive.
However, with absolutely no allegations beyond general negligence, there is no
basis for punitive damages. The Court grants the motion.
CONCLUSION
Defendants
Mario Garcia Ceja and Bernardo Arreguin Ceja’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED,
with 30 days leave to amend.
Moving
party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this
ruling with the Court within five days.
The parties are directed to the header of this
tentative ruling for further instructions.