Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 21STCV29279, Date: 2022-12-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV29279    Hearing Date: December 16, 2022    Dept: 28

Defendant Randolph-Huntington Partners, LTD. and RHA Partners, LTD’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND

On August 9, 2021, Plaintiff Maria Pulido (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Super Center Concepts, Inc. (“SCC”), Superior Grocers (“Grocers”), Florentino Ahumada (“Florentino”) and Yvette Ahumada (“Yvette”) for general negligence, motor vehicle negligence and premises liability. Plaintiff later amended the complaint to include Defendants Randolph-Huntington Partners, LTD., (“RHP”), RHA Partners, LTD (“RHA”) and Comstock Crosser & Associates Developments Company (“Comstock”). 

On October 14, 2021, RHP and RHA filed an answer and a Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendant Florentino for implied indemnity, contribution and declaratory relief. 

On November 16, 2021, SCC filed an answer and a Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendants Florentino, Yvette, RHP and RHA for implied indemnity, contribution, apportionment, declaratory relief, negligence, breach of contract and express indemnity. SCC dismissed all parties without prejudice. On June 13, 2022, the Court dismissed SCC, without prejudice, pursuant to Plaintiff’s request.

On May 18, 2022, the Court dismissed Florentino and Yvette with prejudice, pursuant to Plaintiff’s request. 

On June 28, 2022, Comstock filed an answer. 

On September 27, 2022, RHP and RHA (“Moving Defendants”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on November 15, 2022.

Trial is currently scheduled for June 6, 2023. 

PARTY’S REQUESTS

Moving Defendants request the Court grant summary judgment on the basis that there is no dispute as to material facts.

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP § 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) 

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1159.)

Whether a commercial landlord had possession and control over commercial property to subject the landlord to liability is a question of law for the court to decide. (Kentucky Fried Chicken of Calif., Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814, 819.) “A landlord has relinquished possessory interest in the land, his or her duty of care to third parties injured on the land is attenuated as compared with the tenant who enjoys possession and control.” (Garcia v. Holt (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 600, 604.) “[W]here a landlord has relinquished control of property to a tenant, a ‘bright line’ rule has developed to moderate the landlord’s duty of care owed to a third party injured on the property as compared with the tenant who enjoys possession and control.” (Salinas v. Martin (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 404, 412.) This bright line rule holds a landlord liable to third parties in a premises liability action only if: (1) the landlord has actual knowledge of the hazard; and (2) the right and ability to remedy it. (Id.)

A land possessor does not have a duty to warn an invitee of obvious dangers but does have a duty to warn about dangerous conditions known to the possessor and those that might have been found by exercise of ordinary care. (Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 20, 27.) Obvious dangerous are those that which that an invitee will perceive “that which would be obvious to him through the ordinary use of his senses.” Id. A land possessor is not liable for damages caused “by a minor, trivial, or insignificant defect in property.” (Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal. App. 4th 922, 927.)

According to Dolquist v. City of Bellflower (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 261, 267-268, when determining if a risk if trivial, courts look to a multitude of factors beyond just depth or height of a sidewalk fault. For example, courts may look towards physical characteristics (such as exposed rebar or broken pieces), visibility, and history (such as whether anyone else has been injured). 

A customer injured by a dangerous condition on a premises owners' property can only recover damages against the owner of a premises if the owner was somehow negligent. (Louie v. Hagstrom's Food Stores, Inc. (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 601.) A premises owner's negligence may be proven by showing that the owner did not “exercise reasonable care to keep the premises reasonably safe for patrons” (Peralta v. Vons Companies, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1035), either because (1) the owner itself created a dangerous condition on the premises (Henderson v. Progressive Optical System (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 180, 184), or (2) someone else created a dangerous condition, and the owner acted unreasonably by not remedying that condition or warning its customers about it (Girvetz v. Boys' Market (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 827, 829) “Absent any evidence that there was a … dangerous condition created by or known to [defendant], [plaintiffs] cannot sustain their burden of proof” so as to defeat a defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Peralta v. The Vons Companies, Inc., (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1036.) A store owner must have actual or constructive notice of the condition to be negligent; it cannot have merely existed. (Id.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that, while crossing the road from the subject store’s exit to the aisles of vehicles in the parking lot, Plaintiff was struck by a vehicle driven by Florentino. (UMF 1.) Plaintiff specifically alleges that Moving Defendants negligently owned, constructed, designed, and controlled the subject area.

A surveillance video depicting the moment of impact showed that the subject vehicle made a left turn, colliding with Plaintiff. (UMF 3-8.) Florentino stated he was only travelling at approximately 5 mph, which matches with the relatively slow speed displayed on the subject video. (UMF 11.) He stated he did not see Plaintiff prior to the collision. (UMF 12.)

The videotape shows no objects that may have obfuscated Florentino’s view of Plaintiff prior to the collision. Florentino was already in the process of turning when he collided with Plaintiff; his car was far enough to have a sight line on Plaintiff that was not obscured by any parked cars in the parking aisle. (UMF 18.) Moving Defendants’ architect expert opined that the layout of the parking lot complied with the industry standards and city regulations. (UMF 17.) The drive aisle in question also did not violate any applicable codes and standards. (UMF 19.)

In order to bring a successful cause of action for either negligence or premises liability, a Plaintiff must show that the subject Defendant had a duty they breached, and in breaching that duty caused injury to Plaintiff. In premises liability cases, breach of duty is generally shown by demonstrating the existence of a dangerous condition. Here, the evidence supports that there was no dangerous condition in the subject parking lot. The subject parking lot complied with applicable standards and regulations and there were no abnormalities, defects or obstructions that would have contributed to Florentino’s negligence. Without a dangerous condition or breach of duty, Moving Defendants cannot be liable for negligence or premises liability based in control of the subject location. The Court finds that Moving Defendants have met their burden and grants the motion.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Randolph-Huntington Partners, LTD. and RHA Partners, LTD’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

            Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.