Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 22STCV37262, Date: 2024-03-05 Tentative Ruling
All parties are urged to meet and confer with all parties
concerning this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreed-upon
resolution of their matter. If you are able to reach an
agreement, please notify the courtroom staff in advance of the hearing if
you wish to submit on the tentative ruling rather than argue the motion by
notifying the court by e-mailing the court at: SMCDept71@LACourt.org. Include
the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the Case Number in the Subject
line. In the body of the email, please provide the date and time of the
hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, and
whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant,
cross-defendant, claimant, intervenor, or non-party, etc.
Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear
at the hearing, the opposing party may still appear at the hearing and argue
the matter, and the court could change its tentative based upon the
argument. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties
in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to
argue. If you submit, but still intend to appear, include the words
"SUBMITS, BUT WILL APPEAR" in the Subject line.
If you elect to argue your matter, you are urged to do so remotely, via
Court-Connect.
If
the moving party fails to appear and/or submit to the Court’s tentative ruling,
the Court will take the matter off calendar.
Note
that once the Court has issued a tentative, the Court has the inherent
authority not to allow the withdrawal of a motion and to adopt the tentative
ruling as the order of the court.
If you
submitted a courtesy copy of your papers containing media (such as a DVD or
thumb drive), unless you request the return of the media in your papers, the
court will destroy it following the hearing of your matter.
Case Number: 22STCV37262 Hearing Date: March 5, 2024 Dept: 71
Superior
Court of California
County
of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT 71
TENTATIVE
RULING
ERICA WOHLWEND,
vs. VEGAMOUR, INC. |
Case No.:
22STCV37262 Hearing Date: March 5, 2024 |
Defendant
Vegamour, Inc.’s unopposed motion to quash Plaintiff Erica Wohlwend’s three
record subpoenas served on the Better Business granted in part and denied in
part. Plaintiff’s subpoena to BBB in
McLean, Virginia, is granted.
Defendant’s motion to quash Plaintiff’s two subpoenas to BBB in San Jose
are granted as modified with regard to Requests 1-4, and denied, but subject to
a protective order, for Requests 5-8.
Defendant Vegamour, Inc. (“Vegamour”) (“Defendant”) moves unopposed
to quash Petitioner Erica Wohlwend’s (“Wohlwend”) (“Plaintiff”) the three
Record Subpoenas (“Subpoenas”) served on the Better Business Bureau (“BBB”). (Notice Motion, pg. 2; C.C.P. §1987.1.)[1]
Background
On or about October 5, 2023,
Plaintiff served a Notice to Consumer or Employee and Objection on the
Custodian of Records for the BBB in San Jose, California. (Decl. of Sahakyan ¶3, Exh. B.) On or about October 5, 2023, Plaintiff served
a Notice to Consumer or Employee and Objection on the Custodian of Records for
the National Advertising Division of the BBB in San Jose, California. (Decl.
of Sahakyan ¶4, Exh. C.) On or about October 17, 2023, Plaintiff
served a Notice to Consumer or Employee and Objection on the Custodian of
Records for the BBB National Advertising Division in McLean, Virginia. (Decl. of Sahakyan ¶5, Exh. D.)
Defendant filed the instant
motion on October 27, 2023. As of the
date of this hearing Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.
Meet and Confer
A motion to quash shall be accompanied by a declaration
showing a “reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution of the
dispute” between the party requesting the records and the “consumer” or
“employee” whose records are involved or counsel for such person. (C.C.P. §§1985.3(g), 1985.6(f)(4).)
Defendant’s counsel, Rima A.
Sahakyan’s, declaration fails to state a “reasonable and good faith attempt at
informal resolution of the dispute.”
Defendant’s motion therefore fails to comply with C.C.P. §1985.3(g) or
§1985.6(f)(4). The Court, in its
discretion, will consider Defendant’s motion.
Motion to Quash
C.C.P. §1987.1 provides, in part:
If a subpoena
requires . . . the production of books, documents, electronically stored
information, or other things before a court, . . . the court, upon motion
reasonably made by [a party], or upon the court’s own motion after giving
counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the
subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon such terms
or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In
addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect
the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable
violations of the right of privacy of the person.
(C.C.P. §1987.1.)
A party may only discover matters, not privileged, that are
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action and that are
either admissible evidence or “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.” (C.C.P.
§2017.010.) Broad discovery requests are
not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 224-225.)
A nonparty entity located outside California cannot be
compelled by subpoena to produce records. (Boal v. Price Waterhouse & Co.
(1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 806, 810 [“Truly, if a subpoena is served on a non-party,
and requires the personal appearance of a custodian not resident in California,
other means must be resorted to secure the documents”]; see also Coopman v.
Superior Court (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 656, 660-661 [A corporate president,
who was a resident party, could not be compelled to produce business records of
his nonresident, nonparty corporation because California did not have
jurisdiction over the corporation].)
First, Plaintiff’s subpoena to BBB’s record custodian in
McLean, Virginia is not subject to this Court’s jurisdiction because BBB in
Virginia is a nonparty entity located outside of California. Second, Plaintiff’s subpoena to BBB in
Virginia is procedurally improper because it fails to check a box specifying
how the BBB in Virginia should produce the documents Plaintiff seeks. (See Decl. of Sahakyan ¶5, Exh. D at Deposition Subpoena ¶1.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s subpoena to BBB in
Virginia must be quashed.
Third, none of the
three Subpoenas are relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence because they are overbroad and lacking in specificity. Request 1 in all three Subpoenas seeks “[a]ny
and all documents regarding Vegamour, Inc. from 2018 through 2023.” (Decl. of Sahakyan, Exhs. B-D.) Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges she was employed
by Defendant from February 2021 until April 2022. (Complaint ¶¶10, 14a.) However, this request seeks documents from a
period of four years during which Plaintiff had no relationship Defendant. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s request is overbroad in time.
Moreover, the language of Request 1 lacks any specificity to Plaintiff’s
claims. By seeking “all documents
regarding” Defendant, it is unclear how such a broad request would reasonably
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence relating to Plaintiff’s narrow
claims of retaliation, breach of contract, and wrongful termination. Request 1 must be limited in time to February
2021 until April 2022.
Further, Plaintiff’s Requests 2-4 are overbroad in time and
scope. As stated above, Plaintiff’s
Complaint alleges she was employed by Defendant from February 2021 until April
2022. (Complaint ¶¶10, 14a.) However, these requests seek documents beyond
the period in which Plaintiff was employed Defendant. Request 2 must be limited in scope to
February 2021 until April 2022 for communications with employees, and Requests 3-4
must be limited in scope from 2022 to the present to account for open and
closed complaints related to the Gro Ageless product line.
However, Defendant’s objections to Requests 5-8 are not
well taken, as they directly pertain to Plaintiff’s allegations of retaliation
based on her alleged protected activities related to false advertising of the efficacy
of Gro Ageless products. (Complaint
¶¶12-13.) Further, any privileged or
confidential information sought in the requests can be subject to a protective
order. (C.C.P. §2025.420.)
Accordingly,
Defendant’s motion to quash Plaintiff’s subpoena to BBB in Virginia is granted;
Defendant’s motion to quash Plaintiff’s two subpoenas
to BBB in San Jose are granted as modified, subject to a protective order for
Requests 5-8.
Conclusion
Moving Party to give
notice.
|
Hon.
Daniel M. Crowley |
Judge of
the Superior Court |
[1] Defendant appears to request this Court quash three
separate deposition subpoenas yet combines its request in one motion. Defendant therefore owes this Court $120.00
in filing fees for the two extra motions it failed to separately file,
regardless of the case law it cites in its brief.