Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 22STCV31574, Date: 2025-06-10 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 22STCV31574    Hearing Date: June 10, 2025    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 71

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

THORSTEN D. MEIER, 

 

         vs.

 

TRILLER, INC., et al.

 Case No.: 22STCV31574

 

 

 

 Hearing Date:  June 10, 2025

 

Moving Defendant Triller Platform Co. f/k/a Triller Inc.’s untimely special motion to strike the first amended complaint of Plaintiff Thorsten D. Meier is denied. 

 

Defendant Triller Platform Co. f/k/a Triller Inc.’s (“Triller”) (“Moving Defendant”) moves to strike the 1st and 14th causes of action in the first amended complaint (“FAC”) of Plaintiff Thorsten D. Meier (“Meier”) (“Plaintiff”) on the grounds that portions of Plaintiff’s FAC arise from the protected activity specifically delineated under the Anti-SLAPP Statute: “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.”  (Notice of Motion, pg. 2; C.C.P. §425.16(e)(2).)

 

Special Motion to Strike

          C.C.P. §4.25.16(f) provides: “The special motion may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court’s discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper. The motion shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing.”  (C.C.P. §4.25.16(f).)

          “In other words, the defendant is only entitled to ‘file[ ]’ such a motion within 60 days of service; thereafter filing may be allowed, or not, in the trial court’s discretion. This language might be readily understood to mean that a trial court need not entertain, but can instead refuse to hear, a motion filed outside the 60 days.”  (Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1186.)  Indeed, some courts have suggested that this provision empowers a trial court to require advance leave before the defendant is permitted to file such a motion.  (See Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Goldberg (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 772, 775 [“A party may not file an anti–SLAPP motion more than 60 days after the filing of the complaint, unless the trial court affirmatively exercises its discretion to allow a late filing.”]; Olsen v. Harbison (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 278, 286 [“The statute expressly provides that a late anti-SLAPP motion shall not be filed unless the court affirmatively exercises discretion to permit it to be filed.”]; Kunysz v. Sandler (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1543 [citing failure to seek leave as one of several defects]; South Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 634, 653, 654 [implying that failure to seek leave could be fatal, but finding motion there timely]; but see Chitsazzadeh v. Kramer & Kaslow (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 676, 684 [failure to seek leave not fatal if court elects to entertain late motion].)  

          The operative FAC was filed and served on January 6, 2025.  Moving Defendant’s Anti-SLAPP Motion was untimely filed on March 11, 2025, without this Court’s permission.  Pursuant to C.C.P. §4.25.16(f), Moving Defendant’s motion should have been filed on or before March 7, 2025.

          Subject to the trial court’s discretion under C.C.P. §425.16(f) to permit late filing, a defendant must move to strike a claim within 60 days of service of the earliest complaint that contains that cause of action.  Defendant cannot use the fact that plaintiff filed an amended complaint to attack claims that appeared in a prior complaint.  The anti-SLAPP statute “is not a vehicle for a defendant to obtain a dismissal of claims in the middle of litigation; it is a procedural device to prevent costly, unmeritorious litigation at the initiation of the lawsuit.”  (Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 645, internal quotes omitted [“To minimize this problem, section 425.16, subdivision (f), should be interpreted to permit an anti-SLAPP motion against an amended complaint if it could not have been brought earlier, but to prohibit belated motions that could have been brought earlier (subject to the trial court's discretion to permit a late motion). This interpretation maximizes the possibility the anti-SLAPP statute will fulfill its purpose while reducing the potential for abuse.”]; Starview Property, LLC v. Lee (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 203, 206 [where amended complaint is based on same facts as alleged in original complaint but pleads new claims for relief, anti-SLAPP motion may be filed within 60 days of service of amended complaint if it addresses newly pled claims].)

          Here, the 1st cause of action appeared in the initial complaint, while the 14th cause of action first appeared in the FAC.  The Court does not exercise its discretion to consider the instant Anti-SLAPP; assuming it did, it would be improper to consider Moving Defendant’s request to strike the 1st cause of action because there was an earlier opportunity to strike the cause of action.  (Starview Property, LLC, 41 Cal.App.5th at pg. 206.)

          Moving Defendant further does not demonstrate good cause for not filing the instant motion earlier; there is a difference between a congested calendar and not being able to reserve and earlier hearing date, and what happened here, which was a late-filed motion.

          Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s motion is denied as untimely.

 

Conclusion

          Based on the foregoing, Moving Defendant’s special motion to strike is denied.

Moving Party to give notice.

 

 

Dated:  June _____, 2025

                                                                            


Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court

 

 





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