Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 22STCV14224, Date: 2025-04-15 Tentative Ruling

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Plaintiff Mir Rafiq’s motion for attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses is granted in the total reduced amount of $62,303.50, consisting of $60,303.50 in attorney fees and an additional $2,000.00 for Plaintiff’s counsel to review Defendant’s Opposition, draft the Reply, and attend the hearing on this Motion.

Plaintiff Mir Rafiq (“Rafiq”) (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order awarding them attorney fees, costs, and expenses in the total amount of $90,545.39 against Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“MBUSA”) (“Defendant”) pursuant to a signed 998 Offer to Compromise, consisting of (1) $60,303.50 in attorney fees for Strategic Legal Practices, APC (“SLP”); (2) a 1.35 multiplier enhancement on the attorney fees (or $21,106.23); (3) $5,135.66 in costs and expenses for SLP; and (4) an additional $4,000.00 for Plaintiff’s counsel to review Defendant’s Opposition, draft the Reply, and attend the hearing on this Motion (though counsel expects to incur over $4,000.00 in fees on these tasks). (Notice of Motion, pgs. 1-2; Civ. Code § 1794(d); C.C.P. §664.6.)

The Court rules on Plaintiff's 4/8/25 evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Meghan Gallagher in support of Defendant’s Opposition as follows:

Plaintiff’s 12/23/24 request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1-24 is denied as irrelevant.

This is a lemon law action brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly”). On November 4, 2024, Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s 998 Offer in the amount of $302,000.00, plus all lease payments made by Plaintiff that were due on or after November 15, 2024, in exchange for the Subject Vehicle, plus attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses by motion. (Decl. of Baker ¶53, Exh. 4 at pg. 2.)

On December 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.

Civil Code §1794(d) provides that a buyer who prevails in an action under that section, “shall be allowed by the court to recover as a part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and the prosecution of such action.”

C.C.P. §998(c)(1) provides as follows: “If an offer made by a defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award, the plaintiff shall not recover his or her post offer costs and shall pay the defendant’s costs from the time of the offer.” (C.C.P. §998(c)(1).) “In determining whether the plaintiff obtains a more favorable judgment, the court . . . shall exclude the post offer costs.” (C.C.P. §998(c)(2)(A).) “If an offer made by a defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award, the costs under this section, from the time of the offer, shall be deducted from any damages awarded in favor of the plaintiff.” (C.C.P. §998(e).)

Section 998’s plain language only penalizes plaintiffs who “fail[] to obtain a more favorable judgment or award” than a §998 offer by cutting off their post-offer costs and requiring them to pay “defendant’s [post-offer] costs” out of any “damages awarded.” (C.C.P. §§998(c)(1), (e).)

A party who settles cannot “fail” to obtain a more favorable “judgment or award.” “Fail[ure]” connotes defeat, abandonment, or “[i]nvoluntarily” falling short of one’s purpose. (Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 385, 413-414, citing Burton’s Legal Thesaurus (3d ed. 1998) p. 228, col. 1, Black’s Law Dict. (rev. 4th ed. 1968) at pg. 711, col. 1; accord Cambridge Dict. Online (2023) [“fail” means “to not succeed in what you are trying to achieve”].) Section 998(d) is explicit: A “judgment or award entered pursuant to this section shall be deemed to be a compromise settlement.” (C.C.P. §998(d).)

To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by the Plaintiff’s counsel. The Supreme Court of California has concluded that a reasonable hourly lodestar rate is the prevailing rate for private attorneys “conducting non-contingent litigation of the same type.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133, emphasis added.)

Plaintiff’s Counsel declares the following hourly rates: (1) Angel Baker at $595 per hour; (2) Eve Canton (Law Clerk) at $325 per hour; (3) Sasha Dismuke at $425 per hour; (4) Jacob Lister at $495 per hour; (5) Rosy Stoliker at $435 per hour; (6) and Michael Tracy at $475 per hour. (Decl. of Shahian ¶ 12, Exh. 20 at pg. 4.) Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that their counsel’s hourly rate is reasonable in their community of practice in their specialized area of law. (Decl. of Shahian ¶¶1-13, Exh. 25.)

Here, Defendant’s opposition objects to the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates. The Court finds Plaintiff’s counsel’s rates to be reasonable such that they do not warrant a reduction.

The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden to show “the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

Here, the declarations and billing records provided by Plaintiff’s counsel are sufficient to meet the burden of proving the reasonableness of the claimed fees in terms of amounts and tasks. To satisfy this burden, evidence and descriptions of billable tasks must be presented in sufficient detail, enabling the court to evaluate whether the case was overstaffed, the time attorneys spent on specific claims, and the reasonableness of the hours expended. (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486-487.)

Plaintiff’s fee recovery is based on 126.8 hours Plaintiff’s counsel spent litigating this case through the instant motion. (See Decl. of Shahian, Exh. 25 at pg. 3.) The fees incurred are reasonable, as captured in the billing records submitted to this Court. Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing records reflect the actual time and clear descriptions of services performed in connection with litigating this case. Although the submission of such detailed time records is not necessary under California law, if submitted, such records “are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

Defendant objects to several of Plaintiff’s requested fees on the basis they were not reasonably incurred or are excessive.

First, Defendant objects to “excessive time on template pleadings and emails” (Opposition, pg. 8.) as follows: 1.6 hrs at $485/hour ($776.00) to tailor a template Complaint; 1.1 hrs at $435/hr ($478.50) to draft amended template deposition notice; 1.3 hrs at $325/hr ($422.50) to draft demand for expert designation; 0.5 hrs at $395/hr ($197.50) to draft email re depositions and trial; 1 hr at $325/hr to draft declaration of unavailability; 0.5 hrs at $395/hr ($197.50) to draft one sentence email; 9 hrs at $425/hr ($3,825) to draft reply to motion to compel PMK depo; 10 hrs at $475/hr ($4,940) each to draft opposition to motion to compel arbitration; 8.8 hrs at $595/hour ($5,236.00) to draft fee motion. (See Opposition, pgs. 5-6.)

Here, Defendant’s objection is not well taken. Defendant merely concludes that all of the above pleadings were templates and are therefore excessive in their respective billing. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) Further, Defendant does not cite any authority stating that the pleadings and emails that it presumes to be templated should be reduced. Therefore, Defendant fails to meet its burden to challenge these fees.

Second, Defendant objects to “excessive billing for hearings” and “improper block-billing” for hearings on December 20, 2022, April 25, 2024, October 29, 2024, and November 4, 2024. (Opposition, pgs. 6-7.) Here, Defendant largely makes conclusory statements that Plaintiff’s fees for appearance at the above hearings are excessive and that they are improperly block-billed. Defendant compares Plaintiff’s billing to Defendant’s in order to claim that it is excessive, which is not a proper basis for objection, stating in a conclusory manner that “Plaintiff’s counsel billed 1.9 hours to prepare for and attend meet and confer conference with Defense counsel. Defense counsel billed 1.4 hours for this task. This is also improper block-billing.” (Id.) Defendant essentially argues that Defendant’s billing should be the benchmark, and therefore anything Plaintiff bills above that is excessive. Defendant provides no authority for such a standard. Therefore, Defendant fails to meet its burden to challenge these fees.

Finally, Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s request for $4,000 for Plaintiff’s counsel to review Defendant’s Opposition, draft the Reply, and attend the hearing on this Motion. (Opposition, pg. 7.), stating, “Defendant objects to the anticipatory $4,000.00 claimed by Plaintiff’s counsel as those hours have not been incurred and the amount is excessive for the task.” (Id.) The Court agrees that $4,000 is excessive and awards $2,000.

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s requested attorneys’ fees in the amount of $60,303.50 and Plaintiff’s request for $2,000.00 in fees for Plaintiff’s counsel to review Defendant’s Opposition, draft the Reply, and attend the hearing on this Motion, totaling $62,303.50.

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request for a 1.35 lodestar multiplier. Given the routine work done in this case and the results obtained in this lemon law area, a multiplier is not appropriate. Any contingency risk factor is already accounted for in the hourly rates, which the Court has found to be reasonable.

Plaintiff requests a total of $5,135.66 in costs and expenses. (Motion, pg. 15.) Defendant contends that it intends to challenge Plaintiff’s costs via a properly noticed motion, which will be filed based on the time allowed per statute. (Opposition, pg. 10.) Defendant asks the Court to decline to award any costs until MBUSA’s motion to strike/tax costs is heard. (Id.)

The Court finds that costs are not to be requested by a fee motion but rather by a memorandum of costs, which Plaintiff has not yet filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1).)

Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses is granted in the reduced total amount of $62,303.50, consisting of $60,303.50 in attorney fees and an additional $2,000.00 for Plaintiff’s counsel to review Defendant’s Opposition, draft the Reply, and attend the hearing on this Motion.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court