Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 21STCV42905, Date: 2023-02-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV42905 Hearing Date: February 23, 2023 Dept: 28
Defendant Josepfina Cardenas’s
Motion for Summary Judgment
Having considered the moving,
opposing and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On
November 22, 2021, Plaintiffs Rubi Sanchez (“Rubi”) and Gustavo Sanchez, Jr.
(“Gustavo”) filed this action against Defendants KM By Katherine (“KM”), Arturo
Ramirez (“Ramirez”), Jose Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) and Katherine Mendez Caballero
(“Caballero”) for motor vehicle negligence, negligent selection and
installation of tire and damages under LC § 3706. Plaintiff later amended the
complaint to include Defendant Josepfina Cardenas (“Cardenas”).
On
January 31, 2022, KM and Cabellero filed an answer. On February 2, 2022,
Ramirez filed an answer. On September 19, 2022, Cardenas filed an answer.
On
February 4, 2022, Gonzalez filed an answer. On October 5, 2022, Gonzalez filed
a Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendant Cardenas for indemnity and
contribution.
On
November 10, 2022, Cardenas filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on January
25, 2023. The Court continued the hearing on the motion to February 23, 2023. On
February 8, 2023, Gonzalez filed an opposition; Gonzalez later withdrew his
opposition. On February 16, 2023, Cardenas filed a reply.
Trial
is scheduled for May 22, 2023.
PARTY’S REQUESTS
Cardenas request the Court grant
summary judgment on the basis that these are no triable issue as to any
material facts.
LEGAL
STANDARD
The
function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a
determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support
for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the
need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th
826, 843.) CCP § 437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if
all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the
evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there
is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
(Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110,
1119.) “The function of the pleadings in
a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the
function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any
triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993)
12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991)
231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)
As
to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary
judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate
an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Scalf v.
D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520) Courts “liberally
construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and
resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006)
39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Once
the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show
that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of
action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the
party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster
v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)
“[I]t
is generally recognized that one who places or entrusts his [or her] motor
vehicle in the hands of one whom he [or she] knows, or from the circumstances
is charged with knowing, is incompetent or unfit to drive, may be held liable
for an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by that driver, provided the
plaintiff can establish that the injury complained of was proximately caused by
the driver’s disqualification, incompetency, inexperience or recklessness ” (Flores
v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1063).
Vehicle
Code § 17150 provide “Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible
for death or injury to person or property resulting from a negligent or
wrongful act or omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business
of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the
permission, express or implied, of the owner.” Under Peterson v. Grieger, Inc. (1961) 57 Cal.2d 43,
54, if an owner entrusts their car to another, they invest in the other party
the same authority to select an operator.
Vehicle
Code § 14604 states: "No
owner of a motor vehicle may knowingly allow another person to drive the
vehicle upon a highway unless the owner determines that the person possesses a
valid driver's license that authorizes the person to operate the vehicle. For
the purposes of this section. an owner is required only to make a reasonable
effort or inquiry to determine whether the prospective driver possesses a valid
driver's license before allowing him or her to operate the owner's vehicle.” McKenna
v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 575-576, clarified that a jury may
find an owner of a vehicle had constructive knowledge, under a theory of
negligent entrustment, if there is evidence from which the jury could find a
party breached its VC § 14604 duty to inquire about the driver’s license
status.
DISCUSSION
This action stems from a rollover vehicle
accident in which allegedly cause a blow out of a faulty tire. Plaintiff
asserts three causes of action against all Defendants—motor vehicle negligence,
installation of a faulty tire and damages pursuant to LC § 3706.
In asserting motor vehicle negligence, a
liable party must have a duty based on their relationship to the vehicle. This
is generally found by asserting a party owned, controlled, or operated the
subject vehicle. Cardenas did not own the subject vehicle, nor was Cardenas
driving at the time of the incident. (UMF 2, 4.) The driver was not driving on
behalf of Cardenas, but rather KM. (UMF 6.) Cardenas has no duty to Plaintiff
or Decedent; the material facts show that Cardenas cannot be liable for motor
vehicle negligence. (UMF 7.)
Plaintiff’s other theory of
liability—installation of the faulty tire—also fails. The undisputed material
fact establishes that Cardenas did not sell or install the subject tired. (UFM
10.) Cardenas did not sell a tire or provide tire installation to the car owner
prior to the incident. (UMF 12.) The Court finds Cardenas has met its burden as
to both major theories of liabilities.
Finally, Cardenas cannot be liable under
Labor Code § 3706, as Cardenas was not Decedent’s employer. (UMF 6.) Labor Code
§ 3706 allows for an employee (or employee’s dependents) to bring an action
against an employer for damages if an employer fails to secure payment of
workers’ compensation. As Cardenas was not Decedent’s employer or principal,
there is no basis for this cause of action.
Cardenas has met its burden; there has been
no opposition filed and not withdrawn. The Court grants summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Defendant
Josepfina Cardenas’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Moving
party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this
ruling with the Court within five days.
The parties are directed to the header of this
tentative ruling for further instructions.