Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 20STCV20433, Date: 2025-03-04 Tentative Ruling

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Defendant Donovan Commercial Industries, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment of Plaintiffs Craig Steven Roberts’ and Carla Roxana Roberts’ First Amended Complaint is denied.

Defendant Donovan Commercial Industries, Inc. (“DCI”) (“Moving Defendant”) moves for summary judgment of Plaintiffs Craig Steven Roberts’ (“Craig”) and Carla Roxana Roberts’ (“Carla”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on the basis Plaintiffs cannot establish that Defendant breached any duty to Plaintiffs, as Plaintiffs cannot show that Moving Defendant sold any product directly to Plaintiffs, and that there is no evidence Defendant caused any harm to Plaintiffs, therefore entitling Moving Defendant to entry of judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims as a matter of law. (Notice of Motion, pg. ii; C.C.P. §437c.)

Plaintiffs’ 2/18/25 evidentiary objection to the Declaration of Sam Donovan (“Donovan”) is sustained as to Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, and overruled as to No. 3.

On May 28, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint against Does 1 through 250 alleging six causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) strict liability- failure to warn; (3) strict liability- design defect; (4) fraudulent concealment; (5) breach of implied warranties; and (6) loss of consortium. On May 1, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a DOE amendment to their complaint, naming DCI as Doe No. 5. (5/1/23 Amendment to Complaint.)

On September 1, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the operative FAC the same alleging six causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) strict liability- failure to warn; (3) strict liability- design defect; (4) fraudulent concealment; (5) breach of implied warranties; and (6) loss of consortium.

On December 6, 2024, Moving Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment. On February 18, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. As of the date of this hearing no reply has been filed.

The moving party bears the initial burden of production. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 845.) A defendant moving for summary judgment meets that burden by either presenting evidence that would require a trier of fact to find for defendant, or by simply pointing out that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence that would allow the trier of fact to find for plaintiff. (Id.) The defendant does not need to conclusively negate every element of the plaintiff’s claim; it is sufficient to show that plaintiff lacks evidence sufficient to establish any one necessary element of the claim. (Id. at 854.) The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to establish the existence of a triable material fact. (Id. at 849.) “The plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, must set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.)

“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are ‘(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.’” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917, internal citations omitted.)

“The first element, duty, ‘may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.’” (Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Association, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1128, internal citations omitted.) A statutory duty of disclosure arises from the relationship between workers who use hazardous chemicals and the manufacturers and distributors of those chemicals. (Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal. App.4th 1187; Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71.)

Moving Defendant argues Plaintiffs cannot establish that it owed Craig a duty as a matter of law. (Motion, pg. 4.) However, as Moving Defendant acknowledges in its motion, duty is established under the stream of commerce theory. California follows a “stream of commerce approach” to strict products liability, extending liability joint and severally to all those who are part of the “overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries from defective products.’” (Fortman v. Hemco, Inc. (1989), 211 Cal.App.3d 241,251.) Here, Moving Defendant does not refute the fact that it manufactures the chemicals used to produce the products alleged in Plaintiffs’ FAC. (See FAC at 5:1-6.)

Moving Defendant’s argument that it never availed itself of California’s jurisdiction is based solely on legal conclusions stated in the Declaration of Donovan, which is not admissible evidence and therefore Moving Defendant does not carry its burden to negate the element of duty in Plaintiff’s negligence claim. (See Defendant’s Disputed Separate Statement of Fact [“D-DSSF”] 22; D-COE Exh. 3 ¶¶8-9.) Further, the document on which Donovan relies to establish that it has never availed itself of the venues wherein a wholesale distributor sells DCI’s products lacks the requisite foundation necessary for this Court to consider the truth of the matters asserted therein. (See D-DSSF 12; D-COE Exh. 3 ¶6, Exh. B.)

Moving Defendant fails to meet its burden to demonstrate it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s negligence cause of action. Therefore, Moving Defendant does not shift the burden to Plaintiffs to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the element of duty.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court