Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 22STCV11210, Date: 2024-04-02 Tentative Ruling


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Case Number: 22STCV11210    Hearing Date: April 2, 2024    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 71

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

RAYMUNDO FLORES SILVA, et al., 

 

         vs.

 

AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO., INC.

 Case No.:  22STCV11210

 

 

 

 Hearing Date:  April 2, 2024

 

Plaintiffs Raymundo Flores Silva aka Raymundo A. Silva’s and Mercedes Casillas Pina’s motion for attorneys’ fees is granted in the total reduced amount of $25,431.50.  Plaintiff’s requests for costs is granted in the amount of 3,603.52. 

Plaintiffs Raymundo Flores Silva aka Raymundo A. Silva (“Silva”) and Mercedes Casillas Pina (“Pina”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) move for an order awarding their attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to a settlement with Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“AHM”) (“Defendant”) in the total amount of $41,750.77, comprised of $25,431.50 in attorneys fees, including a 0.5 lodestar enhancement in the amount of $12,715.75, for a total of $38,147.25 in attorneys’ fees, and costs in the amount of $3,603.52.  (Notice of Motion, pg. 1; Civ. Code §1794(d).) 

 

Evidentiary Objections

Plaintiffs’ 3/25/24 evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Bryan Reynolds (“Reynolds”) are sustained as to Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

 

Background

This is a lemon law action brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly Act”).  On July 24, 2023, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement, whereby the Subject Vehicle would be repurchased for $52,500.00, and attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses would be decided by motion.  (See Decl. of Kirnos ¶20.)  The parties agreed that attorney’s fees and costs would be cut off after March 30, 2023 (the date Defendant’s 998 Offer to Plaintiffs expired) other than time for a motion for attorney’s fees and costs should one be required (as the time for that motion would have been incurred even if Plaintiffs accepted the CCP 998 Offer).  (Id.)  The Settlement Agreement included full restitution of payments made on the Subject Vehicle, and some civil penalties.  (Id.)

On March 1, 2024, Plaintiffs filed this motion for attorneys’ fees and a memorandum of costs.  Defendant filed its opposition on March 20, 2024.  Plaintiffs filed their reply on March 25, 2024.

 

Discussion

Civil Code §1794(d) provides that a buyer who prevails in an action under that section, “shall be allowed by the court to recover as a part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and the prosecution of such action.”

Here, Plaintiffs are the prevailing party per parties’ Settlement Agreement and are entitled to attorneys’ fees.  (See Decl. of Kirnos ¶20.)  Defendant does not contest that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party.

 

Reasonable Fees

To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by the Plaintiffs’ counsel. The Supreme Court of California has concluded that a reasonable hourly lodestar rate is the prevailing rate for private attorneys “conducting non-contingent litigation of the same type.”  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133, emphasis added.)

Roger Kirnos declares the following hourly rates for attorneys of Knight Law Group: (1) Roger Kirnos ($550.00/hour); (2) Amy Morse ($350.00-$450.00/hour); (3) Chris Swanson ($375.00-$500.00/hour); (4) Evelina Chang ($375.00/hour); (5) Elvira Kamosko ($295.00/hour); (6) Heidi Alexander ($325.00-$350.00/hour); (7) Jacob Cutler ($425.00-$450.00/hour); (8) Maite Colón ($300.00-$425.00/hour); (9) Maxwell Kreymer ($200.00-$350.00/hour); (10) Melissa Melero ($225.00-$395.00/hour); (11) Thomas Dreblow ($250.00-$350.00/hour); (12) Timothy Lupinek ($375.00/hour); and (13) Thach Tran ($350.00-$395.00/hour).  (Decl. of Kirnos ¶¶2, 25-38, Exh. A.)  This rate is appropriate given each the attorney’s relative experience and qualifications.  (See id.)  Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated their counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable in their community of practice in their specialized area of law.

Defendant challenges Plaintiffs’ counsel’s hourly rates as unreasonable but does not challenge with the necessary particularity.  (Opposition, pgs. 5-7.)  The Court finds Plaintiffs’ counsel’s rates to be reasonable and do not warrant reductions.

 

Billed Hours

The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden to show “the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.”  (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel’s fee recovery is based on the 66.2 hours spent by their litigating this case for a total of $25,431.50.  (Decl. of Kirnos ¶2, Exh. A at pg. 7.)  Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billed hours were not reasonably incurred, were block billed, vague, and duplicative, and therefore should be cut.  (Opposition, pgs. 7-8.)  The Court has reviewed Defendant’s objections to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billed hours and does not find Defendant met its burden in the argument presented in its motion and attempts to expand its motion by referring to a spreadsheet attached to an exhibit, which the Court will not review.

Defendant does not cite to specific examples in its motion of hours that were excessive, unreasonable and unnecessary, duplicative. Therefore, Defendant did not meet its burden to challenge these fees. 

Second, Defendant’s objection to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s block billing refers only to block billing entries rather than particular dates for particular billing entries that are block billed.  Therefore, Defendant did not meet its burden to challenge these fees. 

Finally, Defendant’s objection to Plaintiffs’ number of attorneys billing on this case for “create[ing] additional inefficiencies” is unavailing, as three of the twelve attorneys who billed on this matter, Jacob Cutler (13.1 hours), Thach Tran (21.2 hours), and Maxwell Kreymer (10 hours) completed 44.3 of the total 66.2 hours billed in this matter.  Therefore, Defendant did not meet its burden to challenge these fees.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees is granted in the amount of $25,431.50.

 

Final Lodestar Determination

The Court denies Plaintiffs’ request for a 0.5 lodestar multiplier.  Given the routine work done in this case and the results obtained in this lemon law area, a multiplier is not appropriate. Any contingency risk factor is already accounted for in the hourly rates, which the Court has found to be reasonable.

 

Costs

Plaintiffs’ memorandum of costs requests a total of $3,603.52.  Defendant only challenges Plaintiffs’ request for the costs of deposing Defendant’s PMQ for the amount of $598.65.  (Decl. of Reynolds ¶15, Exh. H.)  However, Plaintiffs’ request for costs of deposing Defendants’ PMQ is for the March 15, 2023, notice of non-appearance of Defendant’s PMQ, and is therefore appropriate.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ memorandum of costs is granted in the total amount of $3,603.52.

 

Conclusion

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees is granted in the amount of $25,431.50.  Plaintiff’s request for costs is granted in the amount of 3,603.52.  Plaintiffs’ motion is granted in the reduced total amount of

Moving Party to give notice.

 

 

Dated:  April _____, 2024                          


Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court