Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 22STCV33528, Date: 2024-01-31 Tentative Ruling

Defendant Robert Webb (“Webb”) (“Defendant”) demurs to Plaintiffs Deborah Mayers’ (“Mayers”), Marcia Brown’s (“Brown”), and Rochelle Minor’s (“Minor”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) complaint (“Complaint”) as to each cause of action. (Notice of Demurrer, pgs. 1-2.)

Plaintiffs filed the operative Complaint on October 14, 2022, against Defendant and Non-moving Defendants J.P. Morgan Chase N.A. dba J.P. Morgan Chase National Corporate Services, Inc. (“J.P. Morgan Chase”) and all persons unknown claiming and legal or equitable title, estate, lien, or interest in the property described in the Complaint adverse to Plaintiffs’ title or any cloud upon Plaintiffs’ title (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging a single cause of action for quiet title.

On September 25, 2023, Webb filed the instant demurrer. On January 18, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. As of the date of this hearing no reply has been filed.

Webb demurs to Plaintiff’s 1st cause of action on the basis that the cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, that Plaintiffs have filed their claim in the wrong court because the Probate Court has exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to the internal affairs of a trust, and pursuant to Probate Code §§16061.7 and 16061.8, Plaintiffs are permanently barred from pursuing any claims concerning the terms of the trust as amended. (Demurrer, pg. 3; C.C.P. §430.10(e).)

Before filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(a), emphasis added.) A declaration must be filed with a demurrer regarding the results of the meet and confer process. (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(3).)

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

A cause of action for quiet title must allege the following elements: (1) a description of the property; (2) plaintiff’s title or interest and the basis; (3) defendant’s asserting adverse claim or antagonistic property interest; (4) the date as of which the determination is sought; and (5) a prayer for determination of title. (C.C.P. §761.020; see Lucas v. Sweet (1956) 47 Cal.2d 20, 22 [sufficient to plead that plaintiff is the owner of described property, defendant wrongfully claims interest, unless complaint reveals a defect in title]; Leeper v. Beltrami (1959) 53 Cal. 2d 195, 214 [“general rule that a cause of action to quiet title may be stated in general terms”]; Dreher v. Rohrmoser (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 196, 198 [complainants can specifically plead the invalidity of defendants’ legal title and courts may enter such judgment as the equities require]; Lewis v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1850, 1866 [complaint to quiet title must be verified]; Chao Fu, Inc. v. Wen Ching Chen (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 48, 57 [“absent an interest in the property, a party has no standing to ask the court to quiet title in the property or to obtain damages for the cloud on title.”].)

Plaintiffs allege this case involves the residential property located at 6577 2nd Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90043 (“Property”). (Complaint ¶10.) Plaintiffs allege the Property is legally described as follows: “ALL REAL PROPERTY SITUATED IN THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DESCRIBED AS : LOT 22, BLOCK 9 OF TRACT NO 6543, AS PER MAP RECORDED IN BOOK 71, PAGES 35 TO 36 INCLUSIVE, IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF SAID COUNTY.” (Complaint ¶11.)

Plaintiffs allege on or about September 26, 2005, Mary Smith (“Decedent”) the owner of the Property, executed an inter vivos trust entitled The Mary Marcella Smith Living Trust Dated September 26, 2005 (“Trust”). (Complaint ¶12, Exh. 1.) Plaintiffs allege subsequently, the Decedent executed a restatement (amendment) of the Trust, which is dated November 10, 2010 (“November 10, 2010, Trust Amendment”). (Complaint ¶13, Exh. 2.) Plaintiffs allege thereafter, on or about June 5, 2013, the Decedent executed another restatement (amendment) of the Trust (“June 5, 2013, Trust Amendment”). (Complaint ¶14, Exh. 3.) Plaintiffs allege subsequently, on or about December 15, 2017, the decedent executed a Revocation of the Mary Marcella Smith Living Trust (“Revocation”). (Complaint ¶15, Exh. 4.)

Plaintiffs allege ultimately, Decedent died on or about October 4, 2018. (Complaint ¶16.) Plaintiffs allege the Defendant, on or about July 16, 2019, filed an Application to Probate Will and for Issuance of Letters Testamentary in Jefferson County, Texas. (Complaint ¶17.) Plaintiffs allege on or about August 12, 2019, they filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Application to Probate Will and for Issuance of Letters Testamentary in Jefferson County, Texas. (Complaint ¶18.) Plaintiffs allege to resolve the matter filed in Jefferson County, Texas, Plaintiffs Mayers and Brown signed a Family Settlement Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) with Defendant on or about July of 2020. (Complaint ¶19.) Plaintiffs allege the Settlement Agreement involves the Property that is the subject of this suit, which purports to leave the Property with Defendant. (Complaint ¶19.)

Plaintiffs allege subsequently, on or about October 13, 2020, Defendant executes a grant deed (“Trust Deed”) transferring the Property from Decedent’s Trust to Defendant. (Complaint ¶20.) Plaintiffs allege this Trust Deed was ultimately recorded at the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office on or about May 18, 2021. (Complaint ¶20, Exh. 5.)

Plaintiffs allege on information and belief that due to the fact that Decedent executed a Revocation of the Trust, the Property here in Los Angeles County, California must be probated to legally and validly to transfer ownership from the Decedent to her lawful heirs, which are the Plaintiffs. (Complaint ¶21.) Plaintiffs allege on information and belief that Defendant is not the true owner of the Property, but instead Plaintiffs are since the Property has not legally transferred to Plaintiffs. (Complaint ¶22.)

Plaintiffs allege by virtue of the foregoing facts, Plaintiffs are entitled to a judicial declaration that they are the true 100.00% owners of the subject Property. (Complaint ¶26.) Plaintiffs allege they seek to quiet title to the Property in Plaintiffs’ names alone as of the date of May 18, 2021. (Complaint ¶27.)

“The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof.” (Evid. Code §662.) There is no exception to this evidentiary rule, even where the plaintiff claims that the Defendant breached a fiduciary duty. (Toney v. Nolde (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 791, 796.) “[A]s a general matter an action to quiet title cannot be maintained by the owner of equitable title as against the holder of legal title.” (Warren v. Merrill (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 96, 113.) When legal title has been acquired through fraud any number of remedies are available and appropriate. (Id. at pg. 114.) These remedies include quieting title in the defrauded equitable title holder’s name and making the legal title holder the constructive trustee of the property for the benefit of the defrauded equitable titleholder. (Id.)

As a preliminary matter, an action by a beneficiary against the trustee for, e.g., breach of trust, conversion, or fraud concerns the internal affairs of the trust and therefore must be heard by the court having jurisdiction over the trust under

Probate Code §17000(a). (Prob. Code §17000(a).) The “probate court,” or probate department of the superior court hearing proceedings concerning the internal affairs of trusts, has “all the powers of the superior court.” (Prob. Code §17001.) Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not allege the existence of a valid trust, but rather that the Trust at issue was revoked. (Complaint ¶15, Exh. 4.) Further, neither party requested judicial notice of other filings in LASC’s Probate Division that would indicate this Court is without jurisdiction to decide matters in the instant case.

Regarding a valid cause of action for quiet title, here, Plaintiffs allege Webb is the owner of the legal title to the Property. (Complaint ¶20, Exh. 5.) Plaintiffs do not allege Webb acquired legal titled through fraud, as they allege Mayers and Brown entered into a Settlement Agreement with Webb in or about July 2020, which purports to leave the Property with Defendant (assumed to mean Webb). (Complaint ¶19.) Plaintiffs fail to allege their interest in the Property, namely that they are Decedent’s heirs by intestate succession. Plaintiffs merely allege Decedent is Plaintiffs’ mother and grandmother of Defendant (assumed to mean Webb). (Complaint ¶6.)

Accordingly, Webb’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ 1st cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

Webb’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court