Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 21STCV31093, Date: 2022-12-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV31093    Hearing Date: December 9, 2022    Dept: 28

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s Demurrer with Motion to Strike

Having considered the moving, opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows. 

BACKGROUND

On August 23, 2021, Plaintiff Luc Richard Elie (“Plaintiff”), Individually and as Successor-in Interest of the Estate of Xavier Patterson, filed a complaint against Defendants Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”), Samuel Mark Schwarzmer (“Schwarzmer”), Ricardo Rosales (“Rosales”), and Carrie Schwartz (“Schwartz”) for negligence, negligent supervision, training, hiring, and retention and wrongful death.

On March 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed the FAC, removing the cause of action for wrongful death.

On June 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed the SAC.

On October 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed the TAC.

On November 8, 2022, LAUSD filed a Demurrer with Motion to Strike to be heard on December 9, 2022. On November 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On December 1, 2022, LAUSD filed a reply.

Trial is scheduled for February 21, 2023.

PARTY’S REQUESTS

LAUSD requests the Court sustain the demurrer as Plaintiff has failed to plead with particularly that Decedent’s suicide was foreseeable, that LAUSD cause Decedent to suffer from an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide, and that hiring/retaining any employee created a risk to Decedent.

LAUSD also requests the Court strike any mention or request for punitive damages.

Plaintiff requests the Court overrule the demurrer and deny the motion to strike.

LEGAL STANDARD

CCP § 430.10 states: “The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds: (a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading; (b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue; (c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action; (d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties; (e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; (f) The pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and unintelligible; and (g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.”

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.  (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.)  When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.  (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.)  In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice.  (CCP § 430.30(a).)  A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.  (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)  Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.  (Id.)  The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.  (Hahn, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

In California, suicide has historically been viewed as an intervening event that always breaks the chain of causation, thereby precluding any tort liability for a suicide. (Tate v. Canonica (1960) 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 901-03.) An exception is where the defendant's negligence causes the decedent to suffer from an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide. (Id. at 913-15.) The underlying rationale for this exception is that absent volition, the decedent's act of suicide is not independent from the defendant's original negligence. Therefore, in order to satisfy the uncontrollable impulse test, a plaintiff must show that a defendant's negligence causes the decedent to suffer a mental condition in which the decedent cannot control his or her suicidal impulses. (Id. at 915.)

In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code Section 3294. (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294 (a).) “Malice is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." (Coll. Hosp., Inc., supra, 8 Cal. 4th at 725 [examining Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1)].)

“[S]imple negligence will not justify an award of punitive damages.” (Spencer v. San Francisco Brick Co. (1907) 5 Cal.App.126, 128.) Civil Code § 3294(a) states: “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” “[E]ven gross negligence, or recklessness is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.” (Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal App 3d 82, 87.)

DISCUSSION

Demurrer

Under California law, there is generally no duty to prevent suicide unless there is a special relationship between the defendant and the decedent giving rise to such a duty. See Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 293, 253 Cal.Rptr. 97, 763 P.2d 948 (1988). Courts have imposed a duty to prevent suicide only where the defendant has physical custody and substantial control over a person or where the defendant has special training or expertise in mental illness and has sufficient control over a person to prevent the suicide. (Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist. (E.D.Cal. 2014) 997 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1085.) Typically, such defendants are a prison, jail, or hospital. Id. In those circumstances, courts have found that the defendant’s custodial relationship over the suicide victim uniquely places the defendant in a position to detect and prevent suicide. Id. at 1086.

On the other hand, California cases do recognize a duty not to cause someone to take their own life. If a defendant’s negligent conduct results in a victim an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide, the defendant may be held liable for the death. (Tate v. Canonica (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 898, 915.) In other words, if a defendant's negligence causes the decedent to suffer a mental condition in which the decedent cannot control his suicidal impulses, the defendant's negligence is considered to be the proximate cause of the death and the defendant may be held liable. If, on the other hand, the victim retains the ability to control their suicidal impulses and to refrain from committing suicide, a subsequent suicide is deemed a superseding event that breaks the chain of causation between the defendant's negligence and the death. In that case, the defendant is not liable. (Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist. (E.D.Cal. 2014) 997 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1079.)

Plaintiff’s TAC conflates these two theories, claiming, essentially, that Defendants failure to prevent Xavier’s suicide caused Xavier to suffer suicidal impulses. The TAC alleges that Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty to prevent Xavier’s suicide by implementing certain policies and procedures (TAC ¶ 15-27) and that Defendant’s failure to implement those policies and procedures caused Xavier to suffer an uncontrollable impulse to take his own life. (TAC ¶¶ 49, 62.) The Court finds that the TAC fails to state sufficient facts to support either a theory that Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty to prevent Xavier’s suicide or a theory that Defendants’ conduct caused Xavier’s suicidal impulses.

The TAC fails to state facts sufficient to establish a special relationship between Xavier and Defendants giving rise to a duty in Defendants to have prevented Xavier’s suicide. Such a duty arises only when the victim is in the custody of the defendant. In Whooley v. Tamalpais Union High Sch. Dist., for example, the court held, “Courts have imposed a duty to prevent suicide only where the defendant has physical custody and substantial control over a person or where the defendant has special training or expertise in mental illness and has sufficient control over a person to prevent the suicide.” (Whooley v. Tamalpais Union High Sch. Dist. (N.D.Cal 2019) 399 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1001.) In C.A. v. William S. Hart, the court held that school districts have a duty to “supervise at all times the conduct of the children on the school grounds and to enforce those rules and regulations necessary to their protection.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist., supra, 53 Cal.4th at 869.)

Plaintiff alleges that Xavier left school and returned during the 6th period of the school day. (TAC ¶¶ 42-51.) Upon his return, Xavier spoke with Defendant Schwarzmer for approximately 20 minutes. (TAC ¶ 53.) Xavier then left campus again and went the courtyard of his home. (TAC ¶¶ 54-59.) Xavier’s stepmother saw him arrive such that custody of Xavier had passed from Defendants to his stepmother (TAC ¶ 65). Although Plaintiff has added the conclusory statement that “He was never in the custody of his mother,” to the TAC, the Court does not find that this matches the facts. Xavier walked directly into his family’s apartment complex and his stepmother saw him arrive—that is sufficient to establish custody. This is further established by the fact that Xavier’s stepmother did not perceive his behavior when he came home as concerning; she interpreted it as typical for Xavier’s return home, denoting a standard change of custody between the parties. (TAC ¶ 66.) Xavier committed suicide between then and sometime that evening. (TAC ¶ 70.) Accordingly, the TAC alleges clearly that Xavier was no longer the custody of Defendants.

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not and cannot state a claim that Defendants are liable for not having prevented Xavier’s suicide. Defendants did not have custody over Xavier at the time, and so Defendants had no duty for his safety at the time of his suicide.

The TAC also fails to state facts sufficient to establish Defendants affirmatively caused Xavier to experience an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide. Plaintiff ostensibly pleads that Defendants negligently caused Xavier to develop an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide by failing to implement a suicide/threat risk assessment team which was a failure to accommodate Xavier. (TAC ¶ 49.) Plaintiff further alleges that Los Angeles Unified School officers’ failure to interact with Xavier after he left school also caused Xavier to experience an uncontrollable impulse to take his own life. (TAC ¶ 62). These allegations do not allege any affirmative negligent acts by defendants which are alleged to have provoked Xavier.

Cases finding a defendant liable for another’s suicide find either that the defendant did something to create the uncontrollable impulse or failed to take prescribed affirmative action to prevent someone others from inducing the uncontrollable impulse. For example, in Tate v. Canonica, the Court found that the defendants harassed, embarrassed, and humiliated plaintiff in the presence others. (Tate v. Canonica, supra, (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 898, 900.) In Whooley v. Tamalpais Union High Sch. Dist., the court found that the defendant school officials had pressured plaintiff's decedent to achieve and maintain a high grade-point average, to attain high scores on the ACT or SAT exams, and to complete early enrollment applications for colleges all while failing to implement an education plan prescribed by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794). (Whooley v. Tamalpais Union High Sch. Dist. (N.D.Cal. 2019) 399 F. Supp. 3d 986, 991.) In Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., the court found that defendants breached their duty to Plaintiff by failing to stop, remedy, and prevent the in-school harassment and bullying of Decedent. (Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist. (E.D.Cal. 2014) 997 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1084.) In Lucas v. City of Long Beach, the Court found that the cause of plaintiff's death was his own act in hanging himself and that no act or omission of the defendant had produced the mental condition which prompted plaintiff to commit suicide. (Lucas v. City of Long Beach (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 341, 349.)

The TAC makes no non-conclusory allegation that Defendants affirmatively induced Xavier's emotional state. Indeed, the SAC alleges that Xavier was suicidal in April 2018. (TAC ¶ 30.) Near the end of the fall semester, Xavier was depressed and having trouble coping. (TAC ¶ 36.) On the day of his suicide, Xavier came to school agitated. (TAC p. 38.) He left school, then returned, this time very agitated. (TAC ¶ 51.) Xavier spoke with Schwarzmer for approximately 20 minutes, but there is no allegation that the conversation had any effect on Xavier. (TAC ¶ 53.) Xavier then left campus. There are no allegations that any individual associated with LAUSD committed any affirmative acts that contributed to Xavier’s emotional state that eventually resulted in suicide.

In sum, the TAC describes a troubled young man who came to the Defendants as such. The TAC makes no allegation that any action by Defendants did anything to affect Xavier's mental state. Absent allegations that Defendants affirmatively inflicted emotional distress upon Xavier or that Defendants failed to prevent some third party for whom they would be liable from doing so, the TAC fails to state a cause of action that Defendants can be liable for having caused Xavier to suffer an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide. Therefore, the Court finds that the TAC fails to state facts constituting a cause of action for Defendants having caused Xavier to suffer an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide.

Motion to Strike

The Court finds that the facts do not provide a basis for a claim for punitive damages. Punitive damages require a finding of malice, oppression, or fraud. As pled, there is no indication of any of these elements being met. There is no allegation of oppression or fraud. Malice requires an action that is intended to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

There are no allegations of intent to cause Decedent to harm himself contained with the SAC. Plaintiff instead relies upon a conscious disregard for Decedent. The facts as pled do not comply with the standard of despicable conduct done with willful and conscious disregard—there are no facts that indicate that Defendants willfully and consciously allowed Decedent to be unsupervised in a way that would facilitate Decedent to commit suicide.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s Demurrer is SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.

Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District’s Motion to Strike is denied as MOOT.

            Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.