Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 19STCV33844, Date: 2023-01-26 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 19STCV33844 Hearing Date: January 26, 2023 Dept: 28
Defendant Hoag Memorial Hospital Presbyterian’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On September 20, 2019, Plaintiffs Victor Tsai (“Victor”), Alice Tsai (“Alice”) and Rose Tsai (“Rose”) filed this action against Defendants Alhambra Hospital (“Alhambra”), Hoag Memorial Hospital Presbyterian (“Hoag”), Pinegrove Healthcare & Wellness Center, LP (“Pinegrove”), San Gabriel Valley Medical Center (“SGV”) and Tag-2 Medical Investment Group, LLC dba Sunny View Care Center (“Sunny”) for medical malpractice and wrongful death.
On August 19, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the FAC.
On November 24, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the SAC for medical malpractice (wrongful death) and medical malpractice (survival action).
On December 6, 2021, SGV filed an answer. On December 7, 2021, Pinegrove filed an answer. On December 15, 2021, Hoag filed an answer. On February 10, 2022, Alhambra filed an answer. On May 18, 2022, Sunny filed an answer. On November 22, 2022, Sunny was dismissed, with prejudice, pursuant to Plaintiff’s request.
On November 8, 2022, Hoag filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on January 26, 2023. Plaintiff filed a notice of non-opposition.
Trial is scheduled for October 10, 2023.
PARTY’S REQUESTS
Hoag requests the Court grant summary judgment on the basis that there is no dispute of material fact, as Hoag met the standard of care.
LEGAL STANDARD
The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP § 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)
As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
The elements of a cause of action for medical negligence are: (1) duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence and diligence as other members of the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) breach of duty; (3) proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional’s negligence. (Simmons v. West Covina Medical Clinic (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 696, 701-702.) The standard of care that a medical professional is measured by is a matter within the exclusive knowledge of experts; it can only be proven by their testimony, generally. (Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 1001.) Causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based on competent expert testimony; “a less than 50-50 possibility that defendants’ omission caused the harm does not meet the requisite reasonable medical probability test of proximate cause.” (Bromme v. Pavitt (1 992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1504.)
According to CCP § 340.5, “[I]n an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person’s alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first. In no event shall the time for commencement of legal action exceed three years unless tolled for any of the following: (1) upon proof of fraud, (2) intentional concealment, or (3) the presence of a foreign body, which has no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect, in the person of the injured person...”
CCP § 364 states that if notice of an action based on medical professional negligence is served within 90 days of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the time for commencement will be extended 90 days from service of the motion.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs allege that Decedent passed away due to Defendants’ negligent care when Decedent was admitted to the SGV ICU, after she presented for sepsis. Plaintiffs specifically allege that Hoag prematurely and improperly transferred decedent to Alhambra.
Hoag submitted a declaration from Kent Shoji, M.D., a physician licensed to practice medicine in California, with the applicable education and experience to give an expert opinion. (Kent Shoji, M.D. ¶¶ 1, 4-5.) Based upon Decedent’s medical records, Decedent’s death certificate and Kristina Hoban’s declaration, Shoji opined that SGV always complied with the standard of care. (Shoji Decl. ¶¶ 6, 26.) Decedent was admitted to Hoag’s ER before Hoag’s staff realized that Decedent was an out of network patient. (Shoji Decl. ¶ 20.) Shoji found that Hoag’s doctor took appropriate steps to diagnose and treat Decedent prior to the transfer. (Shoji Decl. ¶¶ 27-28.) They arranged to have her transferred to an in-network hospital after her treating doctor acknowledged she was stable for transfer. (Shoji Decl. ¶ 20.) There was a peer-to-peer consult with an Alhambra doctor, who agreed to accept Decedent into the Alhambra medical surgical unit. (Id.) She was successfully transferred and arrived in stable condition, complying with the standard of care required for a hospital (Shoji Decl. ¶¶ 23-24, 29.) There is no indication of any negligence or violation on behalf of Hoag’s staff or doctor. (Shoji Decl. ¶ 30.) Hoag has met its burden, which shifts to Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs filed a notice of non-opposition. The Court grants the motion
CONCLUSION
Defendant Hoag Memorial Hospital Presbyterian’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.
The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.