Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 21STCV03788, Date: 2024-11-27 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 21STCV03788    Hearing Date: November 26, 2024    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 71

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

WESLEY ROBBINS, 

 

         vs.

 

CARL SHAFF, II, et al.

 Case No.:  21STCV03788

 

 

 

 Hearing Date:  November 26, 2024

 

Defendants Stephen Pattillo’s, individually and dba Quality Stamp Shows and OrcoExpo, Brianna Pattillo’s, and Eric Pattillo’s motion to tax pro per Plaintiff Wesley Robbins’ memorandum of costs is denied.

Defendants Edwin Kawasaki’s, Stephen Radell’s, William Miller’s, William Janson’s, Caj Brejtfus’, and Lois Evans’ joinder to Defendants Stephen Pattillo’s, individually and dba Quality Stamp Shows and OrcoExpo, Brianna Pattillo’s, and Eric Pattillo’s motion is denied.

 

Defendants Stephen Pattillo, individually and dba Quality Stamp Shows and OrcoExpo (“Stephen”), Brianna Pattillo (“Brianna”), and Eric Pattillo (“Eric”) (collectively, “Pattillo Defendants”) move to tax costs requested by pro per Plaintiff Wesley Robbins (“Robbins”) (“Plaintiff”) in their entirety on the basis Plaintiff was not the prevailing party in this case, and thus is not entitled to claim costs, and therefore, the entirety of Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Costs must be stricken.  (Notice Motion, pg. 2.)

Defendants Edwin Kawasaki (“Kawasaki”), Steven Radell (“Radell”), William Miller (“Miller”), William Janson (“Janson”), Caj Brejtfus (“Brejtfus”), and Lois Evans (“Evans”) (“Joining Defendants”) join the Pattillo Defendants’ motion to tax and strike the entirety of the Memorandum of Costs filed by Plaintiff.  (Notice Joining Motion, pg. 2.)

 

Procedural Background

On July 19, 2024, at trial, all Defendants moved for nonsuit after parties rested upon the close of evidence before a jury.  (8/14/24 Minute Order.)  Upon Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff agreed to dismiss all the remaining causes of action against Defendants.

On July 29, 2024, Cobb filed a dismissal of his Cross-Complaint against Plaintiff without prejudice.  The dismissal was entered on July 30, 2024.

On August 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Costs claiming $29,880.00 in costs, consisting of $3,830.00 in filing and motion fees; $150.00 in jury fees; $300.00 in deposition costs; $14,600.00 in service of process; $5,000.00 in attorney fees; $3,500.00 for models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits; and $2,500.00 in “Other” unspecified costs.  (See Memorandum of Costs.)  Plaintiff’s memorandum of costs does not indicate under which pleading and which Defendants he seeks to recover such costs.  However, the docket reflects, under the register of actions, that on August 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed the memorandum of costs against David Cobb (Cross-Complainant), Carl Shaff, II (Defendant), and Steve Radell (Defendant).  The docket also reflects on the register of actions that on August 19, 2024, Plaintiff changed the parties the memorandum is filed against from Stephen Pattillo (Defendant), Lionel Pereira (Defendant), Steve Radell (Defendant), John Weigle (Defendant), Carl Shaff, II (Defendant), David Cobb (Cross-Complainant), Briana Pattillo (Defendant), Eric Pattillo (Defendant) to David Cobb (Cross-Complainant).  Therefore, the memorandum is only filed against David Cobb (“Cobb”) as a Cross-Complainant.

On August 19, 2024, Plaintiff also filed a proposed judgment against David Cobb as Cross-Complainant.

On August 20, 2024, Cobb filed an objection to Cross-Complainant Robbins’ Proposed Judgment on August 19, 2024.

On August 20, 2024, this Court denied Robbins’ proposed judgment against Cross-Complainant Cobb.

On August 27, 2024, Pattillo Defendants filed the instant motion.  On September 4, 2024, Joining Defendants filed their joinder.  On November 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed his opposition.  As of the date of this hearing no reply has been filed.

 

Motion to Tax Costs

“If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.”  (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131.)

“[T]he mere filing of a motion to tax costs may be a ‘proper objection’ to an item, the necessity of which appears doubtful, or which does not appear to be proper on its face.  [Citation] However, ‘[i]f the items appear to be proper charges the verified memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred by the defendant [citations], and the burden of showing that an item is not properly chargeable or is unreasonable is upon the [objecting party].’ [Citations.]”  (Id.)

“The court’s first determination, therefore, is whether the statute expressly allows the particular item, and whether it appears proper on its face. [Citation] If so, the burden is on the objecting party to show them to be unnecessary or unreasonable. [Citation.]”  (Id.)

A prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding, except as otherwise expressly provided by statute.  (C.C.P.  §1032(b).)  California law recognizes three types of litigation costs: allowable, not allowable, and discretionary.  (C.C.P. §§1033.5(a), (b), (c)(4).)  Items not specifically allowable as costs under C.C.P. §1033.5(a), and not specifically prohibited under §1033.5(b), may be allowed as costs at the discretion of the trial court if reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation.  (Citizens for Responsible Development v. City of West Hollywood (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 490, 506, citing Ladas v. California State Auto Association (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.)   For allowable costs, C.C.P. §1033.5(c) provides:

(2) Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.

(3) Allowable costs shall be reasonable in amount.

 

(C.C.P. §§1033.5(c)(2)-(3).) 

To the extent Plaintiff challenges costs, they must be challenged as costs that were not, “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation” or not “reasonable in amount.”  (C.C.P. §§1033.5(c)(2)-(3).) 

A defendant who is dismissed from the action is the “prevailing party.” (C.C.P. §1032(a)(4); see City of Long Beach v. Stevedoring Services of America (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 672, 678, 680 [stating cross-defendant is prevailing party entitled to costs under §1032 when cross-complaint is dismissed as moot].) 

A defendant dismissed from the action is the “prevailing party” regardless of whether the dismissal is voluntary or involuntary.  (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606 [stating defendant entitled to costs as a matter of right after plaintiff voluntarily dismissed proceeding]; Crib Retaining Walls, Inc. v. NBS/Lowry, Inc. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 886, 890 [involuntary dismissal pursuant to C.C.P. §877.6 order approving good faith settlement]; Cano v. Glover (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 326, 328, 331 [defendant who obtained dismissal without prejudice and was unnamed in fourth amended complaint was entitled to dismissal with prejudice and costs award (costs award was not dependent on whether dismissal was with or without prejudice)].)

Where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, defendant is the “prevailing party.” (C.C.P. §1032(a)(4).)

Here, the Pattillo Defendants and Joining Defendants are not parties to Cobb’s Cross-Complaint and therefore do not have standing to challenge Robbins’ memorandum of costs on Cobb’s Cross-Complaint; only Cobb could challenge the costs asserted by Robbins on the Cobb Cross-Complaint.  Therefore, Pattillo Defendants’ and Joining Defendants’ motions to tax costs on Robbins’ memorandum of costs on Cobb’s Cross-Complaint is denied.

In order for the prevailing party to obtain its costs, all that is required is the timely filing and service of the “memorandum of costs” that is verified with a statement, “that to the best of his or her knowledge the items of costs are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case.”  (CRC, Rule 3.1700(a)(1).)  Robbins timely filed his Memorandum of Costs.

Here, Robbins was the prevailing party on the Cobb Cross-Complaint because Cobb dismissed Robbins.  (C.C.P. §1032(a)(4).)  Therefore, Robbins’ memorandum of costs on the Cobb Cross-Complaint is proper.

In light of the fact that Cobb did not file a motion to tax costs, Robbins is entitled to all costs against Cobb in his August 19, 2024, Memorandum of Costs.

Accordingly, Pattillo Defendants’ and Joining Defendants’ motions are denied.

 

         Conclusion

         Defendants Stephen Pattillo’s, individually and dba Quality Stamp Shows and OrcoExpo, Brianna Pattillo’s, and Eric Pattillo’s motion to tax pro per Plaintiff Wesley Robbins’ memorandum of costs is denied.

Defendants Edwin Kawasaki’s, Stephen Radell’s, William Miller’s, William Janson’s, Caj Brejtfus’, and Lois Evans’ joinder to Defendants Stephen Pattillo’s, individually and dba Quality Stamp Shows and OrcoExpo, Brianna Pattillo’s, and Eric Pattillo’s motion is denied.

         Moving party to give notice.

 

Dated:  November _____, 2024

                                                                       


Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court