Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 21SMCV01059, Date: 2023-04-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21SMCV01059 Hearing Date: April 18, 2023 Dept: 207
Background
In a related action between the parties, Case No. 21STCV40908, the Court adjudicated the issue of possession at a bench trial on Plaintiff’s claim for unlawful detainer. The Court found for Plaintiff and on December 16, 2022, entered judgment in her favor on her claim for unlawful detainer. Defendant has filed an appeal of that judgment, which is currently pending in the Court of Appeal.
Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment on her claims against Defendant and Defendant’s cross-claims against her. Alternatively, Plaintiff moves to dismiss the cross-claims asserted by Defendant.
Legal Standard
Motions for summary judgment are governed by Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, which allows a party to “move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (C.C.P. § 437c(a)(1).) The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (C.C.P. § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (C.C.P. § 437c(p)(2); Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
Analysis
1. Motion for Summary Judgment
“This court has acknowledged that section 437c is a complicated, unforgiving statute with little flexibility and myriad requirements.” (Haney v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 623, 632 [internal quotation omitted].)
Plaintiff’s motion fails to comply with the procedural requirements of a motion for summary judgment. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a)(2) requires a motion for summary judgment be served at least 75 days before the time set for hearing. It also provides this 75 day notice period may be extended based on how the motion is served. Plaintiff’s motion was served on March 20, 2023, far less than 75 days before the scheduled April 18, 2023, hearing date. “[I]n light of the express statutory language, trial courts do not have authority to shorten the minimum notice period for summary judgment hearings.” (McMahon v. Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 112, 118.) Accordingly, the Court does not have discretion to disregard the untimeliness of Plaintiff’s motion and rule on its merits, and Plaintiff’s motion must thus be DENIED.
The Court also notes Plaintiff’s motion does not comply with the requirements imposed by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350, including but not limited to the requirement to file a separate statement of undisputed material facts in connection with a motion for summary judgment. (See also C.C.P. § 437c(b)(1).) The failure to file a separate statement is itself grounds for denial of a motion for summary judgment. (See, e.g., Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1189 [holding the statute gives the trial court discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment where the moving party fails to file a separate statement].) The Court also has discretion to “ignore evidence not disclosed in moving party's separate statement of undisputed facts.” (San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 315.)
The Court is aware that Plaintiff is a pro per litigant who is unfamiliar with the complex rules and procedures regarding summary judgment motions, however “A party proceeding in propria persona ‘is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater[,] consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985 [internal citation omitted].) Indeed, “‘the in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney.’” [Citation.]” (First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958, fn. 1; see also Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.)
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied without prejudice to be refiled in compliance with the procedural requirements for bringing such a motion.
2. Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff alternatively moves to dismiss Defendant’s cross-claims, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10. Section 430.10 sets forth grounds for bringing a demurrer to a pleading. At the time Plaintiff’s motion was filed on March 21, 2023, Defendant’s original Cross-Complaint was still his operative pleading in this action. On April 7, 2023, the Court granted Defendant’s motion for leave to file a First Amended Cross-Complaint which was deemed filed on April 7. To the extent Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss sought to demurrer to Defendant’s original Cross-Complaint, it is untimely. Pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 430.40(a), Plaintiff had 30 days from the date the Cross-Complaint was served on her to bring a demurrer to it. Defendant’s original Cross-Complaint was filed and served on Plaintiff on July 26, 2021, and thus her time to demurrer has long since expired. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to demurrer to Defendant’s First Amended Cross-Complaint, her motion is premature as the First Amended Cross-Complaint was not deemed filed until April 7, 2023.
The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss under section 430.10 as that statute does not authorize a blanket motion to dismiss but rather allows for the assertion of a demurrer challenging the sufficiency of a pleading. This denial is without prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to bring a demurrer to Defendant’s First Amended Cross-Complaint within the time limits set forth in Code Civ. Proc. § 430.40(a).
Conclusion
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, or, alternatively,
to dismiss Defendant’s Cross-Complaint is DENIED.