Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 22STCV36293, Date: 2023-06-29 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV36293 Hearing Date: June 29, 2023 Dept: 71
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT
71
TENTATIVE RULING
|
ALFREDO
CONTRERAS SIERRA and CARLOS NAVA VEGA, vs. CARLTON
FORGE WORKS, et al. |
Case No.: 22STCV36293 Hearing
Date: June 29, 2023 |
Defendant
Carlton Forge Works’ demurrer to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th causes of action in
Plaintiffs Alfredo Contreras Sierra’s and Carlos Nava Vega’s complaint is sustained
as to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th causes of action with 20 days leave
to amend.
Defendant Carlton Forge Works
(“Carlton”) (“Defendant”)[1]
demurs to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th causes of action in Plaintiffs Alfredo
Contreras Sierra’s (“Sierra”) and Carlos Nava Vega’s (“Vega”) (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) complaint (“Complaint”).
(Notice of Demurrer, pg. 2.)
Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiffs’ June 7, 2023,
request for judicial notice of the Complaint in the instant matter is denied,
as the Court does not need to take judicial notice of filings in the instant
matter.
Background
On November 16, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the operative
Complaint alleging four causes of action against Defendants: (1) discrimination
in violation of Gov. Code §§12940 et seq.; (2) failure to prevent
discrimination in violation of Gov. Code §12940(k); (3) declaratory judgment;
and (4) wrongful termination in violation of public policy arising from
Plaintiffs’ employment by Defendant until the alleged terminations of
Plaintiffs’ employment. (See Complaint
¶¶19, 21, 24, 26.)
On January 9, 2023, Defendant
filed the instant demurrer. On June 7, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their
opposition. On June 22, 2023, Defendant
filed its reply.
Summary of
Allegations
Plaintiffs allege on or about August 1993, Defendants hired
Plaintiff Sierra to work as a liftman.
(Complaint ¶19.) Plaintiffs
allege Plaintiff Sierra was a full-time, non-exempt employee, and performed all
of his job duties satisfactorily before he was wrongfully terminated on or
about June 30, 2020. (Complaint ¶19.)
Plaintiffs allege at the time of Plaintiff Sierra’s termination he was 60 years
old. (Complaint ¶20.) Plaintiffs allege on or about June 30, 2020,
after 27 years of working for Defendants, Plaintiff Sierra was called into the
office by his supervisor and was told he was terminated. (Complaint ¶21.) Plaintiff Sierra alleges on information and
belief that he was terminated due to his age.
(Complaint ¶22.) Plaintiff Sierra
alleges on information and belief that Defendants only fired older employees
and kept newer, younger, and less experienced employees. (Complaint ¶23.)
Plaintiffs allege on or about
2003, Defendants hired Plaintiff Vega to work as a general laborer. (Complaint ¶24.) Plaintiffs allege Plaintiff Vega was a full-time,
non-exempt employee, and performed all of his job duties satisfactorily before he
was wrongfully terminated on or about August 1, 2020. (Complaint ¶24.) Plaintiffs allege at the time of Plaintiff
Vega’s termination he was 56 years old. (Complaint
¶25.) Plaintiffs allege on or about
August 1, 2020, after 17 years of working for Defendants, Plaintiff Vega was
wrongfully terminated. (Complaint ¶26.) Plaintiff Vega alleges on information and
belief that the was terminated due to his age.
(Complaint ¶27.) Plaintiff Vega
alleges on information and belief that Defendants only fired older employees
and kept newer, younger, and less experienced employees. (Complaint ¶28.)
Plaintiffs allege Defendants
discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiffs due solely to Plaintiffs’ age. (Complaint ¶29.) Plaintiffs allege their termination was
substantially motivated by Plaintiffs’ age and Defendants’ discriminatory
animus is evidenced by the previously mentioned facts. (Complaint ¶30.)
Plaintiffs allege as a result
of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer general
and special damages, including severe and profound pain and emotional distress,
anxiety, depression, headaches, tension, and other physical ailments, as well
as medical expenses, expenses for psychological counseling and treatment, and
past and future lost wages and benefits.
(Complaint ¶32.) Plaintiffs
allege as a result of the above, Plaintiffs are entitled to past and future
lost wages, bonuses, commissions, benefits and loss or diminution of earning
capacity. (Complaint ¶33.) Plaintiffs allege they claim general damages
for emotional and mental distress and aggravation in a sum in excess of the
jurisdictional minimum of this Court.
(Complaint ¶34.) Plaintiffs
allege because the acts taken toward Plaintiffs were carried out by officers,
directors and/or managing agents acting in a deliberate, cold, callous, cruel,
and intentional manner, in conscious disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights and in
order to injure and damage Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs request that punitive damages
be levied against Defendants and each of them, in sums in excess of the
jurisdictional minimum of this Court.
(Complaint ¶35.)
Legal Standard
A demurrer is a pleading used to test the legal sufficiency of
other pleadings, i.e., it raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or
content of the opposing party’s pleading (complaint, petition, answer, or
cross-complaint). (C.C.P. §§422.10, 589;
see Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994
[citing text]; Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388
[citing text].)
A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on
the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading
that are judicially noticeable. (Blank
v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian, 116 Cal.App.4th at
pg. 994 [citing text].)
Summary of Demurrer
Defendant demurs to
Plaintiff’s 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th causes of action because they fail to state
facts sufficient to constitute causes of action. (C.C.P. §430.10(e).)
Failure to State a Claim
Age
Discrimination in Violation of Gov. Code §12940 et seq. (1st COA)
“In
order to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination under FEHA, a
plaintiff must present evidence that the plaintiff (1) is over the age of 40;
(2) suffered an adverse employment action; (3) was performing satisfactorily at
the time of the adverse action; and (4) suffered the adverse action under
circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, i.e.,
evidence that the plaintiff was replaced by someone significantly younger than
the plaintiff.” (Sandell v. Taylor-Listug,
Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 297, 321.)
Plaintiffs allege at the time their
termination, Plaintiffs were over the age of 40, and they allege on information
and belief that Plaintiffs’ ages, being over 40, was a motivating factor in
Defendants’ decision to terminate Plaintiffs’ employment. (Complaint ¶¶20-23, 25-30, 43.) Plaintiffs allege at all relevant times
hereto, Plaintiffs were performing competently in the position
Plaintiffs
held with Defendants. (Complaint ¶41.) Plaintiffs allege Plaintiffs allege as a
result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to
suffer general and special damages, including severe and profound pain and
emotional distress, anxiety, depression, headaches, tension, and other physical
ailments, as well as medical expenses, expenses for psychological counseling
and treatment, and past and future lost wages and benefits. (Complaint ¶32.) Plaintiffs allege as a result of the above,
Plaintiffs are entitled to past and future lost wages, bonuses, commissions,
benefits and loss or diminution of earning capacity. (Complaint ¶33.) Plaintiffs allege they claim general damages
for emotional and mental distress and aggravation in a sum in excess of the
jurisdictional minimum of this Court.
(Complaint ¶34.) Plaintiffs
allege because the acts taken toward Plaintiffs were carried out by officers,
directors and/or managing agents acting in a deliberate, cold, callous, cruel,
and intentional manner, in conscious disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights and in
order to injure and damage Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs request that punitive damages
be levied against Defendants and each of them, in sums in excess of the
jurisdictional minimum of this Court.
(Complaint ¶35.)
Plaintiffs fail to allege they
suffered the adverse action under
circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, i.e.,
evidence that plaintiffs were replaced by someone significantly younger than Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege on information and belief
that Defendants only fired older employees and kept the newer, younger, and
less experienced employees. (Complaint ¶¶23,
28.) However, there are no facts to
support the claim that Defendant harbored any discriminatory animus against
Plaintiffs based on age.
Accordingly, Defendant’s
demurrer to Plaintiff’s 1st cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to
amend.
Failure to Prevent
Discrimination in Violation of Gov. Code §12940(k) (2nd COA)
A cause of action for failure
to take all reasonable steps to prevent harassment, discrimination, and
retaliation requires the following elements:
(1) plaintiff was an employee of defendant; (2) plaintiff was subjected
to discrimination/retaliation in the course of employment; (3) defendant failed
to take all reasonable steps to prevent the
harassment/discrimination/retaliation; (4) plaintiff was harmed; and (5)
defendant’s failure to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination and
retaliation was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm. (CACI 2527.)
For a private Plaintiff to
establish an actionable claim under FEHA, the private Plaintiff must also plead
and prevail on the underlying claim of discrimination, harassment, or
retaliation. (2 C.C.R. §11023(a)(2); Trujillo
v. North County Transit District (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 289 [“[T]here’s
no logic that says an employee who has not been discriminated against can sue
an employer for not preventing discrimination that didn't happen, for not
having a policy to prevent discrimination when no discrimination occurred . .
..”].) Because Plaintiffs failed to
allege a cause of action for discrimination under FEHA, their derivative cause
of action for failure to prevent discrimination also fails.
Accordingly, Defendant’s
demurrer to Plaintiffs’ 2nd cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to
amend.
Declaratory Relief (3rd COA)
Any person claiming rights
with respect to property, a contract, or a written instrument (other than a
will or trust) may bring an action for a declaration of the party’s rights or
duties with respect to another. The action may be brought before any breach
occurs of the obligation regarding which the declaration of rights is sought. (C.C.P. §1060; Market Lofts Community
Association v. 9th Street Market Lofts, LLC (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 924,
931.) However, such declaratory relief
requires the existence of an actual, present controversy between the parties
over a proper subject. (City of
Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 79.)
“A party seeking declaratory
relief must show a very significant possibility of future harm.” (Monterey
Coastkeeper v. Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 1, 13.) “Declaratory relief [serves] to set controversies at rest
before . . . wrongs are committed. Thus, the remedy is to be used to advance
preventative justice, to declare rather than execute rights.” (Id.; Kirkwood
v. California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 49, 59.) “In essence, declaratory relief operates to declare
future rights, not to address past wrongs.” (Id.; Canova v. Trustees of Imperial
Irrigation District Employee Pension Plan (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1487,
1497.)
Plaintiffs allege an actual
controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiffs and Defendants concerning
their respective rights and duties as it is believed that Defendants may allege
that they did not discriminate against Plaintiffs; that Plaintiffs were not
terminated as a result of Plaintiffs’ ages. Plaintiffs are informed and
believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendants shall dispute Plaintiffs’
contentions. (Complaint ¶58.) Plaintiffs allege pursuant to C.C.P. §1060,
Plaintiffs seeks a judicial determination of Plaintiffs’ rights and duties, and
a declaration that Plaintiffs’ age, engagement in protected activities, and/or
some combination of these protected characteristics was a substantial
motivating factor in the decision to subject Plaintiffs to the aforementioned
adverse employment actions. (Complaint
¶59.)
Plaintiffs allege a judicial
declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time under the circumstances
in order that Plaintiffs, for Plaintiffs and on behalf of employees in the
State of California and in conformity with the public policy of the State,
obtain a judicial declaration of the wrongdoing of Defendants and to condemn
such discriminatory employment policies or practices prospectively. (Complaint ¶60; Harris v. City of Santa
Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203.)
Plaintiffs allege a judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at
this time such that Defendants may also be aware of their obligations under the
law to not engage in discriminatory practices and to not violate the law in the
future. (Complaint ¶61.) Plaintiffs allege Government Code §12965(b)
provides that an aggrieved party, such as the Plaintiffs herein, may be awarded
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs: “In civil actions brought under this
section, the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party,
including the department, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, including
expert witness fees,” and such fees and costs expended by an aggrieved party
may be awarded for the purpose of redressing, preventing, or deterring
discrimination. (Complaint ¶62.)
Plaintiffs’ cause of action
for declaratory relief fails because it is a derivative claim of their 1st
cause of action for discrimination under FEHA.
Further, Plaintiffs admit they are former employees of Defendant and do
not demonstrate a risk of suffering further harm from Defendants; therefore,
Defendants fail to allege an actual, current controversy.
Accordingly, Defendant’s
demurrer to Plaintiff’s 3rd cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to
amend.
Wrongful Termination (4th COA)
“The
elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are
(1) an employer-employee relationship, (2) the employer terminated the
plaintiff’s employment, (3) the termination was substantially motivated by a
violation of public policy, and (4) the discharge caused the plaintiff
harm.” (Garcia-Brower
v. Premier Automotive Imports of CA, LLC (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 961, 973,
internal citation omitted.)
Plaintiffs
allege at all times mentioned in their Complaint, it was a fundamental policy
of the State of California that Defendants cannot discriminate and/or retaliate
against any employee on the basis of age, and/or engagement in protected
activity. (Complaint ¶65.) Plaintiffs allege on information and belief
that Plaintiffs’ age and engagement in protected activity with respect to these
protected classes, and/or some combination thereof, were factors in Defendants’
conduct as alleged hereinabove. (Complaint
¶66.) Plaintiffs allege such discrimination,
resulting in the wrongful termination of Plaintiffs’ employment on the basis of
age was a proximate cause in Plaintiffs’ damages. (Complaint ¶67.)
Plaintiffs’
cause of action for wrongful termination is derivative of the 1st cause of
action for discrimination in violation of FEHA.
Accordingly, Defendant’s
demurrer to Plaintiff’s 4th cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to
amend.
Conclusion
Defendant’s demurrer to
Plaintiffs’ Complaint is sustained as to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th causes of
action with 20 days leave to amend.
Dated:
June _____, 2023
Hon. Daniel M. Crowley
Judge of the Superior Court
[1] Defendant Precision Castparts Corp. filed the initial
motion along with Defendant Carlton Forge Works. On May 31, 2023, Defendant Precision
Castparts Corp. was dismissed from this action without prejudice.