Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 20STLC03541, Date: 2022-09-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STLC03541    Hearing Date: September 28, 2022    Dept: 28

Defendants River Rock Real Estate Gorup, Inc. And EW 3KSRB Owner, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Having considered the moving, opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND

On April 21, 2021, Plaintiff Morshelle Evette Thompson-Tea (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant River Rock Real Estate Group, Inc. (“RR”) for general negligence and premises liability. Plaintiff later amended the complaint to include Defendant EW 3KSRB Owner LLC (“EW”).

On July 6, 2021, Defendants filed an answer.

On July 6, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on September 28, 2022. On September 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On September 20, 2022, Defendants filed a reply.

Trial is currently scheduled for November 1, 2022.

PARTY’S REQUESTS

Defendant requests the Court grant summary judgment on the basis that there is no dispute as to material facts.

Plaintiff requests the Court deny the mot

OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff’s Objections are OVERRULED.

Defendants’ Objections are OVERRULED.

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP § 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) 

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1159.)

Whether a commercial landlord had possession and control over commercial property to subject the landlord to liability is a question of law for the court to decide. (Kentucky Fried Chicken of Calif., Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814, 819.) “A landlord has relinquished possessory interest in the land, his or her duty of care to third parties injured on the land is attenuated as compared with the tenant who enjoys possession and control.” (Garcia v. Holt (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 600, 604.) “[W]here a landlord has relinquished control of property to a tenant, a ‘bright line’ rule has developed to moderate the landlord’s duty of care owed to a third party injured on the property as compared with the tenant who enjoys possession and control.” (Salinas v. Martin (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 404, 412.) This bright line rule holds a landlord liable to third parties in a premises liability action only if: (1) the landlord has actual knowledge of the hazard; and (2) the right and ability to remedy it. (Id.)

A land possessor does not have a duty to warn an invitee of obvious dangers but does have a duty to warn about dangerous conditions known to the possessor and those that might have been found by exercise of ordinary care. (Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 20, 27.) Obvious dangerous are those that which that an invitee will perceive “that which would be obvious to him through the ordinary use of his senses.” Id. A land possessor is not liable for damages caused “by a minor, trivial, or insignificant defect in property.” (Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal. App. 4th 922, 927.)

According to Dolquist v. City of Bellflower (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 261, 267-268, when determining if a risk if trivial, courts look to a multitude of factors beyond just depth or height of a sidewalk fault. For example, courts may look towards physical characteristics (such as exposed rebar or broken pieces), visibility, and history (such as whether anyone else has been injured). 

A customer injured by a dangerous condition on a premises owners' property can only recover damages against the owner of a premises if the owner was somehow negligent. (Louie v. Hagstrom's Food Stores, Inc. (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 601.) A premises owner's negligence may be proven by showing that the owner did not “exercise reasonable care to keep the premises reasonably safe for patrons” (Peralta v. Vons Companies, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1035), either because (1) the owner itself created a dangerous condition on the premises (Henderson v. Progressive Optical System (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 180, 184), or (2) someone else created a dangerous condition, and the owner acted unreasonably by not remedying that condition or warning its customers about it (Girvetz v. Boys' Market (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 827, 829) “Absent any evidence that there was a … dangerous condition created by or known to [defendant], [plaintiffs] cannot sustain their burden of proof” so as to defeat a defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Peralta v. The Vons Companies, Inc., (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1036.) A store owner must have actual or constructive notice of the condition to be negligent; it cannot have merely existed. (Id.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that while walking into the break room of Defendants’ business premises, she slipped on water on the floor coming from a leak under a nearby sink and fell, sustaining injuries. Plaintiff was working as an employee of Third Party Kaiser Permanent (“Kaiser”), which was solely responsible for maintaining the subject property during the lease period.

In order for a landowner to be liable for negligence based in premises liability, said owner must have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. As Defendants had rented the property to Kaiser, who had taken on the duty to maintain and repair fixtures, Plaintiff makes no showing of constructive knowledge. (SSN 21-22.) Plaintiff also testified that Kaiser had no reason to know about the leaking pipe from the kitchen sink prior to her injury. (SSN 15-16.) Plaintiff only noticed the subject puddle of water after she fell, as it matched with the white tile flooring (SSN 9,10.) Plaintiff only noticed the subject puddle of water after she fell, as it matched with the white tile flooring (SSN 9,10.) All indicates that Defendants, who were not primarily responsible for maintenance of the property, would not have actual or constructive notice. Defendants met their burden, which shifts to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff argues that pursuant to the lease agreement between Kaiser and Defendants, Defendants were to provide janitorial services, including but not limited to cleaning the breakroom five days a week. (UMF 29, 33.) The lease agreement creates a dispute of material fact as to whether Defendants had an obligation to perform janitorial services in the breakroom. As Defendants identifies, it is unclear as to when or where these services are being provided—thus the Court cannot state that there is no dispute as to whether or not Defendants were liable for the janitorial maintenance of the area in question. The Court finds there is sufficient evidence as to a dispute of material fact and denies the motion.

CONCLUSION

Defendants River Rock Real Estate Gorup, Inc. And EW 3KSRB Owner, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

            Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.

Ruling on Defendants Riverrock Real Estate Group, Inc. and EW 3KSRB Owner LLC’s Unopposed Motion to Compel Responses to Form/Special Interrogatories

Having reviewed Defendants, Riverrock Real Estate Group, Inc. and EW 3KSRB Owner LLC’s unopposed Motion to Compel Responses to Form/Special Interrogatories, the Court rules as follows.

On June 16, 2022, Defendants, Riverrock Real Estate Group, Inc. and EW 3KSRB Owner LLC served Special Interrogatories, Set No. Two, on Plaintiff Morshelle Evette Thompson-Tease.

Responses were due July 16, 2022.   Plaintiff, Morshelle Evette Thompson-Tease, has failed to provide timely responses. Defendants, Riverrock Real Estate Group, Inc. and EW 3KSRB Owner LLC, now move to compel responses. 

The Court grants the motion pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. § 2030.290(b) and orders Plaintiff Morshelle, Evette Thompson-Tease, to provide verified responses to the interrogatories compliant with Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.210 (a) and 2030.220 without objections by October 28, 2022.

Defendants, Riverrock Real Estate Group, Inc. and EW 3KSRB Owner LLC, request monetary sanctions totaling $2,100.00.

The Court awards sanctions pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc. § 2023.030 (a) and  Code of Civ. Proc. § 2030.290 (c) in the amount of $750.00, calculated as follows:

Defendants request sanctions totaling $2,100.00, based upon 6 hours of attorney’s work at a rate of $350.00 per hour. The Court grants sanctions based on 3 hours of attorney’s work at a rate of $250.00 per hour.

The sanctions total $750.00 and are payable by Plaintiff, Morshelle Evette Thompson-Tease, and his counsel by October 28, 2022.

Moving Party is to give notice of this ruling.