Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 22STCV27750, Date: 2024-11-27 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STCV27750 Hearing Date: November 27, 2024 Dept: 71
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT 71
TENTATIVE RULING
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FERNEY PINTO
SANTANDER,
vs. JP MORGAN
CHASE BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION. |
Case No.:
22STCV27750 Hearing Date: November 27, 2024 |
Plaintiff Ferney Pinto Santander’s unopposed
motion for an order approving a PAGA Settlement reached in this case is denied,
without prejudice.
Plaintiff Ferney
Pinto Santander (“Pinto Santander”) (“Plaintiff”) moves unopposed for an
order approving the Joint Stipulation of PAGA Representative Action Settlement and
Release (“Settlement Agreement”) between Plaintiff on
behalf of himself and as a representative of the State of
California on one hand and Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association
(“JP Morgan Chase”) (“Defendant”) reached in this case. (Notice Motion, pg. 2; Lab. Code §2699(l)(2).)[1]
Background
Plaintiff and Defendant (collectively, “Parties”) reached a
settlement of all claims in this case, including the PAGA claim at issue in early
July 2024, following a mediation before Michael Dickstein, Esq. in April 2024. (See Decl. of Bradey ¶¶6-10, 70, Exh. 1.) Plaintiff requests the Court issue an order
approving the following: (1) the Gross Settlement Amount of $2,800,000
distributed as follows: (a) up to $40,000 for the cost of settlement
administration; (b) $15,000 for the proposed service and claim release payment
to the named Plaintiff for bringing this matter on behalf of the LWDA and his execution
of a general release of all claims; (c) up to $980,000.00 for Plaintiff’s
Counsel’s proposed attorneys’ fees; (d) up to $25,000 in litigation costs; (e) $1,323,750,
or 75% of the remainder, distributed to the LWDA pursuant to PAGA; and (f) $441,250,
or 25% of the remainder, distributed to the Settlement Group Members. (Memorandum, pg. 1.)
On November 11, 2024, Non-party Jonathan De La Cerda (“De La
Cerda”) filed an amicus brief in this matter after requesting leave of this
Court to do so. Plaintiff filed a
response to De La Cerda’s amicus brief on November 15, 2024. JP Morgan Chase also filed its response to De
La Cerda’s amicus brief on November 15, 2024.
Discussion
Labor Code §2699(s)(2)
provides, as follows: “The superior court shall review and approve any
settlement of any civil action filed pursuant to this part. The proposed
settlement shall be submitted to the [Labor & Workforce Development Agency
(“LWDA”)] at the same time that it is submitted to the court.” (Labor Code §2699(s)(2), emphasis added.)
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff submitted evidence he substantially complied with Labor Code §2699(s)(2). Plaintiff submitted a copy of the Settlement
and instant motion to the LWDA on July 3, 2024. (Decl. of Bradley ¶72, Exh. 3.) The statute requires that “[t]he proposed
settlement shall be submitted to the agency at the same time that it is
submitted to the court,” and the settlement was filed with this Court on August
28, 2024. (See Labor Code §2699(s)(2).) Regardless, the Court considers Plaintiff’s
motion to comply with this requirement.
On June 7, 2022, prior to commencing his lawsuit, as required by
California Labor Code section 2699.3, Plaintiff provided the LWDA and Defendant
with written notice of his intent to assert claims under PAGA and the basis for
those claims. (Decl. of Grodan ¶3, Exh.
A.) On August 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed the
operative complaint against Defendant asserting a single cause of action under
PAGA.
On April 15, 2024, before Plaintiff initiated arbitration of his
individual claims, the parties engaged in mediation before Michael Dickstein,
Esq. (Decl. of Bradley ¶6.) At the conclusion of the mediation, Dickstein issued
a “mediator’s proposal” which was accepted by the Parties on April 17, 2024. (Decl. of Bradley ¶8.) After acceptance of the mediator’s proposal, the
Parties agreed on the principal terms of a settlement and thereafter executed a
memorandum of understanding. (Decl. of
Bradley ¶8.) The Settlement Agreement
was fully executed on July 3, 2024. (See
Decl. of Bradley ¶70, Exh. 1 [“Settlement Agreement”].)
The Settlement defines “Representative Action Member(s)” means all
non-exempt employees employed by Defendant in California during the period of
June 21, 2021, through Date of Court Approval.”
(Settlement Agreement ¶15.) “Estimated
Covered PAGA Pay Periods” means the estimated total of 670,802 Covered PAGA Pay
Periods at issue between June 21, 2021, and April 15, 2024, provided by Defendant
in connection with the execution of the Parties’ Memorandum of Understanding. (Settlement Agreement ¶8.) The definitions are proper pursuant to the
statute of limitations and the date of notice to the LWDA.
The Settlement includes a provision, “Release
of Claims by Plaintiff, the LWDA, and All Representative Action Members,” which
bars Plaintiff, in his individual capacity and as proxy and private attorney
general for the State of California, the LWDA, and Representative Action Members
from pursuing any action against Defendant for from all claims, demands,
rights, obligations, liabilities, actions, and causes of action (including
attorneys’ fees and costs) for PAGA civil penalties under the California Labor
Code, Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders, regulations, and/or any other
provisions of law for alleged violations of California Labor Code Sections 200,
204, 203, 226, 227.3, 246, 248, 221, 223, 226, 510, 1174, 1182.11, 1182.12,
1197, 1194, 1198, and 2802, with respect to Representative Action Members during
the period from June 21, 2021 through the Date of Court Approval (“Released
Claims”).” (Settlement Agreement ¶54.)
De La Cerda objects to this section in the
Settlement Agreement on the basis this provision sweeps too broadly and is not
limited to claims based on the facts and theories asserted in Plaintiff’s PAGA
letter. As the California Supreme Court
explained in Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc., PAGA is silent regarding a PAGA
plaintiff’s authority to object to a proposed settlement in another PAGA
plaintiff’s action. (Turrieta v.
Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, 713.)
The Turrieta Court stated,
Courts,
in evaluating the adequacy and fairness of proposed PAGA settlements, remain
free to exercise discretion to consider arguments and evidence informally
offered by plaintiffs pursuing overlapping PAGA claims in separate actions.
Indeed, Turrieta and Lyft concede that such plaintiffs may offer objections to
courts and that “courts have discretion to consider [those] objections.”
(Id. at pg. 707.) This Court exercises its discretion to
consider De La Cerda’s objection. Despite
the narrow allegations in Plaintiff’s PAGA letter, ¶54 of the Settlement Agreement
purports to release Defendant from all liability for PAGA penalties
arising from any violation of Labor Code §2802.
The
Court finds the amicus brief’s suggestion to add the following sentence to the
end of ¶54 to be in the best interest of Representative Action Members: “Notwithstanding
anything in this Paragraph 54 to the contrary, the release of PAGA penalty
claims arising from the Settling Defendants’ alleged violations of Labor Code
section 2802 is limited to claims based on the facts and theories asserted in
Plaintiff’s June 7, 2022 PAGA Letter.” (Amius
Brief, pg. 11.)
Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s motion for approval of the PAGA Settlement Agreement is denied,
without prejudice.
Moving Party to give notice.
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|
Hon. Daniel M. Crowley |
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Judge of the Superior Court |
[1] The Court notes the Labor Code has been amended,
effective July 1, 2024, such that the text and citation included in Plaintiff’s
notice of motion, formerly Labor Code §2699(l)(2), has been relabeled Labor Code §2699(s)(2).