Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 22STCV30076, Date: 2024-02-23 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22STCV30076    Hearing Date: February 23, 2024    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 71

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Alexandria Danielle Mosher’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is granted in the total reduced amount of $23,085.38.  Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees is granted in the reduced amount of $21,988.00, and Plaintiff’s costs is granted in the amount of $1,097.38.

Plaintiff Alexandria Danielle Mosher (“Mosher”) (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order awarding her attorneys’ fees, reasonable costs, and expenses and against Defendants Hyundai Motor America (“HMA”) and Parkway Hyundai (“Parkway”) (collectively, “Defendants”) as the prevailing party pursuant to the accepted Release and Settlement Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) accepted and signed by Plaintiff on October 09, 2023.  (Notice of Motion, pgs. i-ii; Civ. Code §1794(d).)  Plaintiff moves for an order entering Judgment against Defendants, and in favor of Plaintiff, for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $25,034.50, and costs in the amount of $1,097.38.  (Notice of Motion, pg. ii.)

Background

This is a lemon law action brought under the Song-Beverly Act (“Act”).  On October 9, 2023, Plaintiff accepted a Settlement made by Defendants in the amount of $27,995.24, and Defendants agreed in the offer that Plaintiff will surrender the Subject Vehicle and thereafter, should Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants not agree on an attorney’s fees amount, Plaintiff will have the right to petition this Court for an award of the fees, costs, and expenses reasonably earned and incurred during this litigation, thereafter.  (See Decl. of Saeedian ¶¶17-18.)

On January 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion for attorneys’ fees.  Defendants filed their opposition on February 8, 2024.  Plaintiff filed her reply on February 15, 2024, as well as her memorandum of costs.

Discussion

Civil Code §1794(d) provides that a buyer who prevails in an action under that section, “shall be allowed by the court to recover as a part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and the prosecution of such action.”

Here, Plaintiff is the prevailing party per parties’ agreement and is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs, and Defendants do not contest this issue.

Reasonable Fees

To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by the Plaintiff’s counsel. The Supreme Court of California has concluded that a reasonable hourly lodestar rate is the prevailing rate for private attorneys “conducting non-contingent litigation of the same type.”  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133, emphasis added.)

Plaintiff’s Counsel declares the following hourly rates of the attorneys who worked on this case: (1) Michael Saeedian ($695.00/hour); and (2) Christopher Urner ($525.00/hour).  (Decl. of Saeedian ¶¶3-4.)  These rates are appropriate given each attorney’s relative experience and qualifications.  (See id.)  Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated her counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable in their community of practice in their specialized area of law.

Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s counsels’ hourly rate, arguing Plaintiff failed to meet her burden to demonstrate her counsels’ rates are reasonable.  Defendants’ argument is unavailing.  A declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel is sufficient evidence of the market rates charged in the legal community, especially where no evidence is presented to the contrary.[1]  (See Davis v. City of San Diego (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 893, 902-904; Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154; see Decl. of Saeedian ¶12.)  The Court finds Plaintiff’s counsels’ rates to be reasonable and does not warrant a reduction.

Billed Hours

The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden to show “the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.”  (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

Plaintiff’s fee recovery is based on the 52.6 hours spent by her attorneys litigating this case.  (Decl. of Saeedian ¶23, Exh. A.)  Defendants argue several categories of Plaintiff’s counsel’s billed hours were unsubstantiated or unreasonable and should be reduced.  (Opposition, pgs. 7-10.)  The Court has reviewed Defendants’ objections to Plaintiff’s counsel’s billed hours and agrees with some of Defendants’ objections.

First, Defendants’ objection to Plaintiff’s request for fees and costs from Parkway, which was only sued in this action for a negligent repair cause of action, is well taken.  Here, Plaintiff is only entitled to recovery attorneys’ fees and costs on her Song-Beverly causes of action, not a cause of action in tort.  (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1133 [“When a cause of action for which attorney fees are provided by statute is joined with other causes of action for which attorney fees are not permitted, the prevailing party may recover only on the statutory cause of action.”]; Pellegrino v. Robert Half International, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 278 [“Where fees are authorized for some causes of action in a complaint but not others, allocation is a matter within the trial court’s discretion . . . . [and] a trial court’s discretion is abused only when its ruling ‘exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.’”].)  Therefore, the Court reduces Plaintiffs’ request for fees by $3,046.50 for work done exclusively litigating this case against Parkway.

Second, Defendants’ objection to Plaintiff’s counsel’s fees incurred in connection with Plaintiff’s pursuit of discovery is unavailing.  Defendant concedes that it has received written discovery in this case, and Plaintiff is entitled to recover fees incurred in the course of litigation.  (Opposition, pg. 6.)  Defendants fail to support their argument with case law to support a reduction in fees for using templates.  Therefore, Defendants did not meet their burden to challenge these fees.

Third, the Court also disagrees with Defendant’s objection to the 8.6 hours ($2,889.50) Plaintiff’s counsel billed for client communications.  A review of Plaintiff’s billing record indicates these billing entries are not block billed and are separately entered into the billing statement with a description of the topic of conversation.  Defendants fail to support their argument with case law to support a reduction in fees. Therefore, Defendants did not meet their burden to challenge these fees.

Defendants’ fourth objection to 3.9 hours on the instant fee motion is unavailing.  General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.  (Id.)  Further, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff cannot recover fees for reviewing the opposition and preparing a reply are now moot.   Therefore, Defendant did not meet its burden to challenge these fees.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees is granted in the reduced amount of $21,988.00.

Costs

The California legislature intended the word “expenses” in the Act to cover outlays not included in the detailed statutory definition of “costs,” and the legislative history of the Act further demonstrates that the legislature exercised its power to permit the recovery by prevailing buyers of a host of litigation expenditures.  (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137-138.)  “If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.”  (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131.)

Any effort to tax or strike costs must occur in the form of a motion to strike or to tax costs and must be served and filed fifteen (15) days after service of the cost memorandum.  (CRC, Rule 3.1700(b)(1).)  After the 15-day deadline to file a motion to tax costs has passed, the Court clerk must immediately enter the costs. (CRC, Rule 3.1700(b)(4).)

Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff’s requested costs.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to costs in the amount of $1,097.38.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees is granted in the reduced amount of $21,988.00, and Plaintiff’s costs is granted in the amount of $1,097.38.  Plaintiff’s motion is granted in the total reduced amount of $23,085.38.

Moving Party to give notice.

Dated:  February _____, 2024