Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 22STCV28709, Date: 2023-07-11 Tentative Ruling

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Defendant Frank H. Whitehead III (“Whitehead”) (“Defendant”) moves for an order awarding his attorneys’ fees and costs against Plaintiffs Shari Giuliany (“Giuliany”), Bill Demarest (“Demarest”), and Helen Ortega (“Ortega”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) in the total amount of $31,424.15, comprised of $25,664.15 for attorney’s fees and costs already incurred, and an additional $5,760.00 for this motion and future anticipated attorney’s fees and costs. (Notice of Motion, pgs. 1-2; C.C.P. §425.16(c)(1).)

On August 22, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their operative complaint (“Complaint”) against Defendant Whitehead and the Law Offices of Frank H. Whitehead III (“Law Office”) (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging two causes of action: (1) Violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1692, et seq. (“FDCPA”); and (2) Violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Civil Code §§1788 et seq. (“RFDCPA”). On July 11, 2023, this Court granted Defendant’s special motion in the alternative to strike (“Anti-SLAPP Motion”) the 2nd cause of action in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (7/11/23 Minute Order.)

On September 18, 2023, Defendant filed the instant motion for attorneys’ fees. On October 3, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. On December 4, 2023, Defendant filed his reply.

C.C.P. §425.16(c)(1) provides, in part, “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs.” California law makes the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing anti-SLAPP defendant mandatory. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131 [“[u]nder Code of Civil Procedure §425.16, subdivision (c), any SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney’s fees.”].) Here, Defendant was the prevailing party in the Anti-SLAPP Motion. (See 7/11/23 Minute Order.) Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees is proper and he is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs.

The California Supreme Court has determined the lodestar method is the proper mechanism to calculate attorneys’ fees under C.C.P. §425.16(c). (See Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at pg. 1136.) To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by Defendant’s counsel. The “reasonable hourly rate” applicable under the lodestar method is the rate “prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (Id. at pg. 1096.)

Defendant’s Counsel declares his hourly rate in this case is $475 per hour. (Decl. of Hovsepian ¶¶14-15, Exh. H.) The Court determines based on its experience that Defendant’s Counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable in his community of practice.

An anti-SLAPP motion is complex in nature and requires the submission of declarations and evidence akin to a motion for summary judgment or a preliminary injunction. Defendant’s counsel declares the Anti-SLAPP motion in the instant case required him to spend many hours researching the relevant law, interviewing his client, and reviewing the Complaint and underlying eviction cases. (Decl. of Hovsepian ¶4.) Defendant’s efforts resulted in the dismissal of one of two causes of action alleged against him. Accordingly, Defendant’s requested attorneys’ fees are reasonable.

The verified time entries of the attorneys are entitled to a presumption of credibility, which extends to an attorney’s professional judgment as to whether time spent was reasonably necessary to the litigation. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396 [“We think the verified time statements of the attorney as officers of the court are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”].) “California courts do not require detailed time records, and trial courts have discretion to award fees based on declarations of counsel describing the work they have done and the court’s own view of the number of hours reasonably spent.” (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698-699.)

Here, the billing statement of the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred on the motion and the declarations by counsel demonstrate the reasonableness of the time spent on this case. (See Decl. of Hovsepian ¶14, Exh. H.) However, Defendant’s billing statement contains block billing and vague time entries. Further, Defendant’s counsel seeks compensation for billing entries that are unrelated to the anti-SLAPP motion. Accordingly, the Court reduces the total attorneys’ fees and costs sought on this motion to $18,762.50.

With regards to the instant motion for attorneys’ fees, Defendant’s counsel requests attorneys’ fees for 3.5 hours, and an additional 4.5 hours in anticipated fees for reviewing the opposition, preparing a reply, and appearing at the hearing for the instant motion. (Decl. of Hovsepian ¶16.) The Court calculates the fees on the instant motion as follows (3.5 hours + 4.5 hours) x $475/hour = $3,800 in attorneys’ fees.

Accordingly, the Court calculates the total reduced attorneys’ fees to be $22,562.50.

Defendant requests $120.00 in costs for filing fees for filing the anti-SLAPP motion and the instant motion for attorneys’ fees. The Court awards Defendant’s request for costs in the amount of $120.00

Defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is granted in the reduced total amount of $22,682.50.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court