Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 21STCV42905, Date: 2023-02-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV42905    Hearing Date: February 23, 2023    Dept: 28

Defendant Josepfina Cardenas’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Having considered the moving, opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.

 

BACKGROUND

On November 22, 2021, Plaintiffs Rubi Sanchez (“Rubi”) and Gustavo Sanchez, Jr. (“Gustavo”) filed this action against Defendants KM By Katherine (“KM”), Arturo Ramirez (“Ramirez”), Jose Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) and Katherine Mendez Caballero (“Caballero”) for motor vehicle negligence, negligent selection and installation of tire and damages under LC § 3706. Plaintiff later amended the complaint to include Defendant Josepfina Cardenas (“Cardenas”).

On January 31, 2022, KM and Cabellero filed an answer. On February 2, 2022, Ramirez filed an answer. On September 19, 2022, Cardenas filed an answer.

On February 4, 2022, Gonzalez filed an answer. On October 5, 2022, Gonzalez filed a Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendant Cardenas for indemnity and contribution.

On November 10, 2022, Cardenas filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on January 25, 2023. The Court continued the hearing on the motion to February 23, 2023. On February 8, 2023, Gonzalez filed an opposition; Gonzalez later withdrew his opposition. On February 16, 2023, Cardenas filed a reply.

Trial is scheduled for May 22, 2023. 

 

PARTY’S REQUESTS

Cardenas request the Court grant summary judgment on the basis that these are no triable issue as to any material facts.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) CCP § 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) 

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

“[I]t is generally recognized that one who places or entrusts his [or her] motor vehicle in the hands of one whom he [or she] knows, or from the circumstances is charged with knowing, is incompetent or unfit to drive, may be held liable for an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by that driver, provided the plaintiff can establish that the injury complained of was proximately caused by the driver’s disqualification, incompetency, inexperience or recklessness ” (Flores v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1063).

Vehicle Code § 17150 provide “Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.” Under Peterson v. Grieger, Inc. (1961) 57 Cal.2d 43, 54, if an owner entrusts their car to another, they invest in the other party the same authority to select an operator.

Vehicle Code § 14604 states: "No owner of a motor vehicle may knowingly allow another person to drive the vehicle upon a highway unless the owner determines that the person possesses a valid driver's license that authorizes the person to operate the vehicle. For the purposes of this section. an owner is required only to make a reasonable effort or inquiry to determine whether the prospective driver possesses a valid driver's license before allowing him or her to operate the owner's vehicle.” McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 575-576, clarified that a jury may find an owner of a vehicle had constructive knowledge, under a theory of negligent entrustment, if there is evidence from which the jury could find a party breached its VC § 14604 duty to inquire about the driver’s license status.

 

DISCUSSION

This action stems from a rollover vehicle accident in which allegedly cause a blow out of a faulty tire. Plaintiff asserts three causes of action against all Defendants—motor vehicle negligence, installation of a faulty tire and damages pursuant to LC § 3706.

In asserting motor vehicle negligence, a liable party must have a duty based on their relationship to the vehicle. This is generally found by asserting a party owned, controlled, or operated the subject vehicle. Cardenas did not own the subject vehicle, nor was Cardenas driving at the time of the incident. (UMF 2, 4.) The driver was not driving on behalf of Cardenas, but rather KM. (UMF 6.) Cardenas has no duty to Plaintiff or Decedent; the material facts show that Cardenas cannot be liable for motor vehicle negligence. (UMF 7.)

Plaintiff’s other theory of liability—installation of the faulty tire—also fails. The undisputed material fact establishes that Cardenas did not sell or install the subject tired. (UFM 10.) Cardenas did not sell a tire or provide tire installation to the car owner prior to the incident. (UMF 12.) The Court finds Cardenas has met its burden as to both major theories of liabilities.

Finally, Cardenas cannot be liable under Labor Code § 3706, as Cardenas was not Decedent’s employer. (UMF 6.) Labor Code § 3706 allows for an employee (or employee’s dependents) to bring an action against an employer for damages if an employer fails to secure payment of workers’ compensation. As Cardenas was not Decedent’s employer or principal, there is no basis for this cause of action.

Cardenas has met its burden; there has been no opposition filed and not withdrawn. The Court grants summary judgment.

 

CONCLUSION

Defendant Josepfina Cardenas’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

            Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.

The parties are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.