Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 23STCP03048, Date: 2024-05-20 Tentative Ruling

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Defendant JAMS, Inc.’s motion to dismiss pro per Plaintiff Annunziata Crupi’s petition to vacate arbitration award is granted.

Defendant JAMS, Inc. (“JAMS”) (“Defendant”) moves for an order dismissing pro per Plaintiff Annunziata Crupi’s (“Crupi”) (“Plaintiff”) petition to vacate arbitration award (“Petition”) on the following grounds: (1) JAMS is not a proper party pursuant to C.C.P. §1285; (2) this Court does not have jurisdiction to vacate interlocutory arbitration rulings pursuant to C.C.P. §1283.4; (3) the doctrine of arbitral immunity bars the Petition insofar as it seeks to hold JAMS liable for actions taken in its official capacity as an adjudicator; and (4) the litigation privilege bars the Petition insofar as it seeks to hold JAMS liable for rendering the interim rulings at issue. (Notice Motion, pg. 2; C.C.P. §1285.2.)

JAMS’ 1/19/24 request for judicial notice of (1) Plaintiff’s JAMS Complaint on November 12, 2021, in JAMS Case No. 5220000062 (Exh. A); (2) Request for Removal filed by Plaintiff on June 16, 2023, in JAMS Case No. 5220000062 (Exh. B); (3) Interim Ruling regarding Plaintiff’s Request for Removal issued by Hon. Jackson Lucky on January 18, 2023, in JAMS Case No. 5220000062 (Exh. C); (4) Informal Appeal Request submitted by Plaintiff on July 19, 2023, in JAMS Case No. 5220000062 (Exh. D); and (5) Interim Ruling regarding Plaintiff’s Informal Appeal Request issued by Hon. Jackson Lucky on July 26, 2023, in JAMS Case No. 5220000062 (Exh. E), are granted.

JAMS’ 1/19/24 request for judicial notice of (1) JAMS’ Objections to Plaintiff’s Petition to Vacate filed on October 2, 2023; and (2) Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt executed by counsel for JAMS on January 9, 2024, are denied because this Court does not need to take judicial notice of filings on the instant docket.

Plaintiff’s Petition arises out of an arbitration between Plaintiff and the University of Southern California (“USC”) over which JAMS is presiding, JAMS Case No. 5220000062 (“the Underlying Arbitration.”) Plaintiff appears to take issue with two interim rulings issued by JAMS’ Hon. Jackson Lucky in the Underlying Arbitration, both of which were related to Plaintiff’s request to remove the case from JAMS.

The Underlying Arbitration, which was initiated on November 12, 2021, and is still pending, involves a whistleblower employment dispute between Plaintiff and the University of Southern California. (D-RJN, Exh. A.) Plaintiff alleges two claims against USC: (1) a claim for whistleblower retaliation in violation of Labor Code §1102.5, and (2) a claim for wrongful constructive termination.

On June 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a request to remove the case from JAMS. (D-RJN, Exh. B.) On January 18, 2023, Hon. Jackson Lucky issued a ruling denying the request for removal, finding that Plaintiff’s request failed both procedurally and substantively, in part because Plaintiff had waived her right to request removal. (D-RJN, Exh. C.) Plaintiff then informally requested an appeal of Hon. Jackson Lucky’s decision regarding removal. (D-RJN, Exh. D.) On July 26, 2023, Hon. Jackson Lucky denied the request for appeal, explaining that Plaintiff did not have a right to appeal the ruling. (D-RJN, Exh. E.)

JAMS filed the instant motion on January 19, 2024. Petitioner filed her opposition on February 8, 2024. JAMS filed its reply on May 13, 2024.

There is no statutory authority for using a motion to dismiss as a method to challenge opposing pleadings. Under the C.C.P., dismissal motions are expressly authorized only on specified grounds, including nonjoinder of necessary parties (C.C.P. §389(b)), failure to pay fees after a venue transfer order (Stasz v. Eisenberg (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1037), and delay in service of summons or prosecution of the action (see C.C.P. §§581, 583.110 et seq.).

However, several cases hold a motion to dismiss may serve the same function as a general demurrer. Despite lack of statutory authority, courts may assert their inherent judicial power to dismiss cases in which no valid cause of action or defense is stated. (See C.C.P. §581(m) [grounds stated in dismissal statute not “an exclusive enumeration of the court’s power to dismiss an action or dismiss a complaint”]; Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Board of Education (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 1, 38 [motion to dismiss the “legal equivalent of a general demurrer”].)

Courts routinely grant motions to dismiss petitions to vacate arbitration awards when the subject of the petition is not a final award. (See e.g., Cinel v. Christopher (2013) 203 Cal.App.4th 759, 767.) Therefore, this Court will consider JAMS’ motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff’s Petition is improper because it does not seek to vacate a final arbitration award. Generally, only final awards can be subject to petitions to vacate. (See C.C.P. §1283.4 [defining “award” as a “determination of all the questions submitted to the arbitrators the decision of which is necessary in order to determine the controversy”]; see also MapleBear, Inc. v. Busick (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 394, 407 [affirming trial court’s dismissal of petition to vacate “partial final award” for lack of jurisdiction because award did not address merits of the case or “essential dispute.”]

Courts have no jurisdiction over a petition to vacate an arbitration award if the ruling at issue is not a final award. (See e.g., Lonky v. Patel (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 831, 844 [stating, “whether a ruling constitutes an ‘award’ [under C.C.P. §1285] is what confers jurisdiction upon the trial courts.”] A final award is one that “resolve[s] every part of the parties’ controversy that can be resolved at the time.” (Id. at 845.) Furthermore, courts have repeatedly cautioned against permitting judicial review of interim arbitration rulings – specifically, courts have stated that it would “open the door wide to piecemeal judicial review.” (MapleBear, 26 Cal.App.5th at pg. 407; see also Lonky, 51 Cal.App.5th at pg. 844 [stating, if judicial review of interlocutory arbitration rulings was allowed, it “would slow down the dispute resolution process as the parties bounce back and forth between the arbitral and judicial fora.”]

Here, Plaintiff’s Petition is impermissibly based upon two interim rulings – specifically, an order denying Plaintiff’s request to remove the case from JAMS and an order denying Plaintiff’s subsequent informal appeal request, neither of which addressed the merits of the underlying whistleblower controversy. (D-RJN, Exhs. C, E.) These interlocutory rulings “left much of the parties’ controversy unresolved,” as the heart of the dispute was not addressed (i.e., the whistleblower retaliation and wrongful constructive termination claims.) (Lonky, 51 Cal.App.5th at pg. 846.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Petition must be dismissed.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court