Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 22STCV16127, Date: 2023-09-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV16127    Hearing Date: April 10, 2024    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 71

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Florentino C. Apeles’ motion for attorneys’ fees is granted in the total amount of $31,210.00.

Defendant Florentino C. Apeles (“Apeles”) (“Defendant”) moves for an order awarding him attorneys’ fees in the amount of $31,210.00 against Plaintiff National Robertson Carwash Care, Inc. (“Carwash Care”) (“Plaintiff”) as the prevailing party in the instant case.  (Notice of Motion, pgs. 1-2; Civ. Code §1717.)

Background

On May 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed its complaint against Defendant in the instant action.  On August 30, 2022, Plaintiff filed its first amended complaint (“FAC”).  On March 15, 2023, this Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s 1st through 8th causes of action in its FAC with 20 days leave to amend.  (3/15/23 Minute Order.)

On April 3, 2023, Plaintiff its second amended complaint (“SAC”).  On October 5, 2023, this Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to all causes of action with 20 days leave to amend.

On October 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed a third amended complaint (“TAC”), alleging eight causes of action: (1) intentional interference with contractual relationship, (2) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, (3) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, (4) breach of contract, (5) breach of good faith and fair dealing, (6) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment, (7) constructive eviction, and (8) declaratory relief arising from alleged Defendant landlord and Plaintiff tenant’s car wash lease agreement for the car wash portion of real property at 3071 S. Robertson Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90034 (“Subject Property”).   (See TAC.)  

On January 30, 2024, this Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s TAC without leave to amend.  On February 15, 2024, this Court entered Judgment in favor of Defendant.

On February 20, 2024, Defendant filed this motion for attorneys’ fees.  Plaintiff filed its opposition on March 28, 2024.  Defendant filed his reply on April 4, 2024.

Plaintiff’s argument that this Court should delay ruling on the instant motion until after its motion for reconsideration is heard is unavailing and unsupported by case law.

Discussion

Civil Code §1717(a) provides, in part:

In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce the contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.

(Civ. Code §1717(a).)

A party who obtains an “unqualified victory” on a contract dispute is considered the prevailing party for purposes of Civil Code §1717 as a matter of law.  (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 876-877.)  Additionally, the phrase “prevailing party” is understood to include “[t]he party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.”  (C.C.P. §1032(a)(4).)

To determine whether an action is “on a contract,” as that phrase is used in California’s statute providing for an award of prevailing party attorney fees “[i]n an action on a contract,” courts look to the complaint and focus on the basis of the causes of action alleged therein; any cause of action that is based on a contract is an action on that contract, regardless of the relief sought.  (See Yoon v. Cam IX Trust (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 388, 392-393.)

Here, Paragraph 15 of the Lease Agreement provides, “In the event a party to this agreement incurs legal fees and/or costs associated with the enforcement of this Lease, whether by lawsuit or by arbitration, the prevailing party shall be entitled to a recovery of such fees and costs.”  (Decl. of Nussbaum ¶3, Exh.1.)

Plaintiff’s TAC is allegedly based on an oral contract.  Plaintiff intended to embrace the terms of the Lease Agreement and sought to enforce its terms as to Defendant in connection with Plaintiff’ allegation that Defendant had failed to comply with the terms contained therein, permitting Plaintiff to recover those monetary damages Plaintiff claimed resulted from Defendant’s alleged breach of the terms of the Lease Agreement. This necessarily brings Plaintiff’s allegations within the scope of an action based upon a contract and permits Defendant to recover those attorneys’ fees necessarily incurred in defending this action.  (See Brown Bark III, L.P. v. Haver (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 809, 819 [“Section 1717 allows a party who defeats a contract claim by showing the contract did not apply or was unenforceable to nonetheless recover attorney fees under that contract if the opposing party would have been entitled to attorney fees had it prevailed.”].)

This Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to the TAC without leave to amend.  Therefore, Defendant is the undisputed prevailing party in this action and is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees.

Reasonable Fees

To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by Defendant’s counsel. The Supreme Court of California has concluded that a reasonable hourly lodestar rate is the prevailing rate for private attorneys “conducting non-contingent litigation of the same type.”  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133, emphasis added.)

Defendant’s Counsel declares the following hourly rates for attorneys who worked on this case: (1) Lane M. Nussbaum ($450.00/hour); (2) Wayne M. Abb ($450.00/hour); (3) Jason Stillman ($450.00/hour); (4) Richard J. Uss ($450.00/hour); and (5) Caroline Gill ($350.00/hour).  (Decl. of Nussbaum ¶17, Exh. 4; Decl. of Abb ¶6; Decl. of Stillman ¶7; Decl. of Uss ¶9.)  Defendant has sufficiently demonstrated his counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable in their community of practice in their specialized area of law.  (Decl. of Nussbaum ¶17, Exh. 4; Decl. of Abb ¶6; Decl. of Stillman ¶7; Decl. of Uss ¶9.)

Plaintiff challenges Defendant’s counsel’s hourly rates as grossly inflated and unreasonable.  However, Plaintiff failed to meet its burden to challenge Defendant’s counsel’s fees because it failed to point to the specific items challenged with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.  (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)  General arguments that fees are “excessive, duplicative, or unrelated” are insufficient.  (Id.)

Billed Hours

The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden to show “the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.”  (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

In this case, the declarations and billing records provided by Defendant’s counsel are sufficient to meet the burden of proving the reasonableness of the claimed fees in terms of amounts and tasks. To satisfy this burden, evidence and descriptions of billable tasks must be presented in sufficient detail, enabling the court to evaluate whether the case was overstaffed, the time attorneys spent on specific claims, and the reasonableness of the hours expended.  (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486-487.)

Defendant’s fee recovery is based on 69.6 hours Defendant’s counsel spent to defend Defendant in this matter over the course of two years.  (Decl. of Nussbaum ¶¶24.)  The fees incurred are reasonable, as captured in the billing records submitted to this Court.  (Decl. of Nussbaum ¶22, Exhs. 4-8.)  Defendant’s counsel’s billing records reflect the actual time and clear descriptions of services performed in connection with litigating this case.  (Decl. of Nussbaum ¶22, Exhs. 4-8.)  Although the submission of such detailed time records is not necessary under California law, if submitted, such records “are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

Plaintiff argues Defendant’s counsel’s work was duplicative and prepared by three senior attorneys, and Defendant’s counsel attempts to recover fees for work that was never done.  (Opposition, pg. 6.)  Defendant specifically objects to 12.1 hours billed in September 2022 to prepare motions to compel discovery that were ultimately withdrawn because responses were ultimately provided (Plaintiff argues that the responses were “timely served,” but the motions were made because responses had not been timely served).  (Opposition, pg. 6; Decl. of Zadeh ¶10, Exh. 16; and see, e.g., Apelles’ Motion to Deem Requests for Admission Admitted, Declaration of Richard J. Uss, ¶ 4 filed November 9, 2022, and Motion to Compel Responses to Form Interrogatories, Declaration of Richard J. Uss, ¶ 5 filed November 9, 2022.)  Plaintiff does not cite to authority stating Defendant is not entitled to recover these fees.  (See Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 410-411; see also Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch., 8F-7 [8:1136], Motion to Compel Answers [“The motion to compel may be heard even if tardy responses are served after the motion is filed. Unless the propounding party takes the matter off calendar, the court may determine whether the responses are legally sufficient and award sanctions for the failure to respond on time.”].)

Accordingly, Defendant’s billed hours were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and were reasonable in amount.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees is granted in the total amount of $31,210.00. 

Moving Party to give notice.

Dated:  April _____, 2024