Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 23STCV02746, Date: 2023-09-20 Tentative Ruling
Department 71: Attorneys who elect to submit on these published tentative rulings, without making an appearance at the hearing, may so notify the Court by communicating this to the Department's staff via the Department's email: SMCdept71@lacourt.org before the set hearing time. See, e.g., CRC Rule 324(b). All parties are otherwise encouraged to appear by LACourtConnect for all matters.
Case Number: 23STCV02746 Hearing Date: September 20, 2023 Dept: 71
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT 71
TENTATIVE RULING
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ANDY WU, vs. ABCO TECHNOLOGY, INC. |
Case No.:
23STCV02746 Hearing
Date: September 20, 2023 |
Defendant Abco Technology,
Inc.’s demurrer to
Plaintiff Andy Wu’s complaint is sustained with
20 days leave to amend as to the 3rd cause of action, and overruled as to the
1st and 2nd causes of action.
Defendant Abco Technology, Inc.
(“Abco”) (“Defendant”) demurs to Plaintiff Andy Wu’s (“Wu”) (“Plaintiff”)
complaint (“Complaint”). (Notice of
Demurrer, pgs. 1-2.)
Meet and Confer
Before filing a demurrer, the moving party must meet and
confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading to attempt
to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and
obviate the need for filing the demurrer.
(C.C.P. §430.41.)
Defendant’s counsel filed a declaration stating he met and
conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel; however Defendant’s counsel does not state
if parties met and conferred in person or by telephone. (Decl. of Hak ¶4.) Defendant’s counsel
declares the parties were unable to come to an agreement as to all of the
items in the demurrer. (See
Decl. of Hak ¶5.) In his
opposition, Plaintiff argues Defendant’s counsel fails to state that Defendant
declined to respond to Plaintiff’s counsel’s ongoing meet and confer attempts. (Opposition, pgs. 4-5.) Defendant’s counsel’s declaration is insufficient
per the requirements of C.C.P. §430.41(a). (C.C.P. §430.41(a).) However, a determination by the court that
the meet and confer process was insufficient is not grounds to overrule a
demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(b).) Therefore, the Court will consider the instant
demurrer.
Background
Plaintiff filed his operative
Complaint against Defendant on February 8, 2023, alleging three causes of
action: (1) violation of whistleblower protection pursuant to Labor Code
§1102.5; (2) violation of Labor Code §§6310, 6311; and (3) wrongful termination
in violation of public policy. Plaintiff’s causes of action stem from his
employment by Defendant as a school administrator on or about May 23, 2022,
until his termination on or about October 20, 2022. (Complaint ¶¶10,18.)
On March 14, 2023, Defendant filed the
instant demurrer. Plaintiff filed his
opposition on September 7, 2023.
Defendant filed its reply on September 13, 2023.
Demurrer
Summary of
Demurrer
Defendant demurs on the basis that Plaintiff’s 1st through 3rd causes of action
fail to state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action against Defendant
and are uncertain. (Demurrer, pgs. 3-4;
C.C.P. §§430.10(e), (b)[1].)
Legal Standard
“[A] demurrer tests the legal
sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc.
(2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A
demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the
pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially
noticeable. (See Donabedian v.
Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a
demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to
judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their
contents].) For purposes of ruling on a
demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the
reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
Failure to State a Claim
Violation of Whistleblower Protection (Lab. Code §1102.5) (1st
COA)
A cause of action for retaliation under
Labor Code §1102.5 requires the following elements: (1) defendant was
plaintiff’s employer; (2) plaintiff disclosed or defendant believed that
plaintiff had disclosed to a person with authority over plaintiff, or an
employee with authority to investigate, discover, or correct legal violations
or noncompliance; (3) plaintiff had reasonable cause to believe that the
information disclosed a violation or noncompliance with a state/federal statute
or a violation of/noncompliance with a local/state/federal rule or regulation;
(4) defendant subjected plaintiff to an adverse employment action; (5)
plaintiff’s disclosure of information was a contributing factor in defendant’s
decision to subject plaintiff to the adverse employment action; (6) plaintiff
was harmed; and (7) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing
plaintiff’s harm. (CACI 4603; see
Lab. Code §1102.5.)
“Although [the plaintiff] did not
expressly state in his disclosures that he believed the County was violating or
not complying with a specific state or federal law, Labor Code section 1102.5,
subdivision (b), does not require such an express statement. It requires only
that an employee disclose information and that the employee reasonably believe
the information discloses unlawful activity.” (Ross v. County of Riverside (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 580, 592-593; see CACI 4603.)
Plaintiff alleges on or about May 23,
2022, he began working for Defendant as a school administrator. (Complaint ¶10.) Plaintiff alleges throughout his employment, Defendant
failed to maintain appropriate office temperatures, which rendered the work
environment unsafe to be in. Indeed, temperatures would exceed 90 degrees
Fahrenheit indoors. (Complaint
¶11.) Plaintiff alleges in or about
August of 2022, he text messaged Arif Sayed (“Mr. Sayed”) that Hector (last
name unknown), Defendant’s Admissions Representative, informed Plaintiff that
it is “too hot to work” in the office and requested to work from home as an
accommodation, to which Arif instructed Plaintiff to “not [] entertain such
excuses . . . [w]e have worked in this office and they can sit next to the AC.
Previously we didn’t even have this liberty because there were classes.” (Complaint ¶12.)
Plaintiff alleges he made several
reports of unsafe working conditions to management. (Complaint ¶13.) Plaintiff alleges on or about September 7,
2022, Plaintiff slack messaged Mr. Sayed, Defendant’s Director, that “my temp
gauge is reading 89 degrees with the AC blowing directly at my back, perhaps we
can consider half day for staff? remote for rest of the day” to which Mr. Sayed
responded “I agree,” effectively acknowledging the unsafe environment at the
workplace. (Complaint ¶13.)
Plaintiff alleges on or about September
27, 2022, Bounrith Ly (“Mr. Ly”), Defendant’s Instructor of Computer Science,
notified Plaintiff that “students complaint [sic] about the room being very
hot. I will take class breaks more often to combat that.” (Complaint ¶14.) Plaintiff alleges he reported this
complaint to Mr. Sayed, to which Mr. Sayed replied by saying to run the
portable air conditioning, once again effectively acknowledging the unsafe
working conditions. (Complaint
¶14.) Plaintiff alleges Mr. Sayed
was aware of the dangerously high temperatures and lack of necessary air
condition as he repeatedly stressed to Plaintiff that the air conditioning
could not be running due to Defendant’s contract with the landlord. (Complaint ¶15.) Plaintiff alleges he not only made written
reports and complaints to Mr. Sayed, but also made numerous verbal reports and
complaints of unsafe working conditions due to excessive heat throughout his
employment with Defendant. (Complaint ¶15.)
Plaintiff alleges after numerous
complaints of unsafe working conditions went unaddressed, Plaintiff then
reported the unsafe working conditions to Defendant’s human resources
department on or about October 12, 2022.
(Complaint ¶16.) Plaintiff
alleges he mentioned that he has safety concerns and that other
students and staff have made similar reports of unsafe conditions. (Complaint ¶16.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s Human Resources
Administrator, Naseem Allana (“Ms. Allana”) responded to Plaintiff on or about
October 14, 2022, and acknowledged the excessive heat problems. (Complaint ¶16.)
Plaintiff alleges the excessive heat in
the workplace even caused Plaintiff to seek medical intervention for which his
medical professional placed him off work due to severe heat exhaustion on
several occasions and even necessitated remote work for Plaintiff from or about
October 11, 2022, until or about October 14, 2022. (Complaint ¶17.) Plaintiff alleges as a
result of his repeated reports and complaints of unsafe working conditions,
Defendant terminated his employment on or about October 20, 2022. (Complaint ¶18.)
Plaintiff alleges Defendant, among
other things, unlawfully retaliated against and terminated Plaintiff in retaliation
for Plaintiff’s report of his reasonable belief that Defendant was
non-compliant with health and safety standards, which created unsafe working
conditions and, indeed, caused Plaintiff to seek medical intervention. (Complaint ¶23.) Plaintiff
alleges his complaints were protected activities as defined under
California law. (Complaint ¶23.) Plaintiff alleges he had reasonable
cause to believe that the above disclosures all involved violations of
California law. (Complaint ¶24.) Plaintiff alleges his assertion of
his rights under Labor Code §1102.5 was a motivating reason for Defendant’s
decision to discharge Plaintiff. (Complaint
¶26.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s
conduct was a factor in causing harm to Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶27.)
Plaintiff alleges as a direct and
proximate result of Defendant’s conduct Plaintiff has lost and continues to
lose wages and work benefits caused by his discharge. (Complaint ¶28.)
Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a cause of
action for violation of whistleblower protection. Plaintiff made reports of unsafe working
conditions as “Defendant failed to maintain appropriate office temperatures,
which rendered the work environment unsafe to be in.” (Complaint ¶11; see also ¶¶15, 16, 18].
Per Ross v. County of Riverside (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 580,
Plaintiff did not need to provide “disclosures that he believed the [Defendant]
was violating or not complying with a specific state or federal law [because]
Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), does not require such an express
statement.” (Ross, 36 Cal.App.5th
at pgs. 592-593.)
Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s 1st
cause of action for violation of whistleblower protection is overruled.
Violation
of Labor Code §§6310, 6311 (2nd COA)
Labor
Code §6310
provides, in part:
(a) No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate
against any employee because the employee has done any of the following:
(1) Made any oral or written complaint to the division,
other governmental agencies having statutory responsibility for or assisting
the division with reference to employee safety or health, their employer, or
their representative.
. . .
(4) Reported a work-related fatality, injury, or illness,
requested access to occupational injury or illness reports and records that are
made or maintained pursuant to Subchapter 1 (commencing with Section 14000) of
Chapter 1 of Division 1 of Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations, or
exercised any other rights protected by the federal Occupational Safety and
Health Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 651 et seq.) . . ..
(b) Any employee who is discharged, threatened with
discharge, demoted, suspended, or in any other manner discriminated against in
the terms and conditions of employment by their employer because the employee
has made a bona fide oral or written complaint to the division, other
governmental agencies having statutory responsibility for or assisting the
division with reference to employee safety or health, their employer, or their
representative, of unsafe working conditions, or work practices, in their employment
or place of employment, or has participated in an employer-employee
occupational health and safety committee, shall be entitled to reinstatement
and reimbursement for lost wages and work benefits caused by the acts of the
employer . . ..
(Lab.
Code §§6310(a)(1), (4), §6310(b).)
Labor Code §6311
provides:
No
employee shall be laid off or discharged for refusing to perform work in the
performance of which this code, including Section 6400, any occupational safety
or health standard, or any safety order of the division or standards board will
be violated, where the violation would create a real and apparent hazard to the
employee or their fellow employees. Any employee who is laid off or discharged
in violation of this section or is otherwise not paid because the employee
refused to perform work in the performance of which this code, any occupational
safety or health standard, or any safety order of the division or standards
board will be violated and where the violation would create a real and apparent
hazard to the employee or their fellow employees shall have a right of action
for wages for the time the employee is without work as a result of the layoff
or discharge.
(Lab.
Code §6311.)
CACI 4605 provides that in order to
establish a claim under Labor Code §6310, a plaintiff must allege the
following: (1) plaintiff was an employee of defendant; (2) plaintiff, on his
own behalf or on behalf of others, made an oral complaint to Defendant
regarding unsafe working conditions or exercised his rights to workplace health
and safety; (3) defendant discharged plaintiff; (4) plaintiff’s complaint was a
substantial motivating reason for defendant’s decision to discharge plaintiff;
(5) plaintiff was harmed; and (6) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor
in causing plaintiff’s harm. (See
CACI 4605.)
With
regard to element 2, the complaint must have been made to (1) the Division of
Occupational Safety and Health, (2) to another governmental agencies having
statutory responsibility for or assisting the division with reference to
employee safety or health, (3) to the employer, or (4) to the employee’s
representative. (CACI 4605; Lab. Code
§6310(a)(1).)
Plaintiff
alleges Defendant unlawfully retaliated against and terminated him in
retaliation for his report of his reasonable belief that Defendant was
non-compliant with health and safety standards, which created unsafe working
conditions and, indeed, caused Plaintiff to seek medical intervention. (Complaint ¶33.) Plaintiff alleges his complaint was a
protected activity as defined under California law. (Complaint ¶33.) Plaintiff alleges the assertion of his rights
under Labor Code §§6310 and 6311 was a substantial motivating reason for
Defendant’s decision to retaliate against and discharge Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶34.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s
conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm to the Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶35.) Plaintiff alleges as a direct and proximate
result of Defendant’s conduct Plaintiff has lost and continues to lose wages
and work benefits caused by his discharge.
(Complaint ¶36.)
Plaintiff
sufficiently alleges a cause of action for violation of Labor Code §§6310 and
6311. Plaintiff alleges “[a]fter
numerous complaints of unsafe working conditions went unaddressed, Plaintiff
then reported the unsafe working conditions to Defendant’s human resources
department on or about October 12, 2022. Plaintiff mentioned that he has safety
concerns and that other students and staff have made similar reports of unsafe
conditions.” (Complaint ¶16.) Plaintiff alleges “the excessive heat in the workplace
even caused Plaintiff to seek medical intervention for which his medical
professional placed him off work due to severe heat exhaustion on several
occasions and even necessitated remote work for Plaintiff from or about October
11, 2022, until or about October 14, 2022.”
(Complaint ¶17.) Plaintiff
alleges “[a]s a result of Plaintiff’s repeated reports and complaints of unsafe
working conditions, Defendant terminated his employment on or about October 20,
2022.” (Complaint ¶18.)
Accordingly,
Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s 2nd of action for violation of Labor Code
§§6310 and 6311 is overruled.
Wrongful
Termination in Violation of Public Policy (3rd COA)
“The
elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are
(1) an employer-employee relationship, (2) the employer terminated the
plaintiff’s employment, (3) the termination was substantially motivated by a
violation of public policy, and (4) the discharge caused the plaintiff harm.” (Garcia-Brower
v. Premier Automotive Imports of CA, LLC (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 961, 973,
internal citation omitted.)
“Labor
Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b), which prohibits employer retaliation
against an employee who reports a reasonably suspected violation of the law to
a government or law enforcement agency, reflects the broad public policy
interest in encouraging workplace ‘whistleblowers,’ who may without fear of
retaliation report concerns regarding an employer’s illegal conduct. This
public policy is the modern day equivalent of the long-established duty of the
citizenry to bring to public attention the doings of a lawbreaker. [Citation.]”
(Ferrick v. Santa Clara University
(2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1355.)
“To
establish a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, an
employee must prove causation. (See CACI 2430 [using phrase ‘substantial
motivating reason’ to express causation].) Claims of whistleblower harassment
and retaliatory termination may not succeed where a plaintiff ‘cannot
demonstrate the required nexus between his reporting of alleged statutory
violations and his allegedly adverse treatment by [the employer].’” (Id.)
Plaintiff
alleges at all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was employed by
Defendant. (Complaint ¶38.) Plaintiff alleges at all times relevant to
this action, Labor Code §1102.5 and Government Code §§12900 et seq. were in
full force and effect and were binding upon Defendant. (Complaint ¶39.) Plaintiff alleges these sections, inter
alia, require Defendant to refrain from retaliating against and terminating any
employee on the basis of making a complaint regarding a good faith belief of an
unlawful activity, unsafe working conditions, unsafe working practices, and
opposition to conduct related thereto, as previously pled herein. (Complaint ¶39.)
Plaintiff
alleges Defendant’s conduct as previously alleged was in retaliation for
Plaintiff’s assertion of rights under Labor Code §1102.5 and Government Code §§12900
et seq. (Complaint ¶40.) Plaintiff alleges his assertion of his rights
under Labor Code §1102.5 and Government Code §§12900 et seq. was a substantial
motivating reason for Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶41.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s
conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm to Plaintiff as set forth
herein. (Complaint
¶41.) Plaintiff alleges
Government Code §§12900 et seq. evinces a policy that benefits society at
large, was well-established at the time of Plaintiff’s discharge. (Complaint ¶42.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s
wrongful termination of Plaintiff's employment was substantially motivated by
making a complaint regarding a good faith belief of an unlawful activity, unsafe
working conditions, unsafe working practices, and opposition to conduct related
thereto, as previously pled herein.
(Complaint ¶43.)
Plaintiff
alleges as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s actions, Plaintiff has
suffered and continues to suffer losses in earnings and other benefits and will
for a period of time in the future be unable to obtain gainful employment, as
his ability to obtain such employment and earning capacity have been
diminished. The exact amount of such expenses and losses is presently unknown,
and Plaintiff will seek leave of court to amend this complaint to set forth the
exact amount when it is ascertained. (Complaint ¶44.)
Plaintiff alleges as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s
conduct, Plaintiff suffered general damages, as he was psychologically injured.
(Complaint ¶45.) Plaintiff alleges such injuries
have caused and continue to cause Plaintiff great mental pain and suffering. (Complaint ¶45.) Plaintiff alleges as a direct and proximate
result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff, for a period of time in the future,
will be required to employ physicians and incur additional medical and
incidental expenses. (Complaint ¶46.)
Plaintiff
alleges on information and belief that the actions of Defendant’s employees,
officers, directors, and/or managing agents were undertaken with the prior
approval, consent, and authorization of Defendant and were subsequently
authorized and ratified by it as well by and through its officers, directors,
and/or managing agents. (Complaint
¶48.)
Plaintiff concedes Defendant is correct in its position that Plaintiff
relied on Government Code §12900, to support the violation of public policy
prong. (Opposition, pg. 10.) Plaintiff concedes he mistakenly alleged the
said Government Code, instead of alleging Labor Code §§1102.5, 6310, and 6311,
in his pleading. Plaintiff is willing to
amend his complaint to clarify as such.
Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s 3rd cause of
action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.
Uncertainty
A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the
complaint is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., he or she
cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what
counts or claims are directed against him or her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of
California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)
If the complaint contains enough facts to apprise defendant of the
issues it is being asked to meet, failure to label each cause of action is not
ground for demurrer: “Although inconvenient, annoying and inconsiderate, the
lack of labels . . . does not substantially impair [defendant’s] ability to
understand the complaint.” (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986)
185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 n.2.)
Where a demurrer is made upon this ground, it must distinctly
specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain, and where such
uncertainty appears (by reference to page and line numbers of the
complaint). (See Fenton v. Groveland Community Services District
(1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809.)
Defendant fails to specify where the uncertainty appears by
reference to page line and numbers in the complaint. (See id.)
Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer on the basis of uncertainty is
overruled.
Conclusion
Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s 3rd causes
of action in his Complaint is
sustained with 20 days leave to amend.
Defendant’s demurrer to
Plaintiff’s 1st and 2nd causes of action is overruled.
Moving Party to give notice.
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Hon. Daniel M. Crowley |
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Judge of the Superior Court |
[1] Defendant demurs on the basis of uncertainty, citing
C.C.P. §430.10(b). However, a
demurrer on the basis of uncertain pleadings is made pursuant to C.C.P. §430.10(f).
C.C.P. §430.10(b) is an objection on the basis that the person who filed
the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue.