Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 21STCV07158, Date: 2023-08-24 Tentative Ruling

Department 71: Attorneys who elect to submit on these published tentative rulings, without making an appearance at the hearing, may so notify the Court by communicating this to the Department's staff via the Department's email: SMCdept71@lacourt.org before the set hearing time. See, e.g., CRC Rule 324(b). All parties are otherwise encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect for all matters.

Plaintiffs Patrick Bane’s and Sarah Bane’s unopposed motion for attorneys’ fees against Defendant DLI Properties, LLC is granted in the total amount of $116,869.50.

Plaintiffs Patrick Bane (“Patrick”) and Sarah Bane (“Sarah”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) move unopposed for an order awarding them attorneys’ fees and costs against Defendant DLI Properties, LLC (“DLI”) (“Defendant”) in the minimum amount of $82,635.00, together with an enhancement in the amount of $34,234.50, for a total amount of fees sought of $116,869.50. (Notice of Motion, pgs. 1-2; CRC Rule 3.1702(b); C.C.P. §1033.5(a)(10)(A).)

On February 23, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the operative Complaint against DLI and Strategic Realty, Inc. (“Strategic”) and Monica Acosta (“Acosta”) for two causes of action: (1) fraud; and (2) negligent misrepresentation. On April 28, 2023, this Court ordered an Amended Judgment for Plaintiffs against Defendants and granted attorneys’ fees for Plaintiffs against DLI only. (Amended Judgment, pg. 2.)

On June 29, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for attorneys’ fees. As of the date of this hearing DLI has not filed an opposition.

A party may not recover attorneys’ fees unless allowed by contract or statute. (Hom v. Petrou (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 459, 464; C.C.P. §1021.) Here, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees pursuant to the attorneys’ fees provision in its contract with DLI for the purchase of real property at 4849 Farquhar St., Los Angeles, California. (Tr. Exh. 1 ¶25.)

“In the absence of a statute authorizing the recovery of attorney fees, the parties may agree on whether and how to allocate attorney fees.” (Hom, 67 Cal.App.5th at pg. 464; see also C.C.P §1021.) When the parties enter into a contract that “specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs [incurred to enforce the contract are recoverable] . . . then the party who is determined to be the prevailing party on the contract . . . shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees in addition to other costs.” (Civ. Code §1717(a).) The phrase “‘shall be entitled’ reflect[s] a legislative intent that a party prevailing on a contract receive attorney fees as a matter of right (and that the trial court is therefore obligated to award attorney fees) whenever the statutory conditions have been satisfied.” (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 872.) Patrick testified at trial that Plaintiffs engaged in an unsuccessful mediation of the dispute with DLI prior to initiating the instant action, and therefore satisfied the conditions precedent in the contract to recover attorneys’ fees from DLI. (Settled Statement of Trial, pg. 2.) Plaintiffs prevailed on all claims at issue in this lawsuit and are therefore the prevailing parties in this case and are entitled to attorneys’ fees. (See Amended Judgment, pg. 2.)

To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by Plaintiffs’ counsel. The Supreme Court of California has concluded that a reasonable hourly lodestar rate is the prevailing rate for private attorneys “conducting non-contingent litigation of the same type.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133, emphasis added.) “The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096.)

Plaintiffs’ Counsel argues while the nature of the litigation is for the commonly litigated torts of fraud and negligent misrepresentation in the sale of a single-family home to first-time homebuyers, this case presented some unique and difficult issues, particularly in the problem of proving the cost and nature of the relief sought—a sewer connection where the nearest main was 195 feet down the hill at the time of filing, which was complicated by the strict requirements of the City of Los Angeles related to sewage removal. (See Decl. of Garcia ¶2.) Plaintiffs’ counsel declares his hourly rate is $495.00 per hour. (Decl. of Garcia ¶10.) Plaintiff’s counsel he agreed to work for Plaintiffs at a discounted hourly rate of $350 per hour, which is 30% less than his usual hourly rate. (Decl. of Garcia ¶2.) Based on the Court’s experience, Plaintiff’s hourly rate of $495.00 per hour is reasonable in his community of practice in his specialized area of law.

The verified time entries of the attorneys are entitled to a presumption of credibility, which extends to an attorney’s professional judgment as to whether time spent was reasonably necessary to the litigation. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396 [“We think the verified time statements of the attorney as officers of the court are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”].) “California courts do not require detailed time records, and trial courts have discretion to award fees based on declarations of counsel describing the work they have done and the court’s own view of the number of hours reasonably spent.” (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698-699.)

Here, the declaration by counsel of the time incurred on the instant case demonstrates the reasonableness of billed hours, which totals 236.1 hours, including mediation, preparing the pleadings, engaging in discovery, trial preparations, and post-trial work. (See Decl. of Garcia ¶8.) Plaintiffs prevailed in an action that preceded through all phases of litigation. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ billed hours are reasonable.

Plaintiffs’ counsel requests a minimum of $82,645 in attorneys’ fees for the instant motion based on his discounted rate. (Decl. of Garcia ¶8.) Plaintiffs’ counsel requests the Court compensate him at his usual rate, which would add $34,234.50 to the minimum amount of attorneys’ fees requested, for a total of $116,869.50. (Decl. of Garcia ¶10.) In light of the fact that Plaintiffs’ motion is unopposed, and Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks to be compensated at his customary rate, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ request for a final lodestar of $116,869.50.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for attorneys’ fees is granted in the amount of $116,869.50.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court