Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case 21STCV31583 2023-03-03 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 21STCV31583, Date: 2023-03-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV31583 Hearing Date: March 3, 2023 Dept: 28

Defendant County of Los Angeles’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Having considered the moving, opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

On August 26, 2021, Plaintiff Cherryl Jackson (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant County of Los Angeles (“Defendant”) for wrongful death and survival action.

On October 21, 2021, Defendant filed an answer.

On October 7, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on December 23, 2022. The Court continued the hearing on the motion to March 3, 2023. On February 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On February 24, 2023, Defendant filed a reply.

Trial is scheduled for May 22, 2023.

PARTY’S REQUESTS

Defendant requests the Court grant summary judgment on the basis that these are no triable issue as to any material facts.

Plaintiff requests the Court deny the motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP § 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendant’s employee was driving a sheriff's bus when he struck Decedent, resulting in Decedent’s death. The first and only cause of action is for negligence.

Even before reviewing the content of the MSJ, the Court finds the complaint is not sufficient pled. To state a cause of action [for government tort liability] every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty.” (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802.) Plaintiff’s complaint does not bring forward a statutory duty. Plaintiff specifically indicates Defendant is liable under GC §§ 815.2, 815.4 and 820(a). All of these statutes specifically establish that a public entity is liable for the proximate injury caused by an act or omission of an employee; they do not specifically establish any statutory duty that Defendant or Defendant’s employee violated. There is no supported cause of action asserted against Defendant.

The Court evaluates the MSJ to see if parties seem to have arrived at an understanding regarding the underlying statutory duty. Within Defendant’s moving papers, Defendant asserts that the most likely applicable code would be Vehicle Code § 17001. Plaintiff’s opposition does not discuss the merits of VC § 17001, instead focusing on Maxwell v. Colburn (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 180, 185. Maxwell involves an incident in which a pedestrian was allegedly hit by a private citizen operating a vehicle; it is not instructive in a case regarding the actions of a public entity, or a public entity’s employee. Plaintiff’s only reliance on statue is from Vehicle Code § 22350. VC § 22350 states that “No person shall drive a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent having due regard for weather, visibility, the traffic on, and the surface and width of, the highway, and in no event at a speed which endangers the safety of persons or property.” This is not a statutory basis for an action stemming from motor vehicle negligence of a public employee resulting in damages. It does not provide a basis for a negligence—wrongful death action.

Given that Plaintiff has neither provided an adequate statutory basis in the complaint nor in the opposition to the MSJ, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot show proper support for the claim. The Court grants summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

Defendant County of Los Angeles’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.