Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 20STCV18450, Date: 2022-08-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV18450    Hearing Date: August 25, 2022    Dept: 28

Defendant Christopher Delaney’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Having considered the moving, opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND

On May 14, 2020, Plaintiff Jose Bermudez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Christopher Delaney (“Defendant”) for premises liability.

On July 8, 2020, Defendant filed an answer.

On June 9, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On August 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On August 17, 2022, Defendant filed a reply.

Trial is currently set for November 10 ,2022.

PARTY’S REQUESTS

Defendant requests the Court grant summary judgment on the basis that there are no triable issues of fact.

Plaintiffs request the Court deny the motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

A land possessor does not have a duty to warn an invitee of obvious dangers but does have a duty to warn about dangerous conditions known to the possessor and those that might have been found by exercise of ordinary care. (Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 20, 27.) Obvious dangerous are those that which that an invitee will perceive “that which would be obvious to him through the ordinary use of his senses.” Id. A land possessor is not liable for damages caused “by a minor, trivial, or insignificant defect in property.” (Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal. App. 4th 922, 927.)

According to Dolquist v. City of Bellflower (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 261, 267-268, when determining if a risk if trivial, courts look to a multitude of factors beyond just depth or height of a sidewalk fault. For example, courts may look towards physical characteristics (such as exposed rebar or broken pieces), visibility, and history (such as whether anyone else has been injured).  

A customer injured by a dangerous condition on a premises owners' property can only recover damages against the owner of a premises if the owner was somehow negligent. (Louie v. Hagstrom's Food Stores, Inc. (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 601.) A premises owner's negligence may be proven by showing that the owner did not “exercise reasonable care to keep the premises reasonably safe for patrons” (Peralta v. Vons Companies, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1035), either because (1) the owner itself created a dangerous condition on the premises (Henderson v. Progressive Optical System (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 180, 184), or (2) someone else created a dangerous condition, and the owner acted unreasonably by not remedying that condition or warning its customers about it (Girvetz v. Boys' Market (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 827, 829) “Absent any evidence that there was a … dangerous condition created by or known to [defendant], [plaintiffs] cannot sustain their burden of proof” so as to defeat a defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Peralta v. The Vons Companies, Inc., (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1036.) A store owner must have actual or constructive notice of the condition to be negligent; it cannot have merely existed. (Id.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that while Plaintiff was performing repair work at the subject property, Plaintiff stepped on a nail protruding from a piece of wood in the living room floor. Plaintiff was hired to perform the repair work by third-party Jimenez; Defendant specifically alleges that Plaintiff was hired by Jimenez to rip out old hardwood flooring in the living room. During this process, Plaintiff stepped on a nail which was stuck through a piece of the wood flooring he himself had just ripped up. A landlord only has a duty to protect from conditions he knew or should have known about. Plaintiff created the dangerous condition only minutes before he was injured, meaning that there was no constructive or actual notice of the dangerous condition to Defendant. Given that Defendant was not present on the premises at the time of the incident, the Court finds it is unreasonable to assume that Defendant would have known about a nail sticking out a piece of hardwood that was only dislodged moments before the incident. Defendant has met his burden.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant is effectively arguing that contributory negligence is a bar to this case, to which the Court disagrees. Defendant had no duty to warn of a condition created by the Plaintiff which the Defendant did not and should not have known about. The Court grants summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Christopher Delaney’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

            Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.