Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 21STCV45858, Date: 2024-12-10 Tentative Ruling

All parties are urged to meet and confer with all parties concerning this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreed-upon resolution of their matter.  If you are able to reach an agreement, please notify the courtroom staff in advance of the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative ruling rather than argue the motion by notifying the court by e-mailing the court at: SMCDEPT71@lacourt.org. Do not click on the email address, either copy and paste it or type it into your email. Include the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the Case Number in the Subject line. In the body of the email, please provide the date and time of the hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, and whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, claimant, intervenor, or non-party, etc.

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Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

SCHUBERT PALMER,

vs.

WHITE MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER, et al.

Case No.: 21STCV458581

Hearing Date: December 10, 2024

Defendant Jones Lang Lasalle Americas, Inc.’s unopposed motion for a determination that the settlement between Plaintiff Schubert Palmer and Defendant Jones Lang Lasalle Americas, Inc. was made in good faith is granted.

Defendant Jones Lang Lasalle Americas, Inc.’s unopposed motion to seal the Declaration of Jerri Johnson in Defendant Jones Lang Lasalle Americas, Inc.’s Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement is denied.

Defendant Jones Lang Lasalle Americas, Inc. (“JLL”) (“Moving Defendant”) moves for a determination that the settlement between Plaintiff Schubert Palmer (“Palmer”) (“Plaintiff”) and JLL was entered into in good faith and that any potential cross-complaints against settling defendants for indemnity be precluded. (Notice Motion Settlement, pgs. 1-2; C.C.P. §§877.6(a)(2).) JLL moves on the ground that that the settlement entered into between Plaintiff and JLL was in good faith and in accordance with the standards set forth by the California Supreme Court. (Notice Motion Settlement, pg. 2.)

Moving Defendant moves unopposed for an order sealing a declaration by Jerri Johnson (“Johnson”) which has been lodged with the Court in support of Defendant’s Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement because said declaration discloses the amount of the confidential settlement which will be paid by to Plaintiff. (Notice Motion Seal, pg. 2; CRC, Rules 2.550, 2.551.) Moving Defendant further seeks an order sealing any portion of the transcript from any hearing on the Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement wherein the settlement amount is disclosed. (Notice Motion Seal, pg. 2.) Moving Defendant moves on the grounds that that Plaintiff and Defendant have agreed to a confidential settlement with the confidentiality of the amount of settlement being a material term of the settlement, but in the interest of fairness and justice the amount of the settlement has been disclosed to the non-settling defendant, Adventist Health White Memorial [erroneously sued as White Memorial Medical Center and Adventist Health White Memorial] (“AHWM”) (“Non-Settling Defendant”). (Notice of Motion Seal, pg. 2.)

Background

On December 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against AHWM alleging two causes of action: (1) general negligence; and (2) premises liability. On July 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed a DOE Amendment to the Complaint, naming JLL as Doe 1. (7/19/22 Amendment to Complaint.) No cross-complaints were filed as between AHWM and JLL.

On November 6, 2024, Plaintiff and JLL participated in a private mediation (“Mediation”) with mediator Natasha Roit (“Mediator”). As part of the Proposed Settlement, Plaintiff agreed to execute a Request for Dismissal with prejudice as to Defendant JLL for all causes of action alleged by Plaintiff. (Decl. of Johnson ¶3.)

JLL filed the instant motion for good faith settlement and a motion to seal on November 12, 2024. As of the date of this hearing no oppositions have been filed.

Motion for Good Faith Settlement

Legal Standard

C.C.P. §§877(a)-(b) provides:

Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort, or to one or more other co-obligors mutually subject to contribution rights, it shall have the following effect:

It shall not discharge any other such party from liability unless its terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater.

It shall discharge the party to whom it is given from all liability for any contribution to any other parties.

(C.C.P. §§877(a)-(b).)

“The issue of the good faith of a settlement may be determined by the court on the basis of affidavits served with the notice of hearing, and any counter affidavits filed in response, or the court may, in its discretion, receive other evidence at the hearing.” (C.C.P. §877.6(b).)

A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (C.C.P. §877.6(c).)

There is no precise yardstick for measuring “good faith” of a settlement with one of several tortfeasors. But it must harmonize the public policy favoring settlements with the competing public policy favoring equitable sharing of costs among tortfeasors. To accomplish this, the settlement must be within the “reasonable range” (within the “ballpark”) of the settling tortfeasor’s share of liability for the plaintiff’s injuries—taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the particular case. (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 488, 499.)

Whether the settlement was within the “good faith ballpark” is to be evaluated on the basis of information available at the time of settlement, including: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than if found liable after a trial; (4) the allocation of the settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (5) the settlor’s financial condition and insurance policy limits, if any; and (6) evidence of any collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct between the settlor and the plaintiffs aimed at making the non-settling parties pay more than their fair share. (Id.)

“The party asserting lack of good faith (in a settlement) shall have the burden of proof on that issue.” (C.C.P. §877.6(d).)

The Court determines the settlement between Plaintiff and JLL was made in good faith. JLL sufficiently demonstrated each of the relevant factors enumerated in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488 to determine the settlement is made in good faith.

First, JLL agreed to settle with Plaintiff for a confidential sum as reasonable consideration of the compromise, release, and waiver of claims stated therein. (Decl. of Johnson ¶3.) Plaintiff alleged damages of including past medical expenses, past and future loss of earnings and general damages. Under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff and JLL have agreed to a confidential settlement amount to be paid on behalf of Defendant JLL, which is deemed fair, reasonable, and in good faith. (See Decl. of Johnson ¶3.)

Second, JLL believes the settlement reflects a fair approximation of its potential liability relative to the other Defendants. The proposed settlement takes into account a general estimate of its proportional share of liability for Plaintiff’s potential recovery at trial. JLL argues it had strong defenses pertaining to fault of other defendants and previously dismissed cross-defendants as well as to Plaintiff; thus, there was a strong possibility JLL would not be found liable at all for Plaintiff’s alleged injuries and damages. JLL argues that during the negotiation of the proposed settlement, however, consideration was taken into account that if JLL was found liable, then JLL would pay less in settlement potentially than they might be found liable to pay at trial. (Motion Settlement, pg. 8.)

Third, the amount of the settlement reflects a compromise between what Plaintiff believes he would win at trial and what JLL believes it is owed. JLL argues that given Plaintiff’s alleged damages are in excess of the proposed settlement amount, if JLL were found liable at trial, it is possible Plaintiff would be awarded damages in excess of the amount agreed to for settlement in this matter. JLL argues that settlement in this matter acknowledged that risk and resulted in a compromise wherein both parties agreed that JLL would pay less in settlement than may be possibly awarded against them at trial if JLL were found liable. (Motion Settlement, pg. 8.)

Finally, there is no evidence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of Non-Settling Defendant. (Motion Settlement, pg. 9.) The proposed settlement was the product of arm’s length negotiations among experienced counsel in an adversarial setting. (See Motion Settlement, pg. 9.)

Accordingly, JLL’s motion to confirm their settlement with Plaintiff was made in good faith is granted.

JLL’s unopposed motion for a determination that its settlement with Plaintiff was entered into in good faith is granted.

Moving Party to give notice.

Motion to Seal

Legal Standard

CRC Rule 2.551(a) provides, as follows: “A record must not be filed under seal without a court order. The court must not permit a record to be filed under seal based solely on the agreement or stipulation of the parties.”

CRC Rule 2.551(b)(1) provides, as follows: “A party requesting that a record be filed under seal must file a motion or an application for an order sealing the record. The motion or application must be accompanied by a memorandum and a declaration containing facts sufficient to justify the sealing.”

CRC Rule 2.550(d) provides, as follows: “The court may order that a record be filed under seal only if it expressly finds facts that establish: (1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record; (2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record; (3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed; (4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and (5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest.”

CRC Rule 2.550(e) provides: “An order sealing the record must:

(A) Specifically state the facts that support the findings; and (B) Direct the sealing of only those documents and pages, or, if reasonably practicable, portions of those documents and pages, that contain the material that needs to be placed under seal. All other portions of each document or page must be included in the public file.”

Motion to Seal

JLL moves to seal the Declaration of Johnson, which identifies the amount of the settlement between JLL and Plaintiff. JLL moves to seal on the basis that the settlement agreement requires that JLL pay plaintiff a confidential sum in return for Plaintiff dismissing his claim against JLL with prejudice.

JLL argues there exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the Declaration of Johnson because the parties agreed that the release agreement will have a confidentiality agreement. (Motion Seal, pg. 5.)

JLL does not sufficiently demonstrate that the information contained in the Declaration of Johnson and the desire for the contents thereof to remain confidential presents an overriding interest that overcomes the right of the public access to the records. The legal authority on which JLL relies is not analogous to the instant situation and is also not a holding that is binding upon this Court. (See Motion Seal, pgs. 4-5.)

The First Amendment provides a right of access to ordinary civil trials and proceedings. (NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1212.) Before court records can be ordered sealed, the Court must hold a hearing and expressly find that (1) there exists an overriding interest supporting closure and/or sealing; (2) there is a substantial probability that the interest will be prejudiced absent closure and/or sealing; (3) the proposed closure and/or sealing is narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest; and (4) there is no less restrictive means of achieving the overriding interest. (Id., 1217-1218.

The Court finds that JLL fails to establish that it’s interest in maintaining the secrecy of its settlement amount overrides the public’s interest in discovering it. Nor has JLL established that there is a substantial probability that its interests will be prejudiced absent sealing the settlement amount. Finally, JLL failed to submit proposed redactions for the Court to review and for the Court to effectuate sealing the declaration. Without these redactions, this Court cannot determine that the sealing is narrowly tailored, or that no less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest.

Accordingly, JLL’s motion to seal is denied.

Conclusion

JLL’s unopposed motion to seal is denied.

Moving Party to give notice.