Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 19STCV39789, Date: 2023-03-16 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 19STCV39789 Hearing Date: March 16, 2023 Dept: 28
Defendant Los Angeles Unified School
District’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Having
considered the moving, opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On
November 4, 2019, Plaintiff Ken Ceasar (“Ceasar”) and Brandon Smith-Bailey
(“Smith-Bailey”) filed this action against Defendants Antelope Valley Union
High School District (“AVUHSD”), Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”)
and Carmen Dejaune Thomas (“Thomas”) for negligence and negligent hiring,
training supervision and retention.
On
January 31, 2020, AVUHSD field an answer and a Cross-Complaint against
Cross-Defendants Thomas and Porsha Bryant (“Bryant”) for equitable indemnity,
apportionment of fault and declaratory relief.
On
March 4, 2020, LAUSD filed an answer and a Cross-Complaint against
Cross-Defendants Thomas and Bryant for equitable indemnity, apportionment of
fault and declaratory relief.
On
October 6, 2021, LAUSD filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on
December 22, 2021. The Court continued the hearing on the MSJ to March 16,
2023. On March 2, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On March 10, 2023,
LAUSD filed a reply.
Trial
is currently set for May 31, 2023.
PARTY’S REQUESTS
LAUSD
requests the Court grant summary judgments LAUSD did not owe a duty of care to
Plaintiffs, LAUSD did not breach any duty to Plaintiffs, LAUSD cannot be held
vicariously liable under GC § 81.52, and there is no evidence to support Plaintiffs’
cause of action for negligent hiring.
Plaintiffs
request the Court deny the motion.
OBJECTIONS
LAUSD’s
Objections:
Sustained:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10-13, 17, 18, 19, 24-28
Overruled: 9,
14-16, 21-23, 29
LEGAL STANDARD
The
function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a
determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support
for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the
need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th
826, 843.) CCP Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary
judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably
deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or
evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992)
7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function
of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of
the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose
whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the
pleadings.” (Juge v. County of
Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v.
Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)
As
to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary
judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate
an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v.
D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally
construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and
resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006)
39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Once
the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show
that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of
action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the
party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster
v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
“The
elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are
‘(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c)
the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.’” (Ladd
v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.) Premises liability relies upon the same
elements as negligence.
A
land possessor owes no duty to protect against third-party criminal assaults
absent prior similar incidents which would give rise to a high degree of
foreseeability. (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6
Cal.4th 666.) The requisite degree of foreseeability rarely, if ever, can be
proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime on the
landowner’s premises. (Id. at 679.)
A
duty of care may arise from a special relationship between a third party and
either the actor or the victim. (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of
California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 435.)
“[I]n
order for one to ‘take charge’ of a person such that a legal duty to control
his or her conduct is created, one must possess the ability to control. (K.G.
v. S.B. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 625, 631.) “Although the proprietor is not an
insurer of its patrons' safety, he has a duty of care to protect patrons from
the reasonably foreseeable criminal or tortious conduct of third persons. Thus,
he is liable for “receiving or harboring guests of known violent or vicious
propensities.” (Cantwell v. Peppermill, Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1797,
1801.)
“Negligence
liability will be imposed on an employer if it ‘knew or should have known that
hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular
harm materializes.’” (Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc. (2009) 172
Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139.) “[A] negligent supervision claim depends, in part, on
a showing that the risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable. [Citations.]
‘Foreseeability is determined in light of all the circumstances and does not
require prior identical events or injuries.’ [Citations.] ‘ “It is not
necessary to prove that the very injury which occurred must have been
foreseeable by the school authorities . . .. Their negligence is established if
a reasonably prudent person would foresee that injuries of the same general
type would be likely to happen in the absence of [adequate] safeguards.” ’ ” (D.Z.
v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 210, 229.)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs
allege that Plaintiffs were high school basketball players attending a school
tournament operated by AVUSD. (SS 1.) They were playing for Quartz Hill High
School (“QHHS”). After playing a game against San Pedro High School (“SPHS”), a
LAUSD school, SPHS student Thomas allegedly inexplicably and suddenly attacked
Plaintiffs, resulting in injuries to both parties. (SS 20-24.)
During
the game between Plaintiffs and Thomas, at some point either Thomas hit one of
Plaintiffs’ teammates with the ball, or vice versa. (SS 3, 5, 6-9.) No one
received a foul for this play and there were no other notable events during the
game. (SS 9.) Thomas’s team won the game. (SS 16.) Following the game, Thomas
was smiling and introducing his family to LAUSD coaches; after introducing his
family, he made a statement that QHHS players had attempted to “jump his
cousin.” (SS 20.) He then suddenly ran up and punched Ceasar in the face. (SS
20-14.) Following the punch, LAUSD coaches immediately attempted to put
themselves between SPHS and QHHS players to avoid an escalation. (SS 32.)
Coaches also told Thomas to stop, but Thomas ignored their admonition. (SS 20.)
No other SPHS players were involved in the fighting. (SS 31.) Following the
fight, LAUSD coaches advised Thomas he would not be allowed to play in future
games. (SS 35.)
Negligence
LAUSD
first claims that LAUSD cannot be liable for the action of Thomas, as LAUSD
does not have a duty to prevent unforeseeable criminal attacks on a
third-party.
Thomas
had no prior history of aggression listed on his school record or shown during
basketball games he played for SPHS. (SS 36.) Witnesses have testified that
there was nothing out of the ordinary about Thomas’s behavior during the game,
and that there was no instigating event that may have indicated Thomas’s later
attack. (SS 5.) Smith-Bailey recalled an argument between Thomas and another
SPHS player, but that it was quickly extinguished with no lasting repercussions.
(SS 7.)
A
school district only has a duty of care if the harm to the student is
reasonably foreseeable. (M.W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union Sch. Dist. (2003)
110 Cal.App.4th 508, 518.) The Court finds that LAUSD was not on notice
as to Thomas’s assault prior to the actual occurrence. Thomas has no prior
disciplinary issues that would give warning that he may physically attack another
student. Most witnesses testify there were no potential inciting events during
the game; the only indication of any inciting event is a small dispute
that Smith-Bailey recalls being quickly extinguished without any residual anger
or yelling. While Plaintiffs claim that the audience seated behind QHHS yelled
and heckled QHHS, this would not put LAUSD on notice that Thomas, a player not
sitting in the audience, would physically assault another player. (SS 4, 11.)
There were no specific threats made, no anger exhibited or any other indication
that Thomas would attack Plaintiffs. LAUSD have met their burden as to
negligence.
Plaintiffs
argue that Thomas’s family members in the audience were “boisterous at times,” using
inappropriate language and gestures. (PSS 8.) They allegedly used racial slurs
and profane language; a referee spoke to a SPHS coach about their conduct but
was told there was not much he could do about them. (PSS 12.) According to the
referee’s deposition, he stated that the LAUSD coach “kind of told me something
that I probably already knew through my gut, and that’s that this kid Thomas
was a bad actor, and he really couldn’t do anything about them...” (Young Depo
68;10-13.) This gut feeling was based on the fact that Thomas showed up
separately from his own team rather than with his school. (Young Depo
68;14-18.) The Court does not find this to be evidence that LAUSD should have
been on notice that Thomas would foreseeable physically assault the member of
another team. Aggression was between the audience and QHHS players; that
aggression is not attributable to Thomas merely because they arrived with him
to the game. Additionally, a hearsay statement that Thomas was a “bad actor,”
extrapolated from a vague statement made by Thomas’s coach is not sufficient to
establish that it was foreseeable he would violently attack another player. The
only alleged aggression performed by Thomas was described by a Plaintiff as a
“little scuffle,” that was “not out of the ordinary.” (Smith Court Testimony
49; 4-7.) According to Smith, the altercation was “just words,” and “it was
cool after,” he told them to calm down. (Smith Court Testimony 50;5-10.)
Both
parties agree that Thomas’s statement that someone was trying to jump his
cousin was made immediately preceding him running to assault Plaintiffs. (PSS
15, 16.) According to one of the coaches' depositions cited by Plaintiffs in
their opposition, he made the statement and “sprinted right away.” (Rogosic
Depo 40; 1-2.) Coaches testified they did not see any indication of a physical
assault or “jumping,” that would provide additional context to Thomas’s
statement. The evidence shows that coaches did not have adequate time to react
in order to stop any immediate assault, and thus it could not have been
foreseeable.
Plaintiff
finally relies on education codes, neither of which is indicative of liability.
Education Code § 44807 provides that a teacher shall hold pupils to a strict
account for their conduct and authorizes a teacher to exercise the same degree
of physical control over a pupil that is reasonably necessary to maintain
order. This is not applicable as the actions were not foreseeable; it is not
reasonable to ask a coach or teacher to assume every single student is going to
physically assault other students, even when being supervised. Education Code §
44808 provides that any time a student is not on school property when an
employee has undertaken to provide transportation for a student, the employee
shall be liable for the conduct of the student; here, both parties have
acknowledged that Thomas came separately and not via school provided transportation.
Plaintiffs even used this as evidence that Thomas was a “bad actor.” Neither education
code is applicable here.
Negligent
Hiring, Training, Supervision and Retention
A
negligent hiring, training, supervision and retention claim requires that
Plaintiffs show that 1) LAUSD know or should have known LAUSD coaches created a
particular risk of harm, 2) that the harm that occurred was foreseeable, and 3)
that LAUSD continued to employ said employees even after discovery their
unfitness for their position.
As
established above, the harm that occurred was not foreseeable; it was not
foreseeable that a student with no previous record of violent acts would
suddenly attack another student following a basketball game he won. In
addition, there is no indication that LAUSD knew or should have known either
coach presented a particular risk of harm. Both have worked as basketball
coaches for years prior and have completed the trainings required to coach high
school basketball. They taught their
players, including Thomas, to not punch back if they are struck first. They
also told players that if they fail to comply with sportsman like behavior,
they could face suspension or ejection from the team. (SS 55.) The coaches took
the appropriate steps to try and diffuse the situation, ensure other students
were not also put at risk and to punish Thomas by removing him from the team,
following the incident. LAUSD has met its’ burden.
Plaintiff
provided no evidence that indicated that either coach was negligently hired,
trained supervised or retained. The only evidence offered was that this would
not have occurred had the coaches provided proper instruction to the players,
which is a conclusory argument without merit.
Based
on the above, the Court grants summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Defendant
Los Angeles Unified School District’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Moving
party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this
ruling with the Court within five days.
The parties are directed to the header of this
tentative ruling for further instructions.