Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case 20STCV38993 2022-10-27 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 20STCV38993, Date: 2022-10-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV38993 Hearing Date: October 27, 2022 Dept: 28

Defendant Juan De La Cruz’s Demurrer with Motion to Strike

Having considered the moving, opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

On October 9, 2020, Plaintiffs Herminio Ramirez (“Herminio”) and Omar Ramirez (“Omar”) filed this action against Defendants William Storm (“Storm”) and John Doe (“Doe”) for motor vehicle negligence, general negligence, violation of the Vehicle Code 20001(a) and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs later amended the complaint to include Defendants Auto Pro Auto Supply (“Auto”) and Juan De La Cruz (“Cruz”).

On September 19, 2022, Cruz field a Demurrer with Motion to Strike to be heard on October 27, 2022. On October 18, 20222, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On October 21, 2022, Cruz filed a reply.

There is no currently scheduled trial date.

PARTY’S REQUESTS

Cruz requests the Court sustain the demurrer on the basis that it is time barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Cruz also requests the Court strike the request for punitive damages.

Plaintiffs request the Court overrule the demurrer and deny the motion to strike.

LEGAL STANDARD

CCP § 430.10 states: “The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds: (a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading; (b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue; (c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action; (d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties; (e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; (f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible; and (g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.”

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (CCP § 430.30(a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Id.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

CCP §335.1 states that there is a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, beginning from the date of the incident. CCP §474 states “When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint, or the affidavit if the action is commenced by affidavit, and such defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly.”

In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code Section 3294. (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294 (a).) “Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." (Coll. Hosp., Inc., supra, 8 Cal. 4th at 725 [examining Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1)].)

“[S]imple negligence will not justify an award of punitive damages.” (Spencer v. San Francisco Brick Co. (1907) 5 Cal.App.126, 128.) Civil Code § 3294(a) states: “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” “[E]ven gross negligence, or recklessness is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.” (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal App 3d 82, 87.)

DISCUSSION

Demurrer

The subject incident occurred on October 11, 2018; the original complaint was filed on October 9, 2020. Cruz was amended in as “DOE 2” on October 5, 2021.

Cruz argues that Plaintiffs cannot claim a genuine lack of knowledge of Cruz’s identity at the time of the original filing because Plaintiffs claimed they were able to take a photograph of Cruz’s license plate after the alleged incident occurred. Cruz states that Plaintiffs’ ignorance is either based on negligence or willful failure to conduct an investigation to identify the registered owner of the subject vehicle.

Ignorance stemming from negligence is insufficient to deny leave to amend with the true name of a previously identified DOE defendant. In order to sustain a demurrer on this basis, Cruz must show that Plaintiffs had knowledge of Cruz’s name and refused to name Cruz—there is no indication that this is the case. Even with Cruz’s license plate number, this does not mean that Plaintiffs were aware Cruz was the owner. Upon learning that Cruz was the owner, Plaintiffs took proper steps to amend the complaint and substitute in Cruz. The Court overrules the demurrer.

Motion to Strike

The Court finds that the facts, as pled, do not provide a basis for a claim for punitive damages. Plaintiffs effectively plead that Cruz negligently merged into Plaintiffs’ lane of travel, colliding into Plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiffs also allege that Cruz immediately fled the scene. That is insufficient to support a finding of oppression, fraud of malice. Malice requires intent to injure or despicable conduct carried on with willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. A simple hit and run while speeding does not qualify as such. In the absence of aggravating allegations, there is no basis for punitive damages. The Court grants the motion.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Juan De La Cruz’s Demurrer is OVERRULED.

Defendant Juan De La Cruz’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED, with 30 days leave to amend.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.