Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 22STCV31574, Date: 2025-06-10 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STCV31574 Hearing Date: June 10, 2025 Dept: 71
Superior
Court of California
County
of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT 71
TENTATIVE
RULING
THORSTEN D.
MEIER, vs. TRILLER, INC., et al. |
Case No.: 22STCV31574 Hearing Date: June 10, 2025 |
Moving
Defendant Triller Platform Co. f/k/a Triller Inc.’s untimely special motion to
strike the first amended complaint of Plaintiff Thorsten D. Meier is denied.
Defendant Triller
Platform Co. f/k/a Triller Inc.’s (“Triller”)
(“Moving Defendant”) moves to strike the 1st and 14th causes of action in the first
amended complaint (“FAC”) of Plaintiff Thorsten D. Meier (“Meier”)
(“Plaintiff”) on the grounds that portions of Plaintiff’s FAC arise from the
protected activity specifically delineated under the Anti-SLAPP Statute: “any
written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or
any other official proceeding authorized by law.” (Notice of Motion, pg. 2; C.C.P. §425.16(e)(2).)
Special Motion to Strike
C.C.P. §4.25.16(f) provides: “The special motion may be
filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court’s
discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper. The motion shall be
scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after
the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a
later hearing.” (C.C.P. §4.25.16(f).)
“In other words, the defendant is only entitled to ‘file[ ]’
such a motion within 60 days of service; thereafter filing may be allowed, or
not, in the trial court’s discretion. This language might be readily understood
to mean that a trial court need not entertain, but can instead refuse
to hear, a motion filed outside the 60 days.” (Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp.
(2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1186.) Indeed,
some courts have suggested that this provision empowers a trial court to
require advance leave before the defendant is permitted to file such a motion. (See Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Goldberg
(2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 772, 775 [“A party may not file an anti–SLAPP motion
more than 60 days after the filing of the complaint, unless the trial court
affirmatively exercises its discretion to allow a late filing.”]; Olsen v.
Harbison (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 278, 286 [“The statute expressly provides
that a late anti-SLAPP motion shall not be filed unless the court affirmatively
exercises discretion to permit it to be filed.”]; Kunysz v. Sandler
(2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1543 [citing failure to seek leave as one of
several defects]; South Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P. (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 634, 653, 654 [implying that failure to seek leave could be
fatal, but finding motion there timely]; but see Chitsazzadeh v. Kramer
& Kaslow (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 676, 684 [failure to seek leave not
fatal if court elects to entertain late motion].)
The operative FAC was filed and served on January 6,
2025. Moving Defendant’s Anti-SLAPP
Motion was untimely filed on March 11, 2025, without this Court’s permission. Pursuant to C.C.P. §4.25.16(f), Moving
Defendant’s motion should have been filed on or before March 7, 2025.
Subject to the trial court’s discretion under C.C.P.
§425.16(f) to permit late filing, a defendant must move to strike a claim
within 60 days of service of the earliest complaint that contains that
cause of action. Defendant cannot use
the fact that plaintiff filed an amended complaint to attack claims that
appeared in a prior complaint. The
anti-SLAPP statute “is not a vehicle for a defendant to obtain a dismissal of
claims in the middle of litigation; it is a procedural device to prevent
costly, unmeritorious litigation at the initiation of the lawsuit.” (Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris
Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 645, internal quotes omitted
[“To minimize this problem, section 425.16, subdivision (f), should be
interpreted to permit an anti-SLAPP motion against an amended complaint if it
could not have been brought earlier, but to prohibit belated motions that
could have been brought earlier (subject to the trial court's discretion to
permit a late motion). This interpretation maximizes the possibility the
anti-SLAPP statute will fulfill its purpose while reducing the potential for
abuse.”]; Starview Property, LLC v. Lee (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 203, 206 [where
amended complaint is based on same facts as alleged in original complaint but
pleads new claims for relief, anti-SLAPP motion may be filed within 60 days of
service of amended complaint if it addresses newly pled claims].)
Here, the 1st cause of action appeared in the initial
complaint, while the 14th cause of action first appeared in the FAC. The Court does not exercise its discretion to
consider the instant Anti-SLAPP; assuming it did, it would be improper to
consider Moving Defendant’s request to strike the 1st cause of action because
there was an earlier opportunity to strike the cause of action. (Starview Property, LLC, 41 Cal.App.5th
at pg. 206.)
Moving Defendant further does not demonstrate good cause
for not filing the instant motion earlier; there is a difference between a
congested calendar and not being able to reserve and earlier hearing date, and
what happened here, which was a late-filed motion.
Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s motion is denied as
untimely.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Moving Defendant’s special motion
to strike is denied.
Moving Party to give notice.
Dated: June _____, 2025
|
Hon.
Daniel M. Crowley |
Judge
of the Superior Court |