Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 20STCV14098, Date: 2023-02-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV14098    Hearing Date: February 6, 2023    Dept: 28

Plaintiff Metala Tuivaiti and Tautalaga Tuivaiti’s Motion for Summary Adjudication

Having considered the moving, opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND

On April 9, 2020, Plaintiff Metala Tuivaiti (“Metala”) filed this action against Defendant Ruben Miranda, III (“Miranda” or “Defendant”) for motor vehicle negligence, general negligence and intentional tort.  

On May 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed the FAC, adding Plaintiff Tautalaga Tuivaiti (“Tautalaga”) and Defendants Progressive Group of Insurance (“Progressive”) and United Financial Casualty Company (“United”), as well as causes of action for declaratory relief.  

On August 20, 2020, the Court dismissed United and Progressive, with prejudice, pursuant to Plaintiff’s request.  

On July 29, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the SAC, adding United and Progressive again.  

On October 13, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the TAC, removing United and Progressive.  

On November 16, 2021, Defendant filed an answer.  

On October 13, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Adjudication to be heard on February 6, 2023. On January 23, 2023, Defendant filed an opposition. On January 31, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a reply.

Trial is scheduled for June 5, 2023.  

PARTY’S REQUESTS

Plaintiff requests the Court grant summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action and Defendant’s tenth and eleventh affirmative defenses.

Defendant request the Court deny the motion.

OBJECTIONS

Plaintiffs’ Objections:

Sustained: 3, 11, 12, 13

Overruled: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP § 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) 

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.  If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”  CCP § 664.6.

Courts are empowered to enter judgments pursuant to oral settlements made before the court or written settlements signed by the parties. (Elyaoudayan v. Hoffman (2003) 104 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1428; CCP § 664.6; Weil & Brown, Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2011) ¶12:952.) In deciding motions made under Section 664.6, judges “must determine whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement.”  Kohn v. Jaymar-Ruby (1994) 23 Cal. App. 4th 1530, 1533. In deciding whether to enforce a settlement, courts have the power to decide disputed facts, and to interpret the agreement. Fiore v. Alvord (1985) 182 Cal.App.3d 561, 566; Weil & Brown, Civ. Pro. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2011) ¶¶12:977 – 12:978.5. Judges may receive evidence, determine disputed facts including the terms the parties previously agreed upon, and enter the terms of a settlement agreement as a judgment, but may not newly create material terms. (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360.) Judges also cannot address ambiguities in material terms by filling in the gaps, or adjudicate differences between the parties, as distinguished from just settling or interpreting the settlement provisions. (Terry v. Conlan (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1460.)

DISCUSSION

This case arises from an auto accident between Plaintiff and Defendant that occurred on October 10, 2019. Plaintiffs allege that Plaintiffs made an offer with 4 terms required for acceptance. (UMF 4-7.) Terms included 1) insurer’s agreement to pay all applicable policy limits; 2) provide a copy of the insurer’s declaration page; 3) provide a declaration as to whether the insured was an agent at the time of the accident; and 4) provide an acceptable release. (UMF 8.) Defendant’s offer only communicated 3 out of the 4 terms in Plaintiffs’ offer. (UMF 16, 19-22.) Defendant allegedly proposed new conditions as to the fourth condition, requiring Plaintiffs’ counsel to provide lienholder information so that lienholder names can be added to the release and to the settlement checks as payees, instead of simply providing a release. (UMF 16, 21.) Plaintiff states that this constitutes a counter-offer, as it does not constitute an absolute and unqualified acceptance, as required by Civil Code § 1585. Plaintiff further argues this is a counter-offer because Defendant’s attorney’s set a deadline for Plaintiff to provide the information by and insisted that the indemnification language in the release was insufficient. (UMF 26.)

Plaintiff cites to Karpinski v. Smitty's Bar, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 456, 464-467, which held that it was not necessary for the settling party to include government lienholders by making that agency a co-payee on a check tendered in payment of a settlement. It holds that an indemnity agreement is satisfactory to establish the payment of lien claims. Karpinski specifically states that if settlers were so concerned about their potential liability, “...they could have negotiated for inclusion of terms in the settlement agreement requiring either [party’s] payment of these obligations as a precondition to receipt of the settlement proceeds or inclusion of [lienholders] as payees on the settlement check.” (Id. at 467.) Plaintiff argues that when Defendant insisted on including lienholders in the release, this prevented formation of a contract, as Defendant did not provide an acceptable release before the acceptance deadline. (UMF 26.)

Additionally, Plaintiff cites to their served Requests for Admissions; Defendant admitted that there was no settlement. (UMF 33.). In reviewing the attached Request for Admissions, the Court finds the admission unclear. (Exhibit 13.) It simply states “[Plaintiffs’] claims against you have not be settled,” which seems to encapsulate this subject case, rather than the settlement agreement. This is based upon objections to previous requests for admissions that specifically discussed the offer. (Exhibit 13.)

Defendant states that Defendant did accept the material terms of the contract; parties simply disagreed on the formalization of the contract. Under case law, this is a binding contract. "When parties agree on the material terms of a contract with the intention to later reduce it to a formal writing, failure to complete the formal writing does not negate the existence of the initial contract. If the parties do not agree on the content of the writing ... the proposed writing is not a counteroffer; rather, the initial agreement remains binding and a rejected writing is a nullity." CSAA Ins. Exchange v. Hodroj (2021), 72 Cal. App. 5th 272, 76. Parties agreed to the material conditions of the contract and agreed to reduce the condition to a written agreement. This is consistent with Plaintiff's demands, which required written acceptance of the terms—not performance. (DUMF 3.) Defendant agreed to the material terms, in writing, prior to the deadline. (DUMF 9.)

The Court finds that there is evidence of a binding contract agreement. Parties simply disagreed as to the inclusion of parties in the payment—however, the initial underlying settlement agreement was accepted by both parties. Performance is the only thing potentially at issue here. Therefore, the Court will not award summary adjudication on either the cause of action or the affirmative defenses. The Court denies the motion.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff Metala Tuivaiti and Tautalaga Tuivaiti’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.