Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 22STCV39779, Date: 2024-01-02 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STCV39779 Hearing Date: January 2, 2024 Dept: 71
Superior
Court of California
County
of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT 71
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
SHERRY
SMITH, et al., vs. HENRY
ARCE, et al. |
Case No.:
22STCV39779 Hearing Date: January 2, 2024 |
Moving Defendants Willabee
Property Management’s, Rebecca Proo’s, Michael Proo’s,
and Joining Defendants Henry Arce’s and Elizabeth Arce’s motion to strike portions
of Plaintiffs Sherry Smith’s, Marquis Smith’s, Jeremiah
Smith’s, Faith Smith’s, Joseph Smith’s, and Nehemiah Smith’s first amended
complaint is granted with 20 days leave to
amend.
Defendants
Henry
Arce’s and Elizabeth Arce’s unopposed motion to strike
portions of Plaintiffs Sherry Smith’s, Marquis Smith’s, Jeremiah
Smith’s, Faith Smith’s, Joseph Smith’s, and Nehemiah Smith’s first
amended complaint is granted with 20 days leave to amend.
Moving Defendants
Willabee Property Management (“WPM”), Rebecca Proo (“Rebecca”), and Michael Proo
(“Michael”) (collectively, “Moving Defendants”) and Joining Defendants Henry
Arce (“Henry”) and Elizabeth Arce (“Elizabeth”) (collectively, “Joining
Defendants”) move to strike portions of Plaintiffs Sherry Smith’s (“Sherry”),
Marquis Smith’s (“Marquis”), Jeremiah Smith’s (“Jeremiah”), Faith Smith’s
(“Faith”), Joseph Smith’s (“Joseph”), and Nehemiah Smith’s (“Nehemiah”) (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) claim for punitive damages in their first amended complaint
(“FAC”), in paragraphs 6, 78, 100, 113, 122, 128, 155, and on page 25, line 22,
page 26, lines 11, 24, page 27, lines 3, 7, and 26, on the ground Plaintiffs
failed to allege facts to warrant these claims.
(Notice of MTS WPM, pg. 1; C.C.P. §435.)
Henry and Elizabeth also move
separately to strike the entire FAC, or alternatively, entire paragraphs 2, 4,
29, 41, 46, 55, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 71, 73, 77, 78, 85, 87, 92, 93, 94,
99, 100, 101, 107, 113, 118, 122, 125, 126, 128, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 139,
144, 145, 146, 147, 152, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 163, 164, 169, 170, and 171. (Notice of MTS
Arce, pg. 2; C.C.P. §§435(b)(1), 436, 437; CRC, Rule 3.1322.)
Henry and
Elizabeth also move to strike the following portions of the FAC: (1) ¶5 “each
Defendant failed and refused to take the necessary measures to make the
Property habitable and safe”; (2) ¶6 “In light of the egregious nature of
Defendants’ behavior, which can only be described as willful, oppressive, and
malicious, Plaintiffs also seek punitive damages”; (3) ¶¶15, 16 “but has failed
and/or refused to do so”; (4) ¶48 “Defendants, however, did not complete the
repairs following this conversation with the City of Hawthorne, or anytime
thereafter. Plaintiffs, as stated herein, remain in the Home”; (5) ¶50 “However,
these repair efforts were neither prompt nor, as of this filing, anywhere near
complete. Defendants’ recent remediation efforts have not addressed the
structural problems in the Home and do not diminish the damages that Plaintiffs
incurred due to living for years in the uninhabitable conditions”; (6) ¶51 “Defendants
have breached their common law and statutory duties of care by failing to
repair and maintain the Property. Defendants’ gross failure to maintain the
habitability of the Property has threatened the health and safety of Plaintiffs
and the larger community”; (7) ¶51 “the Arce Defendants directly, or through
their agents, observed and were aware of the uninhabitable and hazardous
conditions. Yet, they intentionally refused to take corrective action and
ratified their employees’, agents’, and other such representatives’ failure to take
corrective action”; (8) ¶66 “each Defendant failed and refused to take
necessary corrective measures throughout the Property”; (9) ¶84 “Defendants had
actual and constructive notice of the defective conditions alleged herein, but despite
such notice, failed to adequately repair and abate the conditions at the Property”;
(10) Prayer ¶1(e) “Punitive damages in an amount to
be proven at trial”; (11) Prayer
¶3(d) “Statutory damages of $2,000.00 for each
violation pursuant to Civil Code section 1940.2(b)”; (12) Prayer ¶3(e) “Punitive
damages in an amount to be proven at trial”; (13) Prayer ¶3(f) “Reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs as the prevailing party for breach of a covenant in
an agreement for a lease of real property under Civil Code section 3304”; (14) Prayer
¶4(d)[1] “Punitive
damages in an amount to be proven at trial”; (15) Prayer
¶5(c) “exemplary and punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial”;
(16) Prayer ¶6(b) “Punitive damages in an amount to
be proven at trial”; (17) Prayer ¶7(d) “Reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to Civil Code section 1942.4(b)(2)”; (18) Prayer ¶8(c) “Reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs,
pursuant to Civil Code section 789(c)(3)”; (19) Prayer ¶9(b) “Punitive
damages in an amount of not less than $100 nor more than $2,000 for each
retaliatory act where the lessor or agent has been guilty of fraud, oppression,
or malice with respect to that act per Civil Code 1942.5(h)”; (20) Prayer
¶9(c) “Reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to Civil Code section
1942.5(i)”; (21) Prayer ¶10(c) “Reasonable
attorneys’ fees, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, in an
amount to be determined after trial”; (22) Prayer ¶11(c) “Civil
penalty of no less than $2,000 and no more than $5,000 for each violation, pursuant
to LACC section 8.52.130.C”; (23) Prayer ¶11(d) “Reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs, at the discretion of the Court”; and (24) Prayer
¶12(b) “Reasonable attorneys’ fees, where allowed by law.” (Notice of MTS Arce,
pgs. 2-4; C.C.P. §§435(b)(1), 436, 437; CRC, Rule 3.1322.) Henry and Elizabeth move on the grounds that
the allegations in the FAC contain irrelevant, false, and improper matter, and the
conclusory language of the allegations in the FAC relative to punitive damages
is improper and not in conformity with the laws of the state of California, as
the FAC does not allege any intentional and/or despicable conduct by Defendant
as grounds for punitive damages. (Notice
of MTS Arce, pg. 4; C.C.P. §§436(a)-(b).)
Request for Judicial Notice
Moving Defendants’ 8/25/23 request
for judicial notice of the complaint, motion to strike the initial complaint,
this Court’s 6/28/23 Minute Order, and the FAC is denied, as the Court does not
need to take judicial notice of filings in the instant case.
Background
Plaintiffs filed their
initial Complaint on December 22, 2022, against Moving Defendants and Joining
Defendants (collectively, “Defendants”).
On June 28, 2023, this Court overruled Moving Defendants’ demurrer to
Plaintiff’s initial complaint and granted their motion to strike Plaintiffs’
claim for punitive damages with 30 days leave to amend. On July 27, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the
operative FAC alleging eleven causes of action: alleging eleven causes of
action: (1) negligence; (2) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (3)
breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; (4) nuisance; (5) premises
liability; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) collection of
rent for substandard dwelling; (8) constructive eviction and willful
interruption of services; (9) retaliation; (10) violation of unfair competition
law; and (11) harassment. Plaintiffs’
causes of action stem from their tenancy at a rental home located at 12117
Menlo Avenue, Hawthorne, CA 90250, APN 4046-005-021 (“Property” or “Home”). (FAC ¶1.)
1.
Moving
Defendants’ and Joining Defendants’ Motion to Strike
Procedural Background
On August 25,
2023, Moving Defendants filed the instant motion. On August 28, 2023, Joining Defendants filed
their notice of joinder to the instant motion.
On December 18, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. On October 11, 2023, Moving Defendants filed
their reply.
Meet and Confer
Before filing a motion to strike, moving
party’s counsel must meet and confer, in person or by telephone, with counsel
for the party who filed the pleading in an attempt to reach an agreement that
would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing a
motion to strike. (C.C.P. §435.5.) A declaration must be filed with the motion
to strike regarding the results of the meet and confer process. (C.C.P. §435.5(a)(3).)
Moving Defendants’ counsel declares that
on August 18, 2023, he met and conferred with Plaintiffs’ counsel by telephone
regarding the deficiencies addressed in the instant motion, and the parties
were unable to come to an agreement.
(Decl. of Minasyan ¶2.)
Therefore, Moving Defendants’ motion to strike is proper.
Legal Standard
C.C.P. §436 provides that the Court may, upon a motion made
pursuant to C.C.P. §435, or at any time within its discretion and upon terms it
deems proper, “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in
any pleading.” (C.C.P. §436(a).)
Punitive Damages
Punitive damages may be recovered upon a
proper showing of malice, fraud, or oppression.
(Civ. Code §3294(a).) “Malice” is
defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct
carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of
others. (Turman v. Turning Point of
Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct
subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the
person’s rights. (Id.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation,
deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to
deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Id.)
Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are
insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud,
or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court
(1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)
“Conduct which warrants punitive damages must be of ‘such severity
or shocking character [as] warrants the same treatment as accorded to willful
misconduct – conduct in which defendant intends to cause harm.’” (Woolstrum v. Mailloux (1983) 141
Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 10, quoting Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc.
(1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 286.)
“[C]onclusory characterization of defendant’s conduct as intentional,
willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of ‘oppression,
fraud, or malice, express or
implied,’ within the meaning of section 3294.” (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73
Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)
Plaintiffs fail to allege facts that would constitute “malice,
fraud or oppression” or would reflect “despicable conduct” on behalf of
Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants knowingly failed and refused to abate a dangerous and unhealthy
nuisance, failed to maintain the Property in a sanitary and safe condition,
threatened to evict Plaintiffs after they complained about the conditions, and
blatantly ignored government orders to comply with applicable laws, which does
not allege malice, oppression, or fraud.
(FAC ¶125; see Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979)
95 Cal.App.3d 279, 285-286 [determining carelessness, characterized as
negligence or recklessness, is not sufficient to support an award of punitive
damages].)
Plaintiffs’ three new paragraphs added in support of their claim
for punitive damages based on service of the 90-Day Notice to Quit as a
retaliatory tactic does not rise to the level of malice, oppression, or fraud,
and is conclusory in nature. (See
FAC ¶¶60-62; Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [“The
mere allegation that an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to
warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation.] Not only must there be
circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the
pleading to support such a claim.”].)
Plaintiffs argue if the Court grants any part of Defendants’
motion to strike, it should grant Plaintiffs leave to amend because they could
add greater specificity to their allegations regarding the basis for punitive
damages. (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998)
63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to strike punitive damages is
granted.
Conclusion
Moving and Joining Defendants’ motion to strike is granted with
20 days leave to amend.
Moving Party to give notice.
2.
Henry
and Elizabeth’s Motion to Strike
Procedural Background
On September 27,
2023, Henry and Elizabeth filed the instant motion. As of the date of this hearing no opposition
has been filed.
Meet and Confer
Henry and Elizabeth’s counsel declares that on August 28, 2023, he met and conferred with
Plaintiffs’ counsel by telephone regarding the deficiencies addressed in the
instant motion, and the parties were unable to come to an agreement. (Decl. of Sharifi ¶¶6-7.) Therefore, Henry’s and Elizabeth’s motion to
strike is proper.
Punitive Damages
For the
same reasons stated regarding Moving and Joining Defendants’ motion to strike
punitive damages, Henry and Elizabeth’s motion to strike punitive damages is granted.
Conclusion
Henry and
Elizabeth’s unopposed motion to strike is granted with
20 days leave to amend.
Moving Party to give notice.
Dated: January _____, 2024
|
|
|
Hon.
Daniel M. Crowley |
|
Judge
of the Superior Court |