Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 22STCV34145, Date: 2023-08-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV34145    Hearing Date: February 22, 2024    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 71

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

KELLEY ANGELA BELL, 

 

         vs.

 

SHANTE M. MASON, et al.

 Case No.:  22STCV34145

 

 

 

 Hearing Date:  February 22, 2024

 

Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s unopposed demurrer to pro per Plaintiff Kelley Angela Bell’s 1st cause of action is sustained without leave to amend.

 

Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. [erroneously sued as JP Morgan Chase] (“Chase”) (“Defendant”) demurs unopposed to pro per Plaintiff Kelley Angela Bell’s (“Bell”) (“Plaintiff”) defective complaint (“Complaint”) as to each cause of action.  (Notice of Demurrer, pg. 1; C.C.P. §§430.10(e)-(f).)

 

Request for Judicial Notice

Chase’s 1/16/24 request for judicial notice of the appellate decision Bell v. Mason (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1102, is granted.  (D-RJN, Exh. 1.)

 

Background

In 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint (“2006 Complaint”) against various defendants arising out of what she alleged was a fraudulent sale of a property located on 4th Avenue in Los Angeles.  (See D-RJN, Exh. 1).  Among other things, Plaintiff’s 2006 Complaint alleged that in 2004 “she was defrauded in the transaction wherein she sold the property for $130,000 to Shante [Mason].”  (D-RJN, Exh. 1 at pg. 5.)  Although Plaintiff prevailed at trial, in 2011 the Court of Appeal reversed and ordered that the trial court enter judgment in favor of the defendants.  (D-RJN, Exh. 1 at pg. 21.)

Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint on October 24, 2022.  Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint (“FAC”) on October 31, 2023.  Plaintiff filed another document on November 1, 2023, which the Court assumes to be a second amended complaint (“SAC”).

On January 16, 2024, Chase filed the instant demurrer.  As of the date of this hearing no opposition has been filed.

 

Summary of Demurrer

Chase demurs generally to Plaintiff’s pleading on the basis it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action and is barred by the statute of limitations.  (Demurrer, pg. 3; C.C.P. §430.10(e).)  Chase demurs specially to Plaintiff’s pleading as uncertain.  (Demurrer, pg. 3; C.C.P. §430.10(f).)

 

          Meet and Confer

Before filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.  (C.C.P. §430.41(a), emphasis added.)  A declaration must be filed with a demurrer regarding the results of the meet and confer process.  (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(3).)

Chase’s counsel’s declaration states that on January 10, 2024, she called the phone number Plaintiff had written on her pleading in an attempt to meet and confer, but found that the number was not a working phone number.  (Decl. of Yu ¶3.)  Chase’s counsel declares she sent a meet and confer letter to Plaintiff by Federal Express on January 10, 2024.  (Decl. of Yu ¶¶4-5, Exh. 1.)  Chase’s counsel declares on January 12, 2024, Plaintiff called her to meet and confer, and Plaintiff indicated she did not want to dismiss her claim against Chase.  (Decl. of Yu ¶6.)  Chase’s counsel declaration is proper under C.C.P. §430.41(a).  Accordingly, the Court will consider the instant demurrer.

 

Legal Standard

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable.  (See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].)  For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law.  (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

 

Failure to State a Claim

Fraud (1st COA)

To prevail on a cause of action for fraud, a plaintiff must plead (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.”  (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638, citations omitted.)  Claims of fraud have a particularity requirement which “necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means” the fraud was tendered.  (Id. at pg. 645.)

          Plaintiff fails to plead any facts of a fraudulent incident, including the actual property that she was allegedly defrauded of.  Moreover, Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any allegations that Chase made a misrepresentation to Plaintiff, that Chase knew that any misrepresentation was false, that Chase had an intent to defraud the Plaintiff, that the Plaintiff relied on a misrepresentation made by Chase, or that such misrepresentation led to Plaintiff’s alleged damages.  (Id. at pg. 638.)

          Further, an action for relief on the ground of fraud is subject to a 3-year statute of limitations.  (C.C.P. §338(d).)  “The cause of action in that case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts

constituting the fraud or mistake.”  (Id.)

Here, the alleged wrongdoing, if any, would have happened in 2003 at the time of the alleged sale to Shante Mason that Plaintiff claims was fraudulent. The statute of limitations for a fraud claim against Chase would have lapsed in or

around 2006, more than 15 years before Plaintiff filed the Complaint in the instant matter.

          Accordingly, Chase’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s 1st cause of action is sustained without leave to amend.

 

Conclusion

Chase’s unopposed demurrer to Plaintiff’s 1st cause of action is sustained without leave to amend.

Moving Party to give notice.

 

Dated:  February _____, 2024

                                                                            


Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court