Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 22STCV20229, Date: 2023-08-23 Tentative Ruling

Defendants Hastee Payman (“Payman”), Rad Khodam (“Khodam”), 2362 Westwood Blvd., LLC’s (“2362 Westwood”), and Hastee Payman and Rad Khodam as Trustees of the Faith Hope Justice 2012 Family Trust (“Trust”) (collectively, “Defendants”) demur to Plaintiffs Amir Ghazinoor’s (“Ghazinoor”) and Fereshteh Sadoughi’s (“Sadoughi”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) second amended complaint (“SAC”). (Notice of Demurrer, pgs. 1-2; C.C.P. §430.10.)

Before filing a demurrer, the moving party must meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing the demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41.)

Defendants’ counsel filed a declaration stating she contacted Plaintiffs’ counsel by letter on June 21, 2023, to meet and confer. (Decl. of Mantovani ¶2, Exh. B.) Defendants’ counsel declares she followed up by telephone the next day and spoke with the assistant to Plaintiffs’ counsel who advised that they received Defendants’ counsel’s email. (Decl. of Mantovani ¶3.) Defendants’ counsel declares she confirmed that Plaintiffs’ counsel should email her by June 26 if he wanted to meet and confer by telephone. (Decl. of Mantovani ¶3.) Defendants’ counsel declares she received an email from Plaintiffs’ counsel the same day advising that he disagreed with Defendants’ position and as a result the parties were unable to resolve the issue. (Decl. of Mantovani ¶4.) Defendants’ counsel’s declaration is not sufficient per the requirements of C.C.P. §430.41(a) to meet and confer in person or by telephone. (C.C.P. §430.41(a).) However, determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(4).) Therefore, the Court will consider the instant demurrer.

Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint on June 21, 2022. Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint (“FAC”) on March 14, 2023. On May 26, 2023, this Court ruled on Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC, overruling Defendants’ demurrer to the 1st, 3rd, 8th, and 10th causes of action and sustaining the demurrer to the 6th and 9th causes of action with 20 days leave to amend. Plaintiffs filed the operative SAC on June 14, 2023 against Defendants alleging ten causes of action: (1) wrongful eviction; (2) breach of contract; (3) conversion; (4) negligence; (5) negligence; (6) intentional interference with prospective economic relations; (7) negligent interference with prospective economic relations; (8) unfair business practices in violation of Business & Professions Code §17200; (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (10) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Plaintiffs’ causes of action stem from Plaintiff Ghazinoor’s alleged entry into a Business Property Lease (“Lease”) with the former owner of real property located at 2362 Westwood Boulevard, Los Angeles, California 90064 (“Subject Property”) to lease Suite No. 2 (“Suite 2”) to be used as a dental office, and Plaintiffs’ subsequent eviction from Suite 2 by Defendants in March 2022. (SAC ¶¶2, 8, Exh. A.)

Defendants filed the instant demurrer on June 26, 2023. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on August 9, 2023. Defendants filed their reply on August 16, 2023.

Defendants demur on the basis that Plaintiffs’ 6th and 9th causes of action fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action against Defendants. (Demurrer, pg. 3; C.C.P. §430.10(e).)

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

“Intentional interference with prospective economic advantage has five elements: (1) the existence, between the plaintiff and some third party, of an economic relationship that contains the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentionally wrongful acts designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm proximately caused by the defendant’s action.” (Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 505, 512; CACI 2202.)

Regarding element 3, the interfering conduct must be wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of the interference itself. (Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 376, 393.) This conduct must fall outside the privilege of fair competition. (PMC, Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 579, 603, disapproved on other grounds in Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1159 n.11.) Whether the conduct alleged qualifies as wrongful if proven or falls within the privilege of fair competition is resolved by the court as a matter of law. (CACI 2202.)

“The question is whether a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant engaged in wrongful acts with the specific intent of interfering with the plaintiff's business expectancy. We conclude that specific intent is not a required element of the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage. While a plaintiff may satisfy the intent requirement by pleading specific intent, i.e., that the defendant desired to interfere with the plaintiff’s prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff may alternately plead that the defendant knew that the interference was certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of its action.” (Korea Supply Co., 29 Cal.4th at pg. 1154.)

Plaintiffs allege in or about March 2022, Defendants illegally used self-help to direct agents and employees of theirs to change the locks to Suite 2, boarded up the doors to Suite 2, and unlawfully took possession of Plaintiff’s equipment, computers, furniture, patient files, and other personal property used for Plaintiff’s dental practice, which forced a complete shutdown of Plaintiff’s Los Angeles dental practice after being in business for approximately 25 years. (SAC ¶70.) Plaintiffs allege Ghazinoor had extensive relationships with patients and their family members, which Defendants had knowledge of, and Defendants’ wrongful acts caused a rupture in Ghazinoor’s dentist-patient relationships. (SAC ¶70.) Plaintiffs allege that while Ghazinoor left the country temporarily because of the COVID-19 pandemic, Ghazinoor always intended to return to Los Angeles (where he has his wife, children, residence, and his office) to run his dental practice. (SAC ¶70.)

Plaintiffs allege by engaging in the wrongful acts described in paragraphs 1-49, Defendants have intentionally interfered with the economic relationship between Ghazinoor and his patients, and future patients. (SAC ¶71.) Plaintiffs allege Defendants knew about said economic relationships and knew that Defendants’ wrongful eviction of Ghazinoor, and seizure of all of the practice’s patient files, and the dental suite’s furniture, fixtures and equipment would disrupt Plaintiffs’ ability to provide dental services to his clients in Los Angeles County. (SAC ¶71.)

Plaintiffs allege Ghazinoor was forced to shut down his Los Angeles dental practice as a proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct, which were the proximate cause of, and a substantial factor in causing these damages. (SAC ¶72.)

Plaintiffs fail to allege Defendants’ motivation in their alleged actions was to interfere with Plaintiff’s relationships with his clients, or, even, that Defendants had knowledge of the identity of some of Ghazinoor’s patients prior to seeing patient names in files while inspecting Ghazinoor’s suite. Nor does Plaintiff allege any specific relationships with patients disrupted by Defendants forcing him to shut down his Los Angeles dental practice. (SAC ¶¶71-72.) Plaintiffs’ allegations of wrongful conduct on information and belief are insufficient to demonstrate Defendants intended to disrupt Ghazinoor’s relationship with his patients.

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.’ A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051; CACI 1600.)

Plaintiffs allege Defendants acted in an intentional, outrageous and deliberate manner to cause serious injury to Plaintiffs. (SAC ¶83.) Plaintiffs allege Payman knew that her vacuum line in her dental suite was leaking into Plaintiff’s suite and over a lengthy period of time was sending spittle, blood, medicines, pathogens, and dental waste into Plaintiff’s suite which the Defendants knew from their training and experience to present a serious risk of permanent and severe injury to the Plaintiffs. (SAC ¶83.) Plaintiffs allege Sadoughi reported she was suffering a chronic serious illness to Defendants, who took no action to locate and remediate this long-term leaking. (SAC ¶83.) Plaintiffs allege Defendants permitted a liquid containing biohazardous material to leak for a long period of time from Suite 3 into Suite 2, which caused damage to Sadoughi’s health, including causing both economic damages and noneconomic damages, and created unsanitary conditions in Suite 2, which Defendants also knew was likely to cause injury to the health of patients visiting Suite 2, as well as causing dangerous mold to grow inside Suite 2. (SAC ¶83.) Plaintiffs allege all Defendants ignored requests to fix the leaks and to investigate the source and permitted said leaks to persist despite receiving multiple notices from Plaintiffs of the leaks, and its terrible consequences. (SAC ¶83.)

Plaintiffs allege Defendants further acted intentionally, outrageously and with intent to cause destruction of Ghazinoor’s business, despite specific instructions that Plaintiffs had not abandoned their dental suite, by permanently locking Ghazinoor out of Suite 2, and seizing his patient files, computers, furniture, fixtures, billing records and dental equipment. (SAC ¶84.) Plaintiffs allege within the last 90 days, Plaintiffs learned that Defendants never ever removed this property from Suite 2, never released or used said Suite 2, and had no purpose for the lockout and seizure except to cause harm to Plaintiffs. (SAC ¶84.)

Plaintiffs allege Defendants further acted intentionally, outrageously and with malice, in playing Lucy pulls out the football from Charley Brown, for sadistic amusement, Defendants engaged in the conduct described in paragraphs 40-48, which is incorporated herein. (SAC ¶85.) Plaintiffs allege as of the date of the filing of the instant action, Plaintiffs have not been allowed to recover their personal property, patient files, nor the dental furniture, fixtures and equipment they are entitled to, from Suite 2. (SAC ¶85.) Plaintiffs allege the entity Defendants acted with malice and oppression, through their managing agents. (SAC ¶85.) Plaintiffs allege the individual and entity Defendants’ acts as alleged herein were willful, malicious, outrageous and intended to oppress and harass Ghazinoor, in reckless disregard of Ghazinoor’s rights, thus entitling Ghazinoor to an award of punitive and/or exemplary damages. (SAC ¶85.)

Plaintiffs allege as a result of the foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants, Sadoughi has suffered severe mental and emotional distress and anguish, all to Plaintiff’s damage in an amount not known which shall be proven at trial. (SAC ¶86.) Plaintiffs allege Defendants intended by such conduct to cause Plaintiff to suffer damages, or they acted with reckless disregard of the consequences of their actions and omissions. (SAC ¶86.) Plaintiffs allege the conduct of Defendants described above was knowing, willful and intentional and engaged in for the purpose of causing, and in fact caused, Plaintiff to suffer. (SAC ¶87.) Plaintiffs allege the entity Defendants acted with malice and oppression, through their managing agents. (SAC ¶87.) Plaintiffs allege as a result, Sadoughi is entitled to an award of punitive damages. (SAC ¶87.)

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court