Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 20STCV26270, Date: 2022-10-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV26270    Hearing Date: October 20, 2022    Dept: 28

Defendant Canoga Healthcare, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Having considered the moving, opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND

On June 18, 2021, Plaintiffs Caroline Thompson (“Thompson”) and Jessie Vesagas (“Vesagas”) filed this action against Defendants 940 East Colorado, L.P. (“940”), FIC-Master Lessee, LLC (“FIC”), Canoga Healthcare, Inc. (“Canoga”), Beverly Enterprises – California, Inc. (“BE CA”), Beverly Enterprises (“BE”), G.B.T. (“GBT”), Grossman Family, LLC (“Grossman”), Theodore Birnkrant (“Theodore”), Carole Birnkrant (“Carole”), Michael Birnkrant (“Michael”), Sally J. Birnkrant (“Sally”), Thomas Birnkrant (“Thomas”), Janet Birnkrant-Levine (“Birnkrant-Levine”), Gary M. Tearson (“Tearson”) and Rosalinda Villaraza (“Villaraza”) for motor vehicle negligence, negligence and premises liability and loss of consortium.

On September 22, 2021, 940 and FIC filed an answer.  On December 10, 2021, Canoga filed an answer.

On July 27, 2022, Canoga filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on October 12, 2022. The Court continued the hearing on the motion to October 20, 2022. On October 6, 2022, Plaintiffs filed an untimely opposition. On October 7, 2022, Canoga filed a reply.

Trial is currently scheduled for December 16, 2022. 

PARTY’S REQUESTS

Canoga requests the Court grant summary judgment on the basis of exclusive workers’ compensation remedy.

Plaintiffs requests the Court deny the motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP Section 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Workers’ compensation is the sole remedy of an injury proximately caused by employee’s employment, during a time in which the employee was performing a service stemming from their employment. Labor Code § 3600. The injury cannot be caused by intoxication, self-infliction, or the injured party’s own aggression, but can be the result of the actions of another employee acting within the scope of his or her employment. Id. Labor Code § 3602(a) provides: “[w]here the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the right to recover compensation is, except as specifically provided in this section and Sections 3706 and 4558, the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or his or her dependents against the employer.” This includes both physical and emotional injuries. (Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 144, 161.)

“[I]njuries sustained by an employee while going to or from his place of work upon premises owned or controlled by his employer are deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment.” (Lewis v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1975) 15 Ca.3d 559, 562.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff, an employee of Canoga, alleges that while walking through Canoga’s parking lot to begin her shift she was struck by a vehicle driven by Canoga’s employee, Villaraza. (UMF 12). Plaintiff has filed a worker’s compensation claim against Canoga, which is currently open and pending. (UMF 16-20, 22).  She has received benefits for this claim. (UMF 23.)

Workers’ Compensation is the sole remedy of an injury proximately caused by an employee’s employment; if compensation is rendered under LC §3600, that compensation is the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee against the employer. Plaintiff has already received benefits, and all causes of action would be covered by said benefits.

Plaintiff’s cause of action for premises liability is based an injury sustained while Plaintiff was going to her place of work on premises owned by the employer, deemed to arise out of the course of employment—Plaintiff was specifically walking from a Canoga parking lot to a Canoga building in order to work her shift. The cause of action for loss of consortium must stem from an underlying cause of action. As the underlying cause of action of premises liability is without evidentiary support, loss of consortium also fails.

Plaintiff argues that she is not employed by Canoga, but rather by Non-Party Longwood (“Longwood”), preventing Canoga from arguing that her claims are barred by Workers’ Compensation. Plaintiff specifically cites to the CACI requirements for an employer’s affirmative defense that an injury was covered by workers’ compensation: showing Canoga was Plaintiff's employer, that Canoga has workers’ compensation insurance, that Plaintiff was injured while doing work for Canoga, and that the work was a contributing injury.

The Court finds conflicting evidence on point.  Plaintiff has submitted evidence that she is employed by Longwood, Defendants argue that that evidence does not support a conclusion that Plaintiff did not work for Defendants.   The Court finds this to be a factual dispute requiring a jury to decide.   

CONCLUSION

Defendant Canoga Healthcare, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

            Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.