Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 19STCV40541, Date: 2023-03-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV40541 Hearing Date: March 29, 2023 Dept: 207
Background
This case arises from allegedly false statements which led
to Plaintiff Stephen Winick’s (“Plaintiff”) arrest on July 20, 2018. Plaintiff
filed his operative Second Amended Complaint on February 5, 2021, alleging
causes of action for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and negligence
against several defendants. As to Defendant Officer Alfredo Flores (“Defendant
Flores”), Defendant Officer Adam Hale (“Defendant Hale”) and Defendant City of
Los Angeles (collectively with Defendants Flores and Hale, “Defendants”),
Plaintiff alleges only one cause of false imprisonment, stemming from Defendants
Flores and Hale’s arrest of Plaintiff for criminal threats pursuant to Penal
Code § 422.
Defendants now move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
claim for false imprisonment, arguing Plaintiff cannot succeed on his cause of
action because a different Court has already determined the arrest was made
with probable cause. Plaintiff opposes the motion.
Defendants’ motion originally came on for hearing before the
Court on February 22, 2023. At that time the Court ordered the parties to
submit supplemental briefing on a point raised by Defendants for the first time
at oral argument. The parties have submitted their supplemental briefing. The
Court notes Plaintiff’s supplemental brief was filed and served one day after
the deadline set by the Court’s February 22 order. Counsel represents this was
necessitated by a medical issue of one of counsel’s family members and was done
with Defendants’ agreement. (Evenstad Decl. at ¶5.) Good cause appearing, the
Court finds Plaintiff’s supplemental brief was timely filed on March 9, 2023.
Summary Judgment Standard
Motions
for summary judgment are governed by Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, which allows a
party to “move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is
contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the
action or proceeding.” (C.C.P. § 437c(a)(1).) The function of a motion for
summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an
opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to
enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to
grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences
reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences
or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary
judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits
or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact
within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima
(1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence
in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning
the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore
v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
As to
each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary
judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate
an essential element, or to establish a defense. (C.C.P. § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005)
128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support
of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the
evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore
v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) Once the defendant
has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable
issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a
defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party
opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (C.C.P. §
437c(p)(2); Sangster v. Paetkau
(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Analysis
Plaintiff’s operative Second
Amended Complaint asserts one cause of action against Defendants for false
imprisonment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Hale and Flores arrested him on
July 20, 2018, for criminal threats under Penal Code § 422(a) in response to a
report made by other Defendants in this action. Plaintiff was subsequently
formally charged with and arraigned on one felony count of violation of section
422. (UMF Nos. 3-4.) Plaintiff pled not guilty to this charge. (UMF No. 5.) Plaintiff’s
preliminary hearing was held on November 16, 2018, before Judge Yvette
Verastegui. (UMF No. 7.) At the preliminary hearing, Judge Verastegui denied
Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the charges, but granted Plaintiff’s motion to
reduce the charge from a felony to a misdemeanor. (UMF Nos. 11-13.) Plaintiff
was eventually acquitted on the misdemeanor charge for violation of section
422.
The parties are in agreement
that a finding that Plaintiff was arrested with probable cause would defeat his
claim for false imprisonment. Defendants argue the issue of probable cause was
decided at the preliminary hearing, and that determination is entitled to
preclusive effect under principles of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel.
There appears to be no dispute
that Plaintiff was arrested without a warrant. Under Penal Code § 836(a), a
police officer may only arrest a person without a warrant if:
(1) The officer has
probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public
offense in the officer’s presence.
(2) The person arrested has
committed a felony, although not in the officer’s presence.
(3) The officer has
probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a
felony, whether or not a felony, in fact, has been committed.
Under section 836(a), Defendant
Hale and Flores could not have arrested Plaintiff for a misdemeanor violation
of Penal Code § 422 as the subject threats were not committed in their
presence. Instead, under section 836(a), their arrest of Plaintiff would only
be proper if they had probable cause to believe Plaintiff had committed a
felony. In other words, a finding of probable cause to believe Plaintiff had
committed a misdemeanor would be insufficient to establish the validity of
Defendant Hale and Flores’ arrest of Plaintiff under section 836(a).
With this understanding in mind,
the Court turns to the preliminary hearing. After taking testimony from
witnesses, Judge Verastegui ruled:
The court did review the
probation report , heard the evidence , and at this time the court will
exercise its discretion and reduce count 1 to a misdemeanor. It appearing to me
from the evidence presented that the following offense has been committed and
that there is sufficient cause to believe the following defendant guilty
thereof: count 1, violation of penal code section 422, however, as a
misdemeanor….
(Ex. C to Evanstad Decl. at
24:6-13.) The docket for these criminal proceedings similarly states:
Defendant's motion to
dismiss due to the insufficiency of the Evidence is denied. Defendant's motion
to reduce to a misdemeanor pursuant to penal Code section 17(b) is granted. Court
finds sufficient cause to hold the defendant to answer on Count 1 as a
misdemeanor.
(Ex. B to Evanstad Decl. at 2.) The
term “sufficient cause” is generally equated with reasonable or probable cause.
(People v. Encerti (1982) 130 Cal. App. 3d 791, 800.)
Citing these passages from the
preliminary hearing, Plaintiff argues Judge Verastegui never found probable
cause for a felony violation of Penal Code § 422, and instead only found
probable cause for misdemeanor violation of section 422. As set forth above, a
finding of probable cause of a misdemeanor charge would be insufficient to
validate the arrest of Plaintiff under section 836(a).
Defendants argue section 422 is
what is known as a “wobbler,” a term used to refer to criminal offenses which
can be charged either as a misdemeanor or felony at the discretion of the
prosecuting agency. (See, e.g., People v. Queen (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 838,
842 [“In the present matter, defendant was found guilty by a jury of three violations
of section 422 (criminal threats), which may be punished as a felony or misdemeanor”].)
Defendants contend violation of section 422 has the same elements regardless of
whether it is charged as a misdemeanor or felony. Plaintiff does not appear to
dispute these points.
Thus, Defendants argue, a
finding of probable cause for a misdemeanor charge by Judge Verastegui is
necessarily a finding of probable cause for a felony charge under section 422. Plaintiff
argues the reduction of the charge from a felony to misdemeanor shows the
arresting officers did not have probable cause to believe a felony was
committed when they arrested Plaintiff. However, if the elements of a felony
violation of section 422 are identical to those of a misdemeanor violation, it
is unclear how an arresting officer could have probable cause to arrest someone
for a misdemeanor violation of the statute but not have probable cause to
arrest someone for a felony violation.
Defendants cite to Beckway
v. DeShong (N.D.
Cal. 2010) 717 F.Supp.2d 908, a federal case which applied California law to find
the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from bringing a claim for false arrest based
on a probably cause finding made at a preliminary hearing. In Beckway
the plaintiff was charged with violating section 422. At the preliminary
hearing, the judge found probable cause to support the charge, but reduced it
from a felony charge to a misdemeanor charge. The defendants argued this
determination of probable cause prevented plaintiff from bringing a claim
against them for false arrest. The plaintiff argued the preliminary hearing did
not determine whether there was probable cause to arrest him for a felony
violation of section 422. The Court disagreed, recognizing section 422 is a
“wobbler” offense and thus the reduction in charge did not impact the probable
cause determination at the preliminary hearing:
Beckway insists that probable cause for
a misdemeanor was not "necessarily decided" because the judge could have
ended his inquiry after rejecting the felony charge. However, reducing the charge
to a misdemeanor does not change the substance of the offense -- it merely alters
how that offense may be punished. Cal. Pen. Code § 17. The preliminary hearing was
held to determine if the criminal threats charge was supported by probable cause,
and Judge Martin concluded that it was. That he also exercised his discretion in
reducing the charge does not mean, as Beckway argues, that the probable cause question
was not necessarily decided. It was.
(Beckway
v. DeShong (N.D. Cal. 2010) 717 F.Supp.2d 908, 921.) In reaching this
conclusion, the Beckway Court relied on California state court
authority, specifically McCutchen v. City of Montclair (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th
1138, which recognized a probable cause determination at a preliminary hearing
may trigger collateral estopped. (McCutchen, 73 Cal.App.4th at 1147 [“However,
unless the plaintiff in a civil suit can demonstrate that the issue of probable
cause was not litigated at the preliminary hearing for tactical reasons, we will
presume that the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue
of probable cause to arrest”].) Ultimately, the McCutchen Court found
collateral estoppel did not apply to the plaintiff’s claims because “the evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing was not the same as the evidence available
to Officer Pipersky at the time of plaintiff's arrest.” (Id.) The Court
notes Plaintiff here has made no such showing.
Plaintiff
argues Beckway is federal authority which is not binding on the Court
and arose under different procedural posture—a motion for judgment on the
pleadings—than is presented here. The Court acknowledges Beckway is not
controlling authority, however the Court finds Beckway is persuasive as
it applied California law and California state court precedent to reach a
result which is not contradicted by California authority. (See Metalclad Corp. v.
Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705, 1714 [“the
decisions of the lower federal courts, while persuasive, are not binding on us”].)
The Court thus follows the reasoning of Beckway and finds the elements
of collateral estoppel have been met with regard to the probable cause
determination at Plaintiff’s preliminary hearing. Plaintiff does not dispute
that a finding of probable cause to arrest is fatal to his claims against
Defendants. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.
Conclusion
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.