Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 20STCV39806, Date: 2024-03-28 Tentative Ruling


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Case Number: 20STCV39806    Hearing Date: March 28, 2024    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 71

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

LUIS SANCHEZ, et al., 

 

         vs.

 

KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC., et al.

 Case No.:  20STCV39806

 

 

 

 Hearing Date:  March 28, 2024

 

Plaintiffs Luis Sanchez’s and Shannon Sanchez’s motion for attorneys’ fees is granted in the total reduced amount of $162,795.00.

 

Plaintiffs Luis Sanchez (“Luis”) and Shannon Sanchez (“Shannon”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) move for an order awarding their attorneys’ fees pursuant to a settlement with Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc. (“KA”) (“Defendant”) in the amount of $165,920.00, including a 1.5 lodestar enhancement in the amount of $82,960.00, for a total of $248,880.00 in attorneys’ fees.  (Notice of Motion, pg. 1; Civ. Code §1794(d).)  The Court grants fees in the amount of $162,795.00.

 

Evidentiary Objections

Defendant’s 3/15/24 evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Norman F. Taylor (“Taylor”) are sustained as to Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

Defendant’s 3/15/24 evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Richard M. Wirtz (“Wirtz”) are overruled as to Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, and sustained as to No. 13.

Plaintiffs’ 3/21/24 evidentiary objection to the Declaration of Siyun Yao (“Yao”) is sustained as to No. 1.

 

Background

This is a lemon law action brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly Act”).  On May 1, 2023, Defendant accepted Plaintiffs’ 998 Offer.  (Decl. of Wirtz ¶30, Exh. 7; Decl. of Yao ¶10.)

On March 4, 2024, Plaintiffs filed this motion for attorneys’ fees.  Defendant filed its opposition on March 15, 2024.  Plaintiffs filed their reply on March 21, 2024.

 

Discussion

Civil Code §1794(d) provides that a buyer who prevails in an action under that section, “shall be allowed by the court to recover as a part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and the prosecution of such action.”

Here, Plaintiffs are the prevailing party per parties’ 998 agreement and are entitled to attorneys’ fees.  (Decl. of Wirtz ¶30, Exh. 7 at ¶5.)  Defendant does not contest that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party.

 

Reasonable Fees

To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by the Plaintiff’s counsel. The Supreme Court of California has concluded that a reasonable hourly lodestar rate is the prevailing rate for private attorneys “conducting non-contingent litigation of the same type.”  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133, emphasis added.)

Plaintiffs retained two law firms for their representation in this matter, Norman Taylor & Associates (“NTA”) and Wirtz Law (“WL”).

 

A.   NTA

Norman Taylor declares his hourly rate is $645.00/hour, and he received the assistance of two paralegals who billed at a rate of $250.00. (Decl. of Taylor ¶¶5, 12; Exh. 1.)  This rate is appropriate given each the attorney’s relative experience and qualifications.  (See id.)  Plaintiffs has sufficiently demonstrated their NTA counsel’s hourly rate is reasonable in their community of practice in their specialized area of law.

Defendant does not challenge Plaintiff’s NTA counsel’s hourly rate as unreasonable with the necessary particularity.  The Court finds Plaintiff’s NTA counsel’s rate to be reasonable and does not warrant a reduction.

 

B.    WL

Counsel for WL declares the following hourly rates of the attorneys who worked on this case: (1) Kelsey Henry ($450.00/hour); (2) Daniel Inscore ($550.00/hour); and (3) Amy Rotman ($550/hour); as well as four legal assistants whose hourly rates range from $250.00-$300.00/hour.  (Decl. of Wirtz ¶¶15-21, 31, Exh. 1 at pg. 28.)  These rates are appropriate given each attorney’s relative experience and qualifications.  (See id.)  Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated ther WL counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable in their community of practice in their specialized area of law.

Defendant does not challenge Plaintiffs’ WL counsel’s hourly rate as unreasonable with the requisite particularity.  The Court finds Plaintiffs’ WL counsel’s rate to be reasonable and does not warrant a reduction.

 

Billed Hours

The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden to show “the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.”  (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

Plaintiff’s NTA Counsel’s fee recovery is based on the 31.9 hours spent by their NTA attorneys litigating this case for a total of $15,875.00.  (Decl. of Taylor ¶5, Exh. 1.)  Plaintiff’s WL Counsel’s fee recovery is based on 346.4 hours spent by their WL attorneys litigating this case for a total of $150,045.00.  (Decl. of Wirtz ¶2, Exh. 1.)  Defendant argues Plaintiff’s counsel’s billed hours were not reasonably incurred and were block billed, and therefore should be cut.  (Opposition, pgs. 5-9.)  The Court has reviewed Defendant’s objections to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billed hours and agrees with some of Defendant’s objections.

First, Defendant does not cite to specific examples of hours that were not for “actual time expended.”  Therefore, Defendant did not meet its burden to challenge these fees.

Second, Defendant’s objection to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s block billing on December 16, 2021; January 7, 2022; November 7, 2022; and November 8, 2022, is well taken.  However, Defendant only cites to these examples in its opposition.  Accordingly, the Court will reduce the requested hours from Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees by $2,310.00.

Third, Defendant’s objection to Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to compel arbitration is not well taken, and not supported by case law.  Therefore, Defendant did not meet its burden to challenge these fees.

Fourth, Defendant’s objection to Plaintiff’s fees involving the first vehicle inspection is not well taken because the inspection was cancelled due to Defendant’s expert’s COVID-19 diagnosis, not for any fault of Plaintiffs, who made appropriate travel plans to attend the inspection from out of state.  Therefore, Defendant did not meet its burden to challenge these fees.

Fifth, Defendant’s objection to duplicative tasks billed for reviewing and revising the statement of claims as well as reserving a previously served set of discovery is well taken.  Accordingly, the Court will reduce the requested hours from Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees by $815.00.

Finally, Defendant’s objection to excessive, unreasonable, and unnecessary billing is not well taken.  Plaintiffs are entitled to conduct research relevant to the claims asserted, issue non-party subpoenas signed by the arbitrator, prepare an arbitration brief, and audit a fee invoice.  Therefore, Defendant did not meet its burden to challenge these fees.

 

Final Lodestar Determination

The Court denies Plaintiffs’ request for a 1.5 lodestar multiplier.  Given the routine work done in this case and the results obtained in this lemon law area, a multiplier is not appropriate. Any contingency risk factor is already accounted for in the hourly rates, which the Court has found to be reasonable.

 

Conclusion

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees is granted in the reduced amount of $162,795.00.

Moving Party to give notice.

 

 

Dated:  March _____, 2024                        


Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court