Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 22SMCV01184, Date: 2023-04-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22SMCV01184 Hearing Date: April 11, 2023 Dept: 207
Background
Plaintiffs Kasra Vahmi and Bersadeh Bagheri (“Plaintiffs”)
bring this action against Defendant Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as
trustee for Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust (“Defendant”) concerning Plaintiffs’
right to possess certain real property located at 2491 Roscomare Road in Los
Angeles, California. This property has been the subject of other litigation
between the parties, most notably an unlawful detainer action brought by
Defendant to recover possession of the property from Plaintiffs, who are
currently occupying the property. This unlawful detainer action was previously
tried to a jury, who returned a verdict in favor of Defendant. The subsequent
judgment entered in that action is currently pending on appeal.
Plaintiffs’ operative pleading in this action is the First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed on March 2, 2023, and asserting causes of
action against Defendant for (1) quiet title, (2) declaratory relief, (3)
injunctive relief, and (4) breach of contract. The Court sustained Defendant’s
prior demurrer to Plaintiff’s original Complaint, on the basis that the
Complaint sought to relitigate issues which were the subject of the unlawful
detainer action. The Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend based on
representations that they could assert claims concerning an alleged contractual
right to purchase the subject property which would not invade the provenance of
the verdict and rulings of the unlawful detainer action or pending appeal
therefrom.
Defendant now brings a demurrer to Plaintiffs’ FAC under
Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.10(e) and 430.10(c). Plaintiffs oppose the demurrer.
Request for Judicial Notice
Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of
pleadings and court records in other actions pending between the parties.
Defendant’s request is unopposed and is GRANTED.
Demurrer Standard
When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations
liberally and in context. (Wilson v. Transit Authority of City of Sacramento
(1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 716, 720-21.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must
be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian
v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the
pleading alone, and not on the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v.
Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) As such,
the court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied
factual allegations. (Id.) However, it does not accept as true
deductions, contentions, or conclusions of law or fact. (Stonehouse Homes
LLC v. City of Sierra Madre (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 531, 538.)
The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege
ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter
of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set
forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with
sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and
extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
(1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.)
Analysis
1. Meet
& Confer
The Court finds Defendants have
satisfied their obligation under Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a)(3) by submitting a
declaration showing “the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer
failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or
otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.” (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(3)(B);
Wozniak Decl. at ¶3.)
2. Other
Litigation Between the Parties
Defendant has previously filed two
unlawful detainer actions against Plaintiffs. The first, action 19SMUD00192, was
dismissed. This unlawful detainer action then gave rise to a malicious
prosecution action filed by Plaintiffs, action 20SMCV00691.
Defendant subsequently filed a
second unlawful detainer case, action 19SMUD02217. The 19SMUD02217 action was
tried to a jury. The jury returned a verdict in Defendant’s favor, finding
Plaintiffs did not have a right to possess the property. In that action,
Plaintiffs argued they had the right to possess the subject property as bona
fide tenants under the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (“PTFA”). In the
19SMUD02217 action, Plaintiffs fully litigated this issue in pre- and
post-trial briefing, as well as in the trial itself, and Plaintiffs claims were
rejected by the Court and the jury. Plaintiffs have appealed this result in the
19SMUD02217 action, and this appeal is still pending. Plaintiffs moved for a
stay of the lockout in the 19SMUD02217 action pending the appeal, which was
denied.
In sustaining Defendant’s prior
demurrer, the Court found Plaintiffs were improperly seeking to relitigate
their status as bona fide tenants under the PTFA, a matter which was fully
adjudicated in the 19SMUD02217 action. The Court found the relief requested in
their original Complaint would necessary and improperly require the Court to overturn
or ignore the jury’s verdict and subsequent rulings which determined Plaintiffs
were not bona fide tenants under the PTFA.
The Court’s tentative ruling sustained
Defendant’s prior demurrer without leave to amend. However, at the hearing on
the demurrer, Plaintiffs’ counsel argued for the first time that Plaintiffs had
a contractual right to purchase the property which was not adjudicated in the
19SMUD02217 action. The Court thus sustained Defendant’s demurrer with leave to
amend to allow Plaintiffs to assert claims related to their purported
contractual right to purchase the property.
3. First
Amended Complaint
Plaintiffs’ FAC asserts causes of
action for quiet title, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and breach of
contract. Each of these causes of action is premised on the allegation that
Plaintiffs had an oral lease with third-party Mia Jeong which allowed them to
occupy the subject property in exchange for monthly rent of $3,500. (FAC at
¶¶5-6.) Plaintiffs allege this oral lease included an option to repurchase the
home from Jeong at any time for $1.19 million. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege
Defendant is bound by the oral option agreement between Plaintiffs and Jeong
because Plaintiffs “are bona fide tenants under the PTFA.” (Id. at ¶9.)
The FAC thus acknowledges Plaintiff’s claim to a right to purchase the property
stems from their status as bona fide tenants under the PTFA. As set forth
above, this issue has been extensively litigated in the 19SMUD02217 action. As
with the original Complaint, the FAC seeks to relitigate Plaintiffs’ status as
bona fide purchasers under the PTFA. Indeed, the FAC itself attacks the
validity of the jury verdict reached in the 19SMUD02217 action: “The jury
verdict resulted in a finding that Vahmi and Bagheri had a lease on the subject
property that was the result of an arm’s length negotiated transaction, but due
to the erroneous jury instruction telling the jury that fair market value
should be determined at the time of the foreclosure sale, the jury found that
the amount of rent was substantially less than fair market value.” (FAC at
¶17.) This exact argument was raised by Plaintiffs and rejected by the Court in
post-verdict briefing in the 19SMUD02217 action. Plaintiffs are thus expressly
using this action to correct what they view as errors made by the Court in the
adjudication of the 19SMUD02217 action.
This conclusion is further
bolstered by a review of the relief sought by Plaintiffs in the FAC. For
example, the FAC seeks “a temporary restraining order to stop the imminent
lockout and sale of the property.” (FAC at ¶39.) The prayer for relief in the
FAC also asks the Court to declare their “rights under the PTFA,” and seeks
permanent injunctive relief prohibiting their evictions from the property. (FAC
at 9-10.) Even if the Court were to find Plaintiffs had a valid option to
purchase the property, this would not entitle Plaintiffs to remain in
possession of the property as they do not claim to have paid Defendant the
$1.19 million required under the purported option agreement. The existence of a
valid purchase option may entitle Plaintiffs to restrain any further sale of
the property, but would not give Plaintiffs the right to occupy the property in
contravention of the judgment on possession entered in the 19SMUD02217 action.
The relief sought by Plaintiffs goes beyond the scope of any claimed right to
purchase the property and instead seeks to collaterally attack the verdict and
rulings on the issue of possession in the 19SMUD02217 action.
As the Court explained in Paul Blanco's
Good Car Co. Auto Group v. Superior Court (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 86:
As a general
rule, a trial judge cannot overturn the order of another trial judge.
[Citations] Weighty concerns compel this long-standing principle. (In re Alberto
(2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 426–431 [125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 526] (Alberto).) Fundamentally,
it “is founded on the inherent difference between a judge and a court and is designed
to ensure the orderly administration of justice.” (Id. at p. 427.) Because
a superior court is a single entity comprised of member judges, “‘one member of
that court cannot sit in review on the actions of another member of that same court.’”
(Id. at pp. 427–428.) “For one superior court judge, no matter how well intended,
even if correct as a matter of law, to nullify a duly made, erroneous ruling of
another superior court judge places the second judge in the role of a one-judge
appellate court,” and “‘it would be only a matter of days until we would have a
rule of man rather than a rule of law.’” (Id. at p. 427.) Furthermore, to
countenance such a practice would lead to judge-shopping—venturing from judge to
judge until a favorable ruling is obtained—which “‘would instantly breed lack of
confidence in the integrity of the courts.’” (Ibid.)
(Id. at 99-100.) As with
Plaintiff’s original Complaint, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ FAC would require
the Court to overturn or ignore the verdict reached by the jury in the
19SMUD02217 action, as well as the Court’s orders in that action denying
Plaintiffs’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for new trial,
and for a stay of proceedings pending the resolution of Plaintiff’s appeal in
order to relitigate Plaintiffs’ status as bona fide tenants under the PTFA and
right to possession of the property stemming therefrom. Accordingly, the Court
SUSTAINS Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ FAC under Code Civ. Proc. §
430.10(c).
Plaintiffs bear the
burden of demonstrating they can cure the defects in the Complaint through
further amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendant’s demurrer does not
make any showing as to how this issue could be cured through further amendment.
The central purpose of this action is to avoid the lockout following the
judgment in the 19SMUD02217 action and to relitigate Plaintiffs’ rights under
the PTFA. The Court is not sustaining the demurrer on the basis of some
technical issue or deficient factual allegations, rather it is sustaining the
demurrer because it cannot grant the relief sought by Plaintiffs without
improperly invading the orders and judgments of the 19SMUD02217 action. The
Court finds no basis to conclude this issue could be cured by further
amendment, and thus the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer without leave to
amend.
Conclusion
Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint is SUSTAINED
without leave to amend.