Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case 19STCV34241 2023-03-30 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 19STCV34241, Date: 2023-03-30 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV34241 Hearing Date: March 30, 2023 Dept: 207

Background

This dispute involves a tenant’s personal injury from mold due to the landlord’s negligence. Plaintiff Michael Landman (“Plaintiff”) was a tenant at the property located at 744 Amaroso Place, Apt 3, in Venice California (“Subject Property”). Defendant David Freedman (“Freedman”), now deceased, was the owner and landlord of the Subject Property. Before Freedman passed away, the Subject Property was transferred to a trust. On June 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint naming Martha Woliung as the Trustee of the David Freedman and Martha Woliung Living Trust Dated October 17, 2019 (“Woliung”), in place of Doe 1.

Woliung moves the Court for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against her. Woliung also moves the Court to strike certain portions of Plaintiff’s operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Plaintiff opposes Woliung’s motion.

Legal Standards

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action, affirmative defenses, claims for damages, or issues of duty if the party contends there is no merit to the cause of action, defense, or claim for damages, or if the party contends there is no duty owed. (See CCP §437c(f)(1).) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Ibid.) A party moving for summary adjudication bears the burden of persuasion that there are no triable issues of material facts. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.

In analyzing motions for summary adjudication, the court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party and accept all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.” (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294; Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389 (Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party”).) A motion for summary adjudication must be denied where the moving party's evidence does not prove all material facts, even in the absence of any opposition (Leyva v. Sup. Ct. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 462, 475) or where the opposition is weak (Salasguevara v. Wyeth Labs., Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 379, 384, 387).

The Court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (C.C.P. § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are: the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Id. § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id. § 437.)

Analysis

Woliung asserts Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against it is barred by Code Civ. Proc. § 377.42, which provides:

In an action or proceeding against a decedent's personal representative or, to the extent provided by statute, against the decedent's successor in interest, on a cause of action against the decedent, all damages are recoverable that might have been recovered against the decedent had the decedent lived except damages recoverable under Section 3294 of the Civil Code.

Civil Code section 3294 governs punitive damages. Thus, under Code Civ. Proc. § 377.42, a decedent’s personal representative or successor-in-interest cannot be held liable for punitive damages. Woliung raised a similar argument in its previous motion to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. In its February 8, 2022, ruling the Court denied Woliung’s motion to strike on the basis that Plaintiff’s operative complaint asserted claims against Woliung in a direct capacity and not only as a successor-in-interest or personal representative of Freedman.

Prior to his death, Freedman was married to Woliung. Woliung asserts Plaintiff moved from the property in December 2018. The property was not transferred to the Trust until October 17, 2019. (Ex. 4 to Motion.) Prior to this transfer, the property was Freedman’s separate marital property. (Ex. 3 to Motion; Woliung Decl. at p.2, ¶¶4-5.) Woliung also states under penalty of perjury that prior to Freedman’s death she “had no ownership interest, management or control” over the property. (Woliung Decl. at p. 3, ¶4.) Therefore, Woliung argues the Trust can only face liability for Plaintiff’s claims as a successor-in-interest to Freedman.

Plaintiff does not dispute that his claim for punitive damages against Woliung as a trustee would be barred by section 377.42 if Woliung’s only potential liability in this action stems from her status as Freedman’s successor-in-interest. Rather, Plaintiff argues the Court can reasonably infer Woliung controlled or managed the property. Plaintiff argues Woliung was present when Plaintiff reported problems to Freedman and thus had knowledge of them. Plaintiff also states Woliung called him in 2019 to offer a settlement of his claims against Freedman. Based on these assertions, Plaintiff argues “It is reasonable to infer [Woliung] had management or control over the Subject Property at the time of Plaintiff s loss, knew about the habitability issues, and was assisting her husband with the Subject Property based on her conduct toward Plaintiff and her relationship with Freedman.” (Opposition at 7.) The Court disagrees. Taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, these interactions with Woliung at most establish Woliung acted as Freedman’s agent on one occasion in communicating Freedman’s settlement offer to Plaintiff. This is not sufficient to demonstrate or even suggest Woliung ever exercised her own ownership, management, or control over the property at the time Plaintiff sustained his claimed damages.

Plaintiff also points to the property deed and premarital agreement submitted by Woliung and argues these documents only establish “she did not have an ownership interest in the Subject Property before Freedman’s death. It does not prove Woliung lacked management and control over the Subject Property at the time of Plaintiff’s loss.” (Opposition at 7.) This argument ignores Woliung’s declaration, in which she states under penalty of perjury that she did not have any management or control over the property prior to Freedman’s death. (Woliung Decl. at p. 3, ¶4.) Plaintiff does not dispute his claims all arose prior to Freedman’s death, and thus Woliung’s uncontested and sworn statement that she did not own, possess, or control, the property prior to Freedman’s death is sufficient to satisfy Woliung’s initial burden in moving for summary adjudication. The burden thus shifted to Plaintiff to establish a triable issue of material fact. The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to carry this burden, and has not provided any evidence suggesting Woliung ever owned, managed, or controlled the subject property prior to Freedman’s death.

The Court GRANTS Woliung’s motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against her.

Woliung separately moves to strike portions of the SAC which assert Plaintiff has suffered $3,000,000 in damages. Woliung correctly asserts under Code Civ. Proc. § 425.10 “where an action is brought to recover actual or punitive damages for personal injury or wrongful death, the amount demanded shall not be stated.” (C.C.P. § 425.10(b).) This is a personal injury action wherein Plaintiff’s SAC expressly demands at least $3,000,000 in monetary damages. Plaintiff acknowledges the SAC runs afoul of section 425.10(b) by specifically claiming these amounts, but argues this alone does not bar Plaintiff’s recovery of punitive damages. The Court agrees Plaintiff has not lost the ability to recover punitive damages, but nonetheless GRANTS Woliung’s motion to strike the specific figure of $3,000,000 from the SAC.

Conclusion

Woliung’s motion for summary adjudication on Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is GRANTED. Woliung’s motion to strike the specific figure of $3,000,000 is GRANTED.