Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 22STCV04191, Date: 2022-08-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV04191 Hearing Date: August 16, 2022 Dept: 28
Defendant Roberto Hernandez’s Motion
to Strike
Having considered the moving papers, the Court rules as
follows.
BACKGROUND
On February 2, 2022, Plaintiff Jimmie Khuu (“Plaintiff”)
filed this action against Defendant Roberto Hernandez (“Hernandez”) for motor
vehicle negligence and general negligence.
On
July 12, 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Strike to be heard on August 16,
2022.
Trial
is currently scheduled for August 2, 2023.
PARTY’S REQUESTS
Defendants
requests the Court strike the paragraphs ¶¶ 19 and 28, as well as the request
for punitive damages.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Any
party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a
notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof, but this time
limitation shall not apply to motions specified in subdivision (e).” (CCP § 435(b)(1), italics added.) “A notice of motion to strike must be given
within the time allowed to plead, and if a demurrer is interposed, concurrently
therewith, and must be noticed for hearing and heard at the same time as the
demurrer.” (CRC 3.1322(b), italic
added.) “The defendant shall answer the
amendments, or the complaint as amended, within 30 days after service thereof,
or such other time as the court may direct, and judgment by default may be
entered upon failure to answer, as in other cases.” (CCP § 471.5(a).)
“The
grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged
pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial
notice.” (CCP § 437(a).) The court looks to whether “the complaint
alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete
defense.” (Ivanoff, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th
p. 725.) The court “assume[s] the truth
of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be
inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has
been taken.” (Id.) “The court does not, however, assume the
truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.]”
(Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358.)
Code
of Civil Procedure § 436 states that “[t]he court may, upon a motion made
pursuant to Section 435, or at any time at its discretion, and upon terms it
deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted
in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or
filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or any order of
the court.”
In
order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set
forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code
Section 3294. (Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal. 4th
704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has
been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294 (a).) “Malice is
defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to
the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a
willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." (Coll.
Hosp., Inc., supra, 8 Cal. 4th at 725 [examining Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1)].)
“...[T]he
act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of
‘malice’...if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious
disregard of the probably dangerous consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979), 24 Cal.3d 890, 892.) The Taylor
court further provides that driving while intoxicated is, alone, insufficient
to justify an award for punitive damages. “Examining the pleadings before us,
we have no difficulty concluding that they contain sufficient allegations upon
which it may reasonably be concluded that defendant consciously disregarded the
safety of others. There is a very commonly understood risk which attends every
motor vehicle driver who is intoxicated. One who willfully consumes alcoholic
beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate
a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental
faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be
held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others. The effect may
be lethal whether or not the driver had a prior history of drunk driving
incidents.” (Id. at 896-897.)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s
complaint alleges that Defendant, while driving under the influence,
negligently drove resulting in injuries to Plaintiff. The complaint further alleges that Defendant
fled the scene after crashing into Plaintiff.
Punitive
Damages
Defendant’s
request is derived from an assertion that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled
substantial enough facts to make a claim for punitive damages, as Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant negligently operated his vehicle, resulting in an
accident collision.
The
Court disagrees, in part. Driving while under the influence can be considered
“despicable conduct...carried on...with a willful and conscious disregard of
the rights or safety of others.” (Coll Hosp., Inc., supra 8 Cal 4th at
725.) It is widely known that driving while intoxicated is likely to cause
serious injury or death to bystanders; it is not mere gross negligence. It
exhibits a conscious disregard for the safety of others, and, given the
likelihood of serious injury, can be argued to be despicable conduct.
However,
the Court notes that driving while intoxicated, alone, is not sufficient to
support a claim for punitive damages. There must be additional circumstances
which “disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.”
(Taylor, supra 24 Cal.3d 890 at 892.) While Plaintiff also alleges that
Defendant fled the scene without rendering aid, there still is a lack of
showing of willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others in
actually causing the injury. There are no additional facts alleged to support
the request. The complaint has not provided an adequate basis to request
punitive damages. The Court grants the motion.
CONCLUSION
Defendant
Roberto Hernandez’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED with 30 days leave to amend.
Moving party is ordered to give
notice of this ruling.
Moving Party is ordered to
file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.
The parties
are directed to the header of this tentative ruling for further instructions.