Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 22STCV34000, Date: 2023-08-11 Tentative Ruling

Defendant General Motors LLC’s demurrer to Plaintiff Amanda Sanchez’s first amended complaint is overruled as to the 4th cause of action.

Defendant General Motors LLC (“GM”) (“Defendant”) demurs to Plaintiff Amanda Sanchez’s (“Sanchez”) (“Plaintiff”) first amended complaint (“FAC”). (Notice of Demurrer, pg. 1.)

Defendant also moves to strike portions of Plaintiff’s FAC, namely Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages in Prayer ¶6 at 26:8. (Notice of MTS, pg. 1.)

Before filing a demurrer or motion to strike, the moving party must meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing the demurrer and/or motion to strike. (C.C.P. §430.41, §435.5.)

Defendant’s counsel declares he attempted to meet and confer telephonically with Plaintiff’s counsel but was unsuccessful in his attempt. (Decl. of Valencia ¶2.) Defendant’s counsel does not provide a date or time for the attempt to meet and confer in his declaration. Plaintiff’s counsel declares Defendant’s counsel did not contact his office nor provide the legal reasoning underlying Defendant’s demurrer and motion to strike. (Decl. of Yang ¶4.) Parties failed to meet and confer, and Defendant has not demonstrated a good faith effort to resolve the issues in the instant motions out of court. However, a determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (C.C.P. §§430.41(a)(4), 435.5(a)(4).)

Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on October 20, 2022. Plaintiff filed the operative FAC on January 18, 2023, against Defendant alleging four causes of action: (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act Civil Code §§1790 et seq. (“Song-Beverly”)- breach of express warranty; (2) violation of Song-Beverly- breach of implied warranty; (3) violation of Song Beverly §1793.2; and (4) fraud- fraudulent inducement, concealment. Plaintiff’s causes of action arise from her April 10, 2020, purchase of a 2020 Chevrolet Silverado (“Subject Vehicle”) and a transmission defect in the Subject Vehicle. (See FAC.)

Defendant filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike on March 20, 2023. Plaintiff filed her oppositions on May 30, 2023. Defendant filed its replies on August 10, 2023.

Defendant demurs on the basis that Plaintiff’s 4th cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action against Defendant and fails to allege a transactional relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose. (Demurrer, pg. 2; C.C.P. §430.10(e).)

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

The required elements for fraudulent concealment are: “(1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact.” (See Bank of America Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 862, 870; Civil Code §1710(3); CACI 1901.) The rule of specificity of pleading is only intended for affirmative fraud cases not fraud by concealment. (See Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement Systems & Planning Association, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.)

Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a cause of action for fraudulent concealment. Plaintiff sufficiently alleges Defendant owed a duty of disclosure to Plaintiff. (FAC ¶125a; SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. Central Pacific Bank (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 859, 860.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant intended to deceive Plaintiff by concealing the known issues with the Transmission Defect in an effort to sell the Subject Vehicle at a maximum price. (FAC ¶129.) Plaintiff alleges she was harmed by Defendant’s concealment of the Transmission Defect because she was induced to enter into the sale of a vehicle that she would not have otherwise purchased. (FAC ¶134.)

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s 4th cause of action is overruled.

C.C.P. §436 provides that the Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to C.C.P. §435, or at any time within its discretion and upon terms it deems proper, “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” and/or “strike out all or part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” A motion to strike should be applied cautiously and sparingly because it is used to strike substantive defects. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1683.) The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading under attack, or from matter which the court may judicially notice. (C.C.P. §437.)

Punitive damages may be recovered upon a proper showing of malice, fraud, or oppression. (Civ. Code §3294(a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Id.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Id.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)

When seeking punitive damages, a party must plead facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that the defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud within the meaning of Civil Code §3294: “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages . . . Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)

Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is pursuant to her 4th cause of action for fraudulent concealment, not for her cause of action for violation of Song-Beverly. Plaintiff plead specific facts that justify punitive damages for fraud, including FAC ¶¶4-14, 23-59, 60-77, and 119-139.

Defendant’s request to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages is denied.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court