Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 20STCV28238, Date: 2023-02-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV28238    Hearing Date: February 15, 2023    Dept: 28

Defendant Alltime Maintenance, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND

On July 27, 2020, Plaintiff Gilberto Gonzalez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Burbon 1420, LLC (“Burbon 1420”), Burbon, LLC (“Burbon”) and Alltime Maintenance, Inc. (“Alltime”) for general negligence and premises liability. Plaintiff later amended the complaint to include Defendant Ritz Flooring, Inc. (“Ritz”).

On January 8, 2021, Burbon 1420 filed an answer and a Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendants Alltime and Ritz for equitable indemnity, contribution, apportionment of fault and declaratory relief. On March 10, 2021, Ritz filed an answer. On April 1, 2021, Alltime filed an answer. 

On February 19, 2021, Ritz filed an answer and a Cross-Complaint against Roes 1 through 20 for indemnification, apportionment of fault and declaratory relief. 

On April 5, 2021, Alltime filed an answer. On April 1, 2021, Alltime filed a Cross-Complaint against Ritz for equitable indemnity, partial equitable indemnity, contribution and equitable apportionment and declaratory relief. On April 29, 2021, Ritz filed an answer. 

On November 22, 2022, Alltime filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on February 9, 2023.

Trial is scheduled for April 10, 2023. 

PARTY’S REQUESTS

Alltime requests the Court grant summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s complaint, Burbon 1420’s Cross-Complaint and Ritz’s Cross-Complaint.

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP § 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) 

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1159.)

A land possessor does not have a duty to warn an invitee of obvious dangers but does have a duty to warn about dangerous conditions known to the possessor and those that might have been found by exercise of ordinary care. (Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 20, 27.) Obvious dangerous are those that which that an invitee will perceive “that which would be obvious to him through the ordinary use of his senses.” Id. A land possessor is not liable for damages caused “by a minor, trivial, or insignificant defect in property.” (Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal. App. 4th 922, 927.)

“Thus, no indemnity may be obtained from an entity that has no pertinent duty to the injured party [citations], that is immune from liability [citations], or that has been found not to be responsible for the injury.” (Jocer Enterprises, Inc. v. Price (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 559, 573-574.) “Equitable indemnity is only available among tortfeasors who are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's injury.” (Stop Loss Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Brown & Toland Medical Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1040-1041.)

CCP Section 1060 states that a party may request declaratory relief based upon “actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties.”

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges he was injured when he stepped on nails, staples or other sharp objects in his apartment, owned by Burbon 1420. Burbon 1420 previously hired Alltime to remove the carpet and install new flooring; Plaintiff alleges that Alltime failed to remove or cover all nails or sharp objects in Plaintiff’s apartment following the installation. Alltime hired a subcontractor, Ritz, to remove the carpet and install new flooring. (SS 3.) Alltime did not remove or install nay of the flooring, nor did Alltime instruct, supervise or have authority to control the manner in which Ritz performed the work. (SS 4-6.)

Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff alleges Alltime is liable for negligence and premises liability. In order to be liable for premises liability, a party must have owned, controlled, maintained or managed the subject premises. At all relevant times, Alltime did not own, control or manage the subject property. (SS 2.) Therefore, Alltime cannot be liable for premises liability.

A claim for negligence requires a Plaintiff to show duty, breach of duty, causation and damages. Here, Plaintiff alleges that duty was breached when Defendants left behind a sharp object, causing him injury. Alltime provides evidence indicating that Alltime did not breach said duty. After initially tearing up Plaintiff’s carpet, Ritz contacted Alltime indicating that they could not proceed with the flooring installation due to a metal piece obstructing the floor. (SS 7.) Ritz left the floor unfinished, without Alltime’s permission. (Id.) Ritz provided two options to solve the issue, which Alltime relayed to the property management company, for approval. (SS 8.) Alltime provided Ritz with the property manager’s instruction. (Id.) Ritz then returned to install the flooring, but left the unit unfinished, again without permission from Alltime. (SS 9.) Alltime entered the unit to cover the unfinished floor with paper until Ritz returned to complete its work. (SS 10.) Alltime did not use or leave behind any nails, staples or other sharp objects. (Id.) Ritz also did not leave behind any sharp objects that may have harmed Plaintiff; furthermore, in the deposition of a Ritz employee, he testified that the alleged nails and staples are not of the variety used by Ritz in installing flooring (SS 11.)

Given that neither Alltime nor Alltime’s contractor left behind any sharp objects that Plaintiff alleges were the cause of his injuries, Alltime cannot be found liable for breach of duty or causation. (SS 12.) Therefore, Alltime has met its burden, which now shifts to other parties.

No other party filed an opposition. As there is no dispute as to material fact, the Court grants summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s complaint.

Cross-Complaints

Bourbon 1420’s Cross-Complaint alleges that Alltime is liable for equitable indemnity, contribution, apportionment of fault and declaratory relief. Ritz’s Cross-Complaint alleges that Alltime is liable for indemnity, apportionment of fault and declaratory relief. All causes of action are derived from equitable indemnity, rather than contractual or express indemnity.

As Alltime has met its burden for summary judgment on the underlying complaint, any claim for equitable indemnity against Alltime is without merit. Both equitable indemnity and indemnity are causes of action made on an equitable basis, not a contractual basis. Without underlying liability as to the actual complaint, Alltime cannot be liable to the Cross-Complainants for equitable actions. The Court grants the motion as to the Cross-Complaints.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Alltime Maintenance, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

            Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.