Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 20STCV38450, Date: 2023-01-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV38450    Hearing Date: January 24, 2023    Dept: 28

Defendant Regents of the University of California’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Having considered the moving and opposing papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND

On October 7, 2020, Plaintiff Hannah Kidweell (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Regents of the University of California (“Defendants”) for general negligence and premises liability.

On February 10, 2021, Plaintiff filed the FAC. On August 10, 2021, Plaintiff filed the SAC, changing the premises liability claim specifically to dangerous condition of public property.

On August 30, 2021, Defendant filed its answer.

On November 8, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on January 24, 2023. On January 10, 2023, Plaintiff submitted an opposition.

Trial is currently scheduled for May 11, 2023.

PARTY’S REQUESTS

Defendant requests the Court grant summary judgment.

Plaintiff requests the Court denies the motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP § 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) 

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

Government Code § 835 provides “[e]xcept as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; ¿or (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.”

A dangerous condition is “a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” GC § 830.

Government Code § 815.6 provides: “[w]here a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.” To impose a mandatory duty on a public entity, the “mandatory nature of the duty must be phrased in explicit and forceful language;” it is not sufficient to contain just some mandatory language. (Guzman v. County of Monterey (2009) 46 Cal. 4th 887, 910-911.)

A totality of circumstances approach should be applied in evaluating whether there is a dangerous condition of public property; the Court should account for physical characteristics of the defect, history of the site and the parties, and the setting at the time of the incident. (Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) I22 Cal.App.4th 922, 927.)

According to Dolquist v. City of Bellflower (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 261, 267-268, when determining if a risk if trivial, courts look to a multitude of factors beyond just depth or height of a fault. For example, for sidewalks, courts may look towards physical characteristics (such as exposed rebar or broken pieces), visibility, and history (such as whether anyone else has been injured).  

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that she was injured on Defendant’s property when she tripped on a carpeted stairwell. She specifically claims her left heel caught on the fourth step from the top of the stairway, resulting in her breaking her ankle. (SS 6.) Plaintiff believes her heel caught on the frayed portion of the carpet but does not assert it as an absolute fact. (SS 7, 9.) Plaintiff has not claimed any other potentially dangerous conditions present on the subject stairs; it was dry, without debris or anything obstructing her view. (SS 11-14.) It was sunny outside and the lights were on inside, meaning the steps themselves were visible. (SS 17-18.) Multiple other individuals walked up and down the stairs without issue. (SS 11, 19.) There were no recorded issues of accidents regarding the subject stairs from 2013 to present except for Plaintiff. (SS 21.)     In reviewing the facts and the pictures provided of the subject defect, the Court finds that the subject defect is trivial, at most. The physical defect is small, consisting of a small section of carpet that is slightly pulled out from the staircase—there is nothing hard or dangerous in the defect that may cause potential injury. The frayed portion measures approximately 1 inch in diameter. (SS 34.) The stairwell was well lit and there is no indication any other individual tripped or injured themselves on the defect. There were no work orders or requests submitted indicating a request was made to replace the carpet (SS 31-32.) Overall, there is no indication that the defect was dangerous or anything beyond trivial.

Plaintiff supplied an expert declaration from Brad Avrit, who stated that the hole/tear was difficult to perceive as it was a similar color and texture of the surrounding carpet. (Avrit Decl. ¶ 11.) As it was in the music school, Defendant was on notice that sometimes visitors will be wearing formal attire, including high heels, which may have gotten caught on such a defect. (Avrit Decl. ¶ 13.)

While the tear may have been “trivial” in the lay sense of the word, it is not a “trivial” defect in the sense that Defendant has no duty to repair it.  A hole in carpet on a single stairway is different from a slight rise between portions of a sidewalk in miles of sidewalk.  Accordingly, the Court cannot say that this defect was “trivial” such that Defendant had not duty to remedy it.    The Court finds that whether under the circumstances the tear in the carpet constituted a dangerous condition is a question of fact for a jury to decide. 

CONCLUSION

Defendant Regents of the University of California’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

            Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.