Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 20STCV08246, Date: 2025-04-22 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 20STCV08246 Hearing Date: April 22, 2025 Dept: 71
County
of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT 71
TENTATIVE
RULING
HARRY GINOZA,
vs. INVESTMENT PARTNERS, INC. |
Case
No.: 23STCV08246 Hearing Date: April 22, 2025 |
Defendant Investor Partners, Inc. d/b/a
Bruce Jay Associates’ demurrer to the 1st and 4th causes of action is sustained
with 30 days leave to amend.
Defendant Investor
Partners, Inc. d/b/a Bruce Jay Associates (“Investor Partners”) (“Defendant”)
demurs to Plaintiff Harry Ginoza’s (“Ginoza”) (“Plaintiff”) Complaint
(“Complaint”) on the basis the Complaint is uncertain in that it fails to
specifically identify the written instruments sought to be cancelled; and the
Complaint fails to plead facts sufficient to state a cause of action against
for fraud Defendant. (Notice of Demurrer, pgs.
1-2; C.C.P. §430.10(e); CRC, Rule 3.1320.)
Background
Plaintiff filed
his operative Complaint on April 13, 2023, against Defendant alleging five
causes of action: (1) cancellation of written instruments; (2) declaratory
relief; (3) quiet title; (4) fraud; and (5) breach of fiduciary duty.[1]
On February 19,
2025, Defendant filed the instant demurrer.
On April 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed his opposition. As of the date of this hearing no reply has
been filed.
A.
Demurrer
Summary of
Demurrer
Defendant demurs
to Plaintiff’s 1st cause of action for cancellation of written instruments on
the basis it is uncertain because the written instruments sought to be cancelled
are not identified with any particularity. (Demurrer, pg. 3.) Defendant also demurs on the basis that Plaintiff’s
the 1st and 4th causes of action fail to state facts sufficient to state a
cause of action. (Demurrer, pg. 3.)
Meet and Confer
Before filing a
demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer
in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed
the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether
an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in
the demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(a),
emphasis added.) A declaration must be
filed with a demurrer regarding the results of the meet and confer process. (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(3).)
Defendant’s
counsel declares that on February 13, 2024, he emailed Plaintiff’s counsel explaining
the grounds for Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint and requesting that
he advise when he is available to meet and confer. (Decl. of Patterson ¶2.) Defendant’s counsel declares Mr. Luan
responded on February 18, 2025, stating that he believes that the allegations
in the Complaint are adequately plead and do not need to be revised. (Decl. of Patterson ¶2.) Defendant’s counsel’s declaration is in violation
of C.C.P. §430.41(a) because he did not attempt to meet and confer in person,
by telephone, or by video conference.
However, the failure to sufficiently meet and confer is not grounds to
overrule or sustain a demurrer. (C.C.P.
§430.41(a)(4); Dumas v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (2020)
45 Cal.App.5th 348, 355; Olson v. Hornbrook Community Services District
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 502, 515.) Accordingly,
the Court will consider the instant demurrer.
Legal Standard
“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a
complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385,
388.) A demurrer can be used only to
challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from
matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004)
116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider
declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted
for the truth of their contents].) For
purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed
to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of
law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital
District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
Failure to State
a Claim
Cancellation of
Written Instruments (1st COA)
“A written
instrument, in respect to which there is a reasonable apprehension that if left
outstanding it may cause serious injury to a person against whom it is void or voidable,
may, upon his application, be so adjudged, and ordered to be delivered up or
canceled.” (Civ. Code §3412; see also Kroeker v. Hurlbert (1940) 38
Cal.App.2d 261, 266 [“In actions to cancel a certain instrument it is necessary
for the complaint to state a case within the code sections for which reason it
is essential to allege the facts affecting the validity and invalidity of the
instrument which is attacked.”].)
Plaintiff alleges that any documents signed by him
benefiting Defendants are void as a matter of law. (Complaint ¶13.) Plaintiff alleges it matters not whether the
parties were aware of Plaintiff’s inability to understand the documents he was
signing and/or his general mental incompetence at the time of obtaining signatures
on these documents although Plaintiff is informed and believes that they were aware.
(Complaint ¶13; see, e.g., Civil Code §1556.) Plaintiff alleges that, further, all parties
that hold an interest in the Property, including Plaintiff have a right to seek
cancellation of instruments inasmuch as they constitute, or may constitute, an
illegitimate cloud on title or claim to title.
(Complaint ¶13.)
Plaintiff alleges that in addition, any deed(s) or agency
contracts were procured by fraud and the terms of the underlying transactions
unconscionable in any event. (Complaint
¶14.)
Plaintiff alleges that a cloud, if left on title, may cause
serious injury because the false claim of ownership precludes Plaintiff from
refinancing the house should it be necessary for his financial needs and it
also precludes Plaintiff from selling the Property should he so desire. (Complaint ¶15.) Plaintiff alleges that, further, a deed, if
not canceled, may be fraudulently transferred subjecting Plaintiff to needless
further legal disputes. (Complaint ¶15.)
Plaintiff fails to allege which written instruments he
seeks to have cancelled. Plaintiff merely
alleges that he “signed certain agreements” (Complaint ¶6), and that he now
seeks to cancel “those instruments, in particular any affecting his free and
clear title to his Property,” (Complaint ¶11) on the grounds that “[a]ny
documents signed by [Plaintiff] benefitting Defendants are void as a matter of
law” (Complaint ¶13).
Accordingly, Defendant’s
demurrer to Plaintiff’s 3rd cause of action for cancellation of written
instrument is sustained with 30 days leave to amend.
Fraud (4th COA)
“The elements of fraud that will give rise to a tort action
for deceit are: ‘(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or
nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to
defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting
damage.’” (Engalla v. Permanente
Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 974, internal quotation marks
omitted.)
Plaintiff alleges Defendants represented to Plaintiff that
the Property was of a certain value and that they were fiduciaries of
Plaintiff’s. (Complaint ¶26.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ representations
were false. (Complaint ¶27.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants knew their
representations were false when they made them, or that they made the
representations recklessly and without regard for their truth. (Complaint ¶28.) Plaintiff alleges that given his age and
infirmity, reasonably and justifiably relied on Defendants’ representations and
omissions. (Complaint ¶29.) Plaintiff alleges he was harmed as a result
of relying on Defendants’ misrepresentations.
(Complaint ¶30.) Plaintiff
alleges his reliance on Defendants’ misrepresentations were a substantial
factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm.
(Complaint ¶31.)
Allegations of fraud must be pleaded with specificity,
general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d
59, 74; Nagy v. Nagy (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1262, 1268.) The heightened pleading standard requires the
plaintiff to allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent
representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said
or wrote, and when it was said or written. (Tarmann v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.) Here, the Complaint conclusively alleges that
“Defendants represented to Plaintiff that the Property was of a certain value
and that they were fiduciaries of Plaintiff’s” and that “Defendants’
representations were false.” (Complaint ¶¶ 26, 27.) The Complaint also vaguely alleges that
Defendants misrepresented “the services they would provide to the Plaintiff and
that said services would financially benefit the Plaintiff.” (Complaint ¶34.) Plaintiff’s cause of action fails to meet the
heightened pleading standard for fraud.
Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s 4th cause
of action is sustained with 30 days leave to amend.
Conclusion
Defendant’s
demurrer to the 1st and 4th causes of action is sustained with 30 days
leave to amend.
|
Hon. Daniel M. Crowley |
Judge of the Superior Court |