Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case 20STCV37781 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 20STCV37781, Date: 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV37781 Hearing Date: December 15, 2022 Dept: 28

Defendant’s Southern California Healthcare System, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

On October 1, 2020, Plaintiff Jens Frederick Larsen (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Prime Healthcare Services – Sherman Oaks, LLC (“PHS”), Sherman Oaks Hospital (“SOH”), Edmond V. Derderian, M.D. (“Derderian”), Thomas L. Johnson M.D. (“Johnson”), Southern California Healthcare System, Inc. (“SCHS”), Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc. (“PMH”), Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc. Dba Southern California Hospital at Culver City (“SCH”) and Matthew Lublin, M.D. (“Lublin”) for two counts of negligence.

On April 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint for two counts of medical malpractice.

On May 20, 2021, Lublin filed an answer. On May 21, 2021, Johnson filed an answer. On May 24, 2021, SCHS filed an answer. On May 25, 2021, PHS, SOH and Derderian filed an answer.

On September 29, 2022, SCHS filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on December 15, 2022.

Trial is scheduled for March 27, 2023.

PARTY’S REQUESTS

SCHS requests the Court grant summary judgment on the basis that SCHS always complied with the applicable standard of care and was not a substantial factor in causing any of Plaintiff’s alleged damages.

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP § 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

The elements of a cause of action for medical negligence are: (1) duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence and diligence as other members of the profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) breach of duty; (3) proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional’s negligence. (Simmons v. West Covina Medical Clinic (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 696, 701-702.) The standard of care that a medical professional is measured by is a matter within the exclusive knowledge of experts; it can only be proven by their testimony, generally. (Flowers v. Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 1001.) Causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based on competent expert testimony; “a less than 50-50 possibility that defendants’ omission caused the harm does not meet the requisite reasonable medical probability test of proximate cause.” (Bromme v. Pavitt (1 992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1504.)

In order for a hospital to be found liable under a theory of ostensible agency, Plaintiff must prove two elements: “(1) conduct by the hospital that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the physician was an agent of the hospital, and (2) reliance on that apparent agency relationship by the plaintiff.” (Mejia v. Community Hospital of San Bernardino (2002) 99 Cal App. 4^th 1448, 1454.)

DISCUSSION

Overview

Plaintiff alleges that, while admitted to SCHS, Plaintiff was given improper medical treatment resulting in aspiration pneumonia and other complications.

SCHS did not employ any of the Defendant doctors—meaning that any allegations against SCHS are either based in ostensible agency or a failure by staff to act within the standard of care.

Ostensible Agency

In order to be liable under a theory of ostensible agency, a Plaintiff must prove that the hospital acted in such a way as to convince a reasonable person that the physician was an agent of the hospital and that Plaintiff relied on that relationship. There are no facts that support finding SCHS liable under a theory of ostensible agency. Upon Plaintiff’s visit to the hospital, he was provided with paperwork to fill out. (SSUF 7.) This included a Conditions of Admission that stated that all physicians and surgeons are not employees, representatives or agents of the hospital. (Id.) Plaintiff signed this paperwork, acknowledging his understanding of this relationship. (Id.) He was provided this same paperwork again during a later visit, in which he signed it while conscious, alert and oriented. (SSUF 10-13.) SCHS has demonstrated that the evidence supports finding no ostensible agency between Defendant Doctors and SCHS.

Expert Declaration

SCHS retained Rudolph Bedford, M.D. to review this matter; Bedford is a physician licensed to practice in the state of California, who is qualified to testify as to the standard of care of treating staff. (Declaration of Rudolf Bedford, M.D. ¶¶ 1-4.) He reviewed the FAC, discovery responses, medical records and other expert’s opinions in forming his opinions. (Bedford Decl. ¶¶ 5.) He opined that the staff’s treatment was always within the standard of care and not the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. (Bedford Decl. ¶ 18.) There is no evidence that staff acted outside of doctors’ orders; nurses appropriately tracked Plaintiff’s NPO status and followed instructions. (Bedford Decl. ¶ 14.) Even had the nurses given Plaintiff liquids prior to surgery, against orders, aspiration is a known and accepted risk of anesthesia—by consenting to anesthesia, Plaintiff accepted this known risk. (Bedford Decl. ¶ 18.).

SCHS has met its burden in showing that it is not liable via either ostensible agency or a failure by staff. The burden shifts to Plaintiff, who did not oppose the motion. The Court grants the motion.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s Southern California Healthcare System, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.