Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 21STCV15183, Date: 2023-03-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV15183    Hearing Date: March 6, 2023    Dept: 28

Defendant RGE Motor Direct, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND

On April 22, 2021, Plaintiff Justin Damiano (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Diamond W. Inc. (“Diamond”) and Industrial Park E Sub B LLC (“Industrial”) for negligence – premises liability.

On June 21, 2021, the case was removed to United States District Court for the Central District of California.

On July 9, 2021, Plaintiff filed the FAC, adding in Defendant RGE Motor Direct, Inc. (“RGE”). Plaintiff later amended the complaint to include Defendants Tiarna Real Estate Services, Inc. (“TRES”) and Alex Damer (“Damer”).

On September 9, 2021, RGE filed an answer. On February 16, 2022, Industrial filed an answer. On April 26, 2022, Damer and TRES filed answers. On March 2, 2023, the Court dismissed Damer, without prejudice, pursuant to Plaintiff’s request.

The case was remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court on October 5, 2021.

As a preliminary matter, the Court has received courtesy copies of the First Amended Complaint which named RGE Motor Direct Inc. dba Onebigoutlet as a defendant and RGE Motor Direct Inc. dba Onebigoutlet’s answer to that First Amended Complaint.  Both were filed in federal court.  The Court orders that these pleadings be deemed filed in this action. 

On November 19, 2021, Diamond filed an answer and a Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendants ROES 1-100 for implied contractual indemnity, equitable indemnity, apportionment, contribution, declaratory relief, express indemnity and breach of contract.

On July 19, 2022, Diamond and Diamond’s Cross-Complaint were dismissed, without prejudice.

On October 18, 2022, RGE filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on January 6, 2023. The Court continued the hearing on the motion to March 6, 2023. Plaintiff filed a notice of non-opposition on February 16, 2023.

Trial is currently scheduled for July 21, 2023.

PARTY’S REQUESTS

RGE requests the Court grant summary judgment as there are no triable issues of material fact.

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP § 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) 

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

“The first element, duty, ‘may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.” (Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Assn., Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1128.)

“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1159.)

A land possessor does not have a duty to warn an invitee of obvious dangers but does have a duty to warn about dangerous conditions known to the possessor and those that might have been found by exercise of ordinary care. (Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 20, 27.) Obvious dangerous are those that which that an invitee will perceive “that which would be obvious to him through the ordinary use of his senses.” Id. A land possessor is not liable for damages caused “by a minor, trivial, or insignificant defect in property.” (Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal. App. 4th 922, 927.)

According to Dolquist v. City of Bellflower (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 261, 267-268, when determining if a risk if trivial, courts look to a multitude of factors beyond just depth or height of a sidewalk fault. For example, courts may look towards physical characteristics (such as exposed rebar or broken pieces), visibility, and history (such as whether anyone else has been injured). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that he was injured while performing roofing maintenance work at the subject property. During a rest break, Plaintiff leaned on a plastic skylight cover with his right hand for support; the skylight cover broke and Plaintiff fell through to RGE’s warehouse space below. (UMF 2-4.)

In order for a party to be liable for premises liability, it must have a duty to the plaintiff. In a premises liability case, duty is derived from a party owning, possessing or controlling the subject property. (Alcaraz v. Vece (1997) 14 Cal.4^th 1149, 1162.) RGE occupies an interior warehouse space inside the subject property; it does not own the building, nor does it manage, maintain or control the roof or skylight. (UMF 5-9.) Industrial owns and maintains the subject property. (UMF 7.) RGE did not hire, instruct or supervise Plaintiff or the roofing contractor to perform the subject maintenance work. (UMF 10). Rather Industrial’s employee hired Plaintiff’s employer to performance work on the subject roof. (UMF 11.)

A party can also be liable for injuries that control outside of the area of control if their area of control is maintained in such a manner as to expose persons to an unreasonable risk of injury offsite. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1159.) There are no allegations, facts or evidence that would support a finding that RGE’s control of the warehouse area resulted in Plaintiff falling through the skylight.  

RGE has shown that RGE did not have a duty to Plaintiff, as RGE did not own, possess or control the subject premises. RGE has met its burden, which shifts to Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a notice of non-opposition. Therefore, the Court grants the motion.

CONCLUSION

The Court orders that the courtesy copies
of the First Amended Complaint which named RGE Motor Direct Inc. dba
Onebigoutlet as a defendant and RGE Motor Direct Inc. dba Onebigoutlet’s answer
to that First Amended Complaint be deemed filed in this action.  

Defendant RGE Motor Direct, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

            Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.