Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 21STCV37230, Date: 2022-12-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV37230 Hearing Date: December 8, 2022 Dept: 28
Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint
Having considered the moving, opposing, and reply papers, as well as the argument of counsel, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
This is an action that arises out of an alleged assault and battery incident in 2021. Leonel Mateo Pascual and Pascual Mateo Pascual (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this action against Raymong G. Guillermo, Los Angeles Private Detectives, and Does 1 through 50 on October 8, 2021, alleging causes of action for (1) assault and battery, (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Pipkin Detective Agency, Inc. (Defendant), originally sued as Doe 1, filed this motion to strike portion of Plaintiff’s complaint on July 8, 2022. Doe 1 is alleged to be a business entity “responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged…: (Complaint, ¶ 11.) It appears Plaintiffs filed a late opposition on October 14, 2022, and Defendant filed a late reply on October 24, 2022. Without objections to the late filings and in the interests of justice, the Court considers all filings on the merits.
Motion to Strike
In support of its motion, Defendant notes that Plaintiffs name Defendant in all three causes of action and seek to recover damages from Defendant for the alleged assault. Defendant moves to strike requests for punitive damages from Plaintiffs’ complaint because there are no material allegations of fact that support an award of punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294.
Opposition and Request for Judicial Notice
In opposition, Plaintiffs contend the complaint asserts sufficient facts to support an award of punitive damages under section 3294. In support of its opposition, Plaintiffs request that the Court take judicial notice of the criminal complaint against defendant Raymond G. Guillermo and criminal case information.
Reply
First, Defendant argues the request for judicial notice is improper. Second, Defendant argues Plaintiff does not allege willful misconduct.
LEGAL STANDARD
Request for Judicial Notice
A motion to strike must be determined solely by the face of the complaint and matters properly subject to judicial notice; extraneous evidence cannot be considered. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437.) The court may take judicial notice of records of any courts of California. (Evid. Code, § 452(d).) The court may also take judicial notice of “[o]fficial acts . . . of any state” and “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, § 452(c), (h).) Additionally, the court may take judicial notice of the contents of a website, and a printout of information from a website can be self-authenticating. (Ampex Corp. v. Carle (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1573-1574; Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 821.)
Motion to Strike Punitive Damages
“Before filing a motion to strike . . . the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (Code Civ Proc. § 435.5(a).) If no agreement is reached, the moving party shall file and serve with the motion to strike a declaration stating either: (1) the means by which the parties met and conferred and that the parties did not reach an agreement, or (2) that the party who filed the pleading failed to respond to the meet and confer request or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5(a)(3).)
Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc. § 435(b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(a); Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782 [“Matter in a pleading which is not essential to the claim is surplusage; probative facts are surplusage and may be stricken out or disregarded”].) An immaterial or irrelevant allegation is one that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ Proc. § 431.10(b).)
Courts disfavor motions to strike, and pleadings must be “liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Code. Civ. Proc. § 452.) On a motion to strike, the court considers the complaint’s allegations in context and presumes them as true. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998), 67 Cal.App.4th 24 1253, 1255.)
Punitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) “Malice” is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1).) “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’ [Citation.]” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.) “As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section 3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) The statute’s reference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.” (Ibid.) Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)
Further, “[t]here must be evidence that defendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiff’s interests and deliberately failed to avoid these consequences.” (Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155; see also Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228 [“Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is aware of the probably dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences”].)
A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify such an award” for punitive damages. (Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 958.) The allegations supporting a request for punitive damages must be alleged with specificity; conclusory allegations without sufficient facts are not enough. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.)
DISCUSSION
Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiffs request that the Court take judicial notice of the criminal complaint against defendant Raymond G. Guillermo and criminal case information. The criminal complaint is a record of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern (Kern Superior Court). The criminal case information is not strictly a “record” of the Kern Superior Court, but it is a printout of a website that contains official acts of the state. Therefore, the Court may take judicial notice of both documents requested by Plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, the Court declines to take judicial notice of both records. They do not state specific facts relating to the underlying incident, and more importantly, the records do not shed light on the sufficiency of the allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ complaint.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is denied.
Motion to Strike Punitive Damages
As a preliminary matter, the Court looks to whether Defendant satisfied the meet and confer requirement of the motion to strike. The declaration from Defendant’s counsel addresses the failure to meet and confer generally but does not specifically say Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to respond to a meet and confer request or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith. (LaScola Decl. ¶¶ 4-6.) Nevertheless, the Court considers the motion to strike on the merits.
Defendant moves to strike paragraphs 22, 25, 28, and 29 from the complaint, which at first appear to be boilerplate conclusory allegations as opposed to facts pled with sufficient specificity. (Motion pp. 8-9.) But the Court does not read allegations subject to the motion to strike in isolation; the Court assumes their truth and reads them in context.
The introduction of the complaint gives an overview of the alleged incident, where Defendants allegedly threatened, assaulted, battered. (Complaint p. 2.) Paragraph 16 specifically alleges the individuals “began a concerted effort to berate, harangue, intimidate, vilify, assault, [and] batter” Plaintiffs, mentioning that Plaintiffs were handcuffed. (Complaint p. 6, ¶ 16.) Moreover, paragraph 17 alleges the corporate employer of the individuals knew or should have known about the individuals’ propensity. (Complaint p. 6, ¶ 17.) Paragraphs 19 and 26 of the complaint repeat and reallege the allegations common to first two causes of action. These factual allegations, read in context and assumed true, could support an award of punitive damages.
But the Complaint fails to allege specific facts as to why moving defendant, sued as Doe 1, is liable for punitive damages. Again, Doe 1 is alleged to be a business entity “responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged…: (Complaint, ¶ 11.) The Complaint provides no further guidance as to what Doe 1, a business entity, did to cause Plaintiff injury. In fact, the Complaint alleges that it was the individual Does (21-50 per ¶ 11) who assaulted and battered Plaintiff. (Complaint, ¶¶ 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30. 35, 36, 37.) The Complaint makes no allegations as to Doe 1, as a business entity.
Therefore, Defendant’s motion to strike punitive damages provisions from Plaintiff’s complaint is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike portions of Plaintiff’s complaint is GRANTED with 30 days leave to amend.
Moving party to give notice.