Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 21STCV44650, Date: 2023-05-15 Tentative Ruling

Department 71: Attorneys who elect to submit on these published tentative rulings, without making an appearance at the hearing, may so notify the Court by communicating this to the Department's staff at (213) 830-0771 before the set hearing time.  See, e.g., CRC Rule 324(b).   All parties are otherwise encouraged to appear by Court Call for all matters.

Case Number: 21STCV44650    Hearing Date: May 15, 2023    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 71

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Performance Composites, Inc.’s and Gabriel Martinez’s motion to strike Plaintiff Daisy Segura-Campos’ claims for punitive damages and prejudgment interest in her second amended complaint is granted.

Defendants Performance Composites, Inc. (“Performance”) and Gabriel Martinez (“Martinez”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move to strike portions of Plaintiff Daisy Segura-Campos’ (“Segura-Campos”) (“Plaintiff”) second amended complaint (“SAC”), specifically the claims for punitive damages and prejudgment interest.  (Notice of Motion, pg. 2; C.C.P. §§ 435(b)(1), 436(b).)  Defendants’ motion is made on the grounds that the SAC fails to allege the requisite specific facts to support claims for punitive damages against Defendants and the portions of the SAC discussed in this motion are improper and not in conformity with California law.  (Notice of Motion, pg. 2.)

Defendants filed the instant motion on September 12, 2022.  Plaintiff filed her opposition on March 13, 2023.  Defendants filed their replies on March 17, 2023.

Motion to Strike

Legal Standard

C.C.P. §436 provides that the Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to C.C.P. §435, or at any time within its discretion and upon terms it deems proper, “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.”  (C.C.P. §436(a).)

Summary of Motion

Defendants seek to strike the following portions of Plaintiff’s SAC: (1) ¶9, (2) ¶11, (3) ¶13, (4) ¶17, (5) ¶19, (6) ¶26, (7) ¶30, (8) Prayer ¶3 at “pre- . . . judgment interest”, and (9) Prayer ¶6.  (Notice of Motion, pg. 2.)

Punitive Damages

Punitive damages may be recovered upon a proper showing of malice, fraud, or oppression.  (Civ. Code §3294(a).)  “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.  (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)  “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights.  (Id.)  “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury.  (Id.)  Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)

a.      Defendant Performance

Absent authorization, direction, or ratification of intentional misconduct by corporate principals, a defendant that a corporate defendant cannot be held liable for punitive damages for the torts of its employees or agents.  (Hartman v. Shell Oil Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 240, 248; Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 167; see also Cruz v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 168 [holding there must be showing that an officer, director, or managing agent of a corporation is involved in the wrongful conduct before punitive damages can be imposed because Civil Code §3294(b) does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation, but requires proof of malice among corporate leaders: the officer[s], or managing agent[s] whose intentions guide corporate conduct]; White v. Ultramar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 573 [defining who could be a “managing agent” of a corporation, rejecting a test that tied directly to a position within the corporate hierarchy and requiring that a managing agent be more than a mere supervisory employee, someone who exercises substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy].)

          While Plaintiff pleads causes of action for sexual harassment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), failure to take all reasonable steps to prevent harassment and retaliation in violation of FEHA, retaliation in violation of FEHA, and wrongful termination of public policy, the allegations are conclusory and are void of the specific factual allegations required to establish that Defendant Martinez, Miguel Valencia, and Human Resources Daisy LNU made corporate policy for Defendant Performance.  Plaintiff merely alleges Defendant Martinez was a supervisor, Miguel Valencia was a production manager, and Daysi Bellamy was an HR representative—not that these individuals possessed the degree of corporate discretion and authority that would enable them to ultimately determine the employer’s corporate policy.  (See SAC ¶¶8-10.)  Moreover, no facts are alleged to suggest that Defendant Martinez, Miguel Valencia, and Human Resources Daisy LNU ever devised or created corporate policy for Defendant Performance and therefore were not managing agents for their employer.  (See Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 397, 422.)

Assuming, arguendo, Plaintiff had alleged facts to support the conclusion that Defendant Martinez, Miguel Valencia, and Human Resources Daisy LNU were the managing agents of Defendant Performance, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that Defendant Performance had preexisting knowledge of the unfitness of Defendant Martinez or any other employee or that Defendant Performance knew or should have known of the alleged conduct and failed to take immediate corrective action.  (Civ. Code §3294(b); College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725-726.)  Plaintiff’s conclusory statements that she “reported sexual harassment to Production Manager Miguel Valencia and Human Resources Representative Daisy LNU” and they are “managing agents” of Defendant Performance “inasmuch as their decisions ultimately determine corporate policy and procedures” fail to satisfy the heightened pleading standard of punitive damages by a corporate employer.  (SAC ¶¶9, 19.)

Accordingly, Defendants’ request to strike punitive damages as to Defendant Performance is granted.

b.     Defendant Martinez

California case law establishes a heightened pleading standard to recover punitive damages under §3294.  (See, e.g., Smith, 10 Cal.App.4th at pgs. 1041-1042; G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 28-29 [“certain tortious injuries demand firm allegations”].).  Based upon this heightened standard of pleading, specific facts must be alleged in order to afford the opposing party with adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against it.  (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)

Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege punitive damages against Defendant Martinez.  Plaintiff alleges “Defendant Martinez sexually harassed Plaintiff . . . by asking her out on unwanted dates, touching her sexually in an unwanted manner, and telling her that he wanted to be with her sexually and romantically.”  (SAC ¶7.)  Plaintiff alleges Defendant Martinez was a supervisor for Defendants.  (SAC ¶8.)

Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege conduct by Defendant Martinez that would rise to the level of “despicable” or “outrageous” conduct.  Here, Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendant Martinez, a supervisor in her workplace, and does not allege with specificity the unwanted and sexual touching of Plaintiff, nor the specific communications in which Defendant Martinez allegedly told Plaintiff he wanted to be with her sexually and romantically.  (See Smith, 10 Cal.App.4th at pg. 1042, citing Monge v. Superior Court (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 503.)

Accordingly, Defendants’ request to strike punitive damages as to Defendant Martinez is granted.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ request to strike claims for punitive damages from Plaintiff’s SAC ¶¶9, 11, 13, 17, 19, 26, 30, and Prayer ¶6 is granted.

Prejudgment Interest

Prejudgment interest is recoverable in actions where “damages are certain or capable of being made certain by calculation.”  (Civ. Code §3287(a).)  Damages are certain or capable of being made certain by calculation if the defendant actually knows the amount of damages owed or could compute the amount from information reasonably available to the defendant.  (KGM Harvesting Co. v. Fresh Network (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 376, 391.)  Similarly, prejudgment interest is not recoverable in personal injury claims because by their very nature, emotional distress and personal injury damages are unliquidated.  (Greater Westchester Homeowners Association v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86, 103 [“The amount of such damage is necessarily left to the subjective discretion of the trier of fact. Retroactive interest on such damages adds uncertain conjecture to speculation.”].)

Defendants argue they cannot be subject to interest charges where, as here, the amount in question is ill-defined and uncertain.  (See SAC Prayer ¶4.)

Plaintiff’s opposition does not argue the issue of recovery of prejudgment interest and therefore concedes her argument.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interest at SAC Prayer ¶4 is granted.

Conclusion

Defendants’ motion to strike from Plaintiff’s SAC ¶¶9, 11, 13, 17, 19, 26, 30, Prayer ¶3 at “pre- . . . judgment interest”, and Prayer ¶6, for punitive damages and prejudgment interest is granted. 

Dated:  May _____, 2023

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court