Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 23STCP01262, Date: 2024-01-22 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23STCP01262    Hearing Date: January 22, 2024    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 71

TENTATIVE RULING

Petitioner Cynthia Randall, Trustee of the Joyce Cecile Victorian 2005 Trust’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is granted in the total amount of $28,962.37.

Petitioner Cynthia Randall, Trustee of the Joyce Cecile Victorian 2005 Trust (“Randall”) (“Petitioner”) moves for an order awarding her attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $28,962.37 against Respondent Sheldon McKinzie (“McKinzie”) (“Respondent”) as the prevailing party on her Petition to Cancel Mechanics’ Lien.  (Notice of Motion, pgs. 1-2; CRC, Rule 3.1702; Civ. Code §8488(c); C.C.P. §§1032, 1033.5.)  Petitioner seeks to recover $28,221.25 in attorneys’ fees and expenses and $741.12 in costs.  (Notice of Motion, pg. 2.)

Evidentiary Objections

Petitioner’s 1/12/24 evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Jason J. Sancen (“Sancen”) is sustained as to Nos. 1, 2, and 3.

Background

Petitioner is the owner of real property located at 2619 South Mansfield Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90016 (“Property”).  (Petition ¶5.)  On November 1, 2022, Respondent recorded a claim of Mechanics’ Lien against the Property. (Petition ¶6, Exh. 1.)  Respondent’s Mechanics’ Lien demanded the sum of $40,000 and stated that the work furnished by Respondent at the Property was “Project Consultant / Manager.”  (Petition ¶6, Exh. 1.) 

On February 21, 2023, Petitioner gave Respondent notice under Civil Code §8482 demanding that Respondent execute and record a release of the Mechanics’ Lien.  (Petition ¶10, Exh. 2.)  Respondent failed to execute a release of the Mechanics’ Lien.  (Petition ¶11.)  On April 19, 2023, Petitioner filed a verified Petition to Cancel Mechanics’ Lien seeking an order that the Property be released from the Mechanics’ Lien recorded by Respondent under Civil Code §8480.

On July 3, 2023, this Court heard Petitioner’s unopposed Petition to Cancel Mechanics’ Lien and granted Petitioner’s request for an order to release Respondent’s Mechanics’ Lien on the Property.  On July 26, 2023, this Court issued its signed order on the Petition to release the Mechanics’ Lien on the Property, stating that “Petitioner is the prevailing party on the Petition entitled to [an] award of Petitioner’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs against Respondent.”  (7/26/23 Ruling at ¶7.)  On July 26, 2023, Petitioner also filed her memorandum of costs.

On September 7, 2023, Petitioner filed this motion for attorneys’ fees.  Respondent filed his opposition on January 3, 2024.  Petitioner filed her reply on January 12, 2024.

Discussion

C.C.P. §1032 provides, in part, that “except as otherwise provided by statue, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.”  (C.C.P. §1032(b); see also Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.App.4th 599, 606; Scott Co. of California v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.App.4th 1103, 1108.)  The litigation costs that the prevailing party may recover includes attorneys’ fees when recovery of such fees is authorized by contract, law, or statute.  (C.C.P. §1033.5(a)(10).)

An award of attorneys’ fees on a petition to cancel a mechanics’ lien if the claimant has not commenced a lawsuit to foreclose said lien within the time required in Civil Code §8460 is governed by Civil Code §8488(c), which provides that “[t]he prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees.”

Here, this Court granted Petitioner’s request for an order to release Respondent’s Mechanics’ Lien on the Property.  Petitioner is the undisputed prevailing party as she has successfully obtained an order to release the Mechanics’ Lien.  Further, this Court’s July 26, 2023, order states that “Petitioner is the prevailing party on the Petition entitled to [an] award of Petitioner’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs against Respondent.”

Therefore, Petitioner is the prevailing party in this action and is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees.

Reasonable Fees

To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by the Plaintiff’s counsel. The Supreme Court of California has concluded that a reasonable hourly lodestar rate is the prevailing rate for private attorneys “conducting non-contingent litigation of the same type.”  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133, emphasis added.)

Petitioner’s Counsel declares the following hourly rates for attorneys who worked on this case: (1) Kirk Pearson ($600.00/hour); (2) Shelby Daws ($335.00/hour); (3) Timothy Mahar Jr. ($475.00/hour); (4) Taylor Hubbard ($395/hour); and (5) Ryan Davies ($535/hour).  (Decl. of Daws ¶14.)  Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated her counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable in their community of practice in their specialized area of law.  (Decl. of Daws ¶¶14-20.)

Respondent does not challenge Petitioner’s counsel’s hourly rates as unreasonable, and the Court finds Petitioner’s counsel’s rates to be reasonable and do not warrant a reduction.

Billed Hours

The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden to show “the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.”  (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

In this case, the declarations and billing records provided by Petitioner’s counsel are sufficient to meet the burden of proving the reasonableness of the claimed fees in terms of amounts and tasks. To satisfy this burden, evidence and descriptions of billable tasks must be presented in sufficient detail, enabling the court to evaluate whether the case was overstaffed, the time attorneys spent on specific claims, and the reasonableness of the hours expended.  (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486-487.)

Petitioner’s fee recovery is based on 59.9 hours Petitioner’s counsel spent to release the Mechanic’s Lien from the property, and an additional 4.6 hours preparing the instant motion and supporting declaration, anticipated fees for reviewing Respondent’s opposition, preparing a reply, and attending the hearing on the matter.  (Motion, pg. 9; Decl. of Daws ¶¶11, 13.)  The fees incurred are reasonable, as captured in the billing records submitted to this Court.  (Decl. of Daws ¶8, Exhs. 5-14.)  Petitioner’s counsel’s billing records reflect the actual time and clear descriptions of services performed in connection with litigating this case.  (Decl. of Daws ¶8, Exhs. 5-14.)   Although the submission of such detailed time records is not necessary under California law, if submitted, such records “are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

Respondent argues Petitioner failed to properly support her request for attorneys’ fees with documents evidencing the need for charging excessive fees given the lack of complexity in this case.  (Opposition, pg. 7.)  Respondent fails to object to Petitioner’s billed fees with specificity to challenge the fees as unrelated, unreasonable, duplicative, or excessive.  General arguments that time spent is excessive is an insufficient challenge on a fee motion.  (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 562.)

Accordingly, Petitioner’s billed hours were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and were reasonable in amount.

Costs

CRC, Rule 3.1700(b)(1) provides “Any notice of motion to strike or to tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum. If the cost memorandum was served by mail, the period is extended as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1013. If the cost memorandum was served electronically, the period is extended as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6(a)(4).”  (CRC, Rule 3.1700(b)(1).)

“After the time has passed for a motion to strike or tax costs or for determination of that motion, the clerk must immediately enter the costs on the judgment.”  (CRC, Rule 3.1700(b)(4).)

Petitioner filed a memorandum of costs on July 26, 2023.  Pursuant to CRC, Rule 3.1700(b)(4), the time to file a motion to strike or tax costs has passed; therefore, the clerk must enter the costs on the judgment.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for $741.12 in costs is granted.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for attorneys’ fees is granted in the total amount of $28,962.37, comprised of Petitioner’s costs in the amount of $741.12, fees in the amount of $23,311.00, and expenses in the amount of $4,910.25. 

Moving Party to give notice.

Dated:  January _____, 2024