Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 21STCV37986, Date: 2022-12-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV37986 Hearing Date: December 9, 2022 Dept: 28
Motion for Reclassification and Transfer to Limited Jurisdiction
This motion for reclassification and
transfer to limited jurisdiction was filed by Brian Agito, Sophia Agito, Pierre
Cedro, and Vincent Cedro (collectively, Defendants). The Court notes that this motion is the first
the Court is learning of these defendants, except for named defendant Pierre
Cedro. The Court considers all movants
named as defendants for the purposes of this motion and asks Noune Sarkisyan
(Plaintiff) to file an “Amendment to Complaint (Fictitious/Incorrect Name)”
form with the Court.
Having considered the
moving and opposing papers, as well as the argument of counsel, the Court rules
as follows.
BACKGROUND
This is an action that arises out of an
alleged motor vehicle collision on November 6, 2019 in Burbank,
California. Plaintiff filed this action
against Pierre Cedro and Does 1 through 25 on October 14, 2021, alleging one
cause of action for motor vehicle negligence.
PARTIES’ REQUESTS
Defendants
move the Court for reclassification and transfer to limited jurisdiction
because Plaintiff cannot recover more than $25,000 in this action. In opposition, Plaintiff contends Defendants
do not meet their burden of proving the damage will not exceed $25,000.
LEGAL STANDARD
Where
the caption to a plaintiff’s complaint fails to state that an action is a
limited civil case, a party may file a motion for reclassification. (Code Civ. Proc. § 422.30(b).) Code of Civil Procedure section 403.040(b)
provides:
If a party files a motion for
reclassification after the time for that party to amend that party’s initial
pleading or to respond to a complaint, cross-complaint, or other initial
pleading, the court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification
only if both of the following conditions are satisfied: 1) The case is
incorrectly classified. 2) The moving party shows good cause for not seeking
reclassification earlier.
A
matter may be reclassified as a limited civil action when in the course of
pretrial litigation, it becomes clear that the matter will necessarily result
in a verdict below the Superior Court’s jurisdictional amount. (Walker v. Sup. Ct. (1991) 53 Cal.3d
257, 262 (Walker); Ytuarte v. Sup. Ct. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th
266, 276.) This standard requires a high
level of certainty that a damage award will not exceed $25,000 and is not
satisfied by a finding that such an award is merely unlikely or not reasonably
probable. (See Walker, supra,
at 269.) Moreover, the court must assume
the existence of the facts supporting the complaint, not determine the claim on
the merits. (Ibid.) The trial court looks to the possibility of a
jurisdictionally appropriate verdict, not to its probability. (Maldanado v. Sup. Ct. (1996) 45 Cal.
App. 4th 397, 402.)
DISCUSSION
In
the caption of her complaint, Plaintiff alleged the action is an unlimited
civil case exceeding $25,000. (Complaint
p. 1.) Accordingly, Defendants are
required to prove both that the case was incorrectly classified and that there
was good cause for not seeking reclassification earlier.
Defendants
argue good cause exists for not having sought reclassification earlier because,
“only recently did Plaintiff serve their supplemental discovery responses and
section 998 offer.” (Motion p. 5.) The Court finds that if Defendants were only
put on notice of the amount in controversy based on Plaintiff’s supplemental discovery
responses and Section 998 Offer, then Defendants have good cause for not seeking
reclassification earlier.
Defendants
argue that Plaintiff only alleges damages amounting to $10,125, the amount of
Plaintiff’s past medical expenses.
(Motion pp. 3-4; Motion, Exh. A.)
However, Plaintiff’s asserted damages are not limited to past medical
expenses. Plaintiff also seeks future
medical expenses which include “one to three cervical and lumbar epidural
injection” at a cost of $8,000 each.
(Opposition p. 2, Exh. A p. 6.) Defendants
characterize Plaintiff’s prospective medical expenses as being “in the amount
of $8,000” based on Plaintiff’s answer to form interrogatories. (Motion p. 5; Motion, Exh. B, p. 7.) However, Plaintiff’s claim for future medical
expenses is not only $8,000, but at least $8,000. Moreover, Plaintiff also makes claims for general damages, such as
lost earning capacity and pain and suffering, which Defendants do not address.
Defendants
argue that even Plaintiff does not calculate her damages as exceeding $25,000
based on her October 7, 2022 service of a California Code of Civil Procedure
section 998 offer (Section 998 Offer) for $25,000.00. (Motion p. 5.) However, a Section 998 Offer is not
Plaintiff’s valuation of the case, nor does it set a ceiling for Plaintiff’s
maximum recovery. Rather, by definition,
it is, “an offer by a party to compromise.”
(Code Civ. Proc. § 998.) The value
of Plaintiff’s Section 998 Offer is not determinative of the amount in
controversy of the case.
Therefore,
Defendants have not established that this matter will necessarily result in a
verdict below the jurisdictional amount of $25,000 to warrant reclassification.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for
reclassification and transfer to limited jurisdiction is DENIED.